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practice. AHJ embraces all subject matter related to accounting
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historical perspective on contemporary accounting issues.
Authors may find the following guidelines helpful.
1. Authors should provide a clear specification of the research
issue or problem addressed and the motivation for the study.
2. Authors should describe the method employed in the research, indicating the extent and m a n n e r in which they intend
to employ the methodology. Manuscripts are encouraged that
draw on a variety of conceptual frameworks and techniques,
including those used in other social sciences.
3. Manuscripts that rely on primary sources should contain a
statement specifying the original materials or data collected or
analyzed and the rationale used in selection of those source
materials. Authors should provide the reader information as to
how these source materials may be accessed.
4. Authors who use a critical or new theoretical framework to
examine prior historical interpretations of the development of
accounting thought or practice should include a discussion of
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and take adequate account of the social, political, and economic
contents of the time period examined and of other environmental factors.
6. While historians have long debated the ability to assign causation to particular factors, we encourage authors to address
and evaluate the probable influences related to the problem or
issue examined.
7. Authors should clearly state all their interpretations of results, and the conclusions they draw should be consistent with
the original objectives of and data used in the study. Interpretations and conclusions should be clearly linked to the research
problem. Authors also should state the implications of the study
for future research.
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THE TELLING POWER OF CCA —
A NEW ZEALAND ORAL HISTORY
Abstract: This report presents results of research on the failure of
the inflation accounting standard in New Zealand. Presentation of
the results in three narratives highlights that any such research is a
series of interlocking and overlapping events, and that narrative is a
direct and efficient means of communicating both causal and transactional components which contributed towards the outcomes. Isolation of the three narratives was chosen to demonstrate that it is
not useful to extol an explanatory or interpretative paradigm for
accounting history if it is advocated at the expense of sequential
accounts of events.

To undertake an oral history project in accounting is to be
immersed in narratives of those to whom the microphone is
directed. As researchers listen and then transcribe, they imbue
resonances and drama, even trauma, from accounting events as
experienced by their group of interviewees, to the point when
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debate on narrative and counternarrative [Funnell, 1998] seems
unrelated to the day-to-day problems of recording, transcription, analysis, and writing up. However, acting on the proposal
by Funnell [1998, p. 144] that "to comprehend the constitutive
effect of the narrative is to open the prospect for liberation
from our sanctioned and settled past," the following report of
this oral history research project was isolated into three narratives. The separation illuminates the constitutive power of narrative in accounting history and, from such illumination, an
advocacy of the utility and role of narrative.
One aspect of narrative analyses in literary studies is the
identification of hegemonic forces which influence, shape, and
order the meanings of events and the m a n n e r of remembrance.
There are exemplary studies in other disciplines, such as the
analysis by Landau of "Human Evolution as Narrative" [1984]
in which was presented an analysis of narrative used in accounts of h u m a n evolution, utilizing established methods of
analysis of folk stories. Just as explanations of h u m a n evolution
inevitably utilize narrative and can be analyzed using literary
methods, so also research histories can be analyzed as struggles
for success, with both malevolent and benevolent powers driving events outside the control of individuals.
In this case of the debate about current cost accounting
(CCA) and the introduction of "inflation accounting standards,"
the hegemonic process is one whereby the interests of other
groups (account preparers and users) are coordinated with
those of the dominant group. However, hegemony, as a social
process, is continually resisted, limited, altered, and challenged
[Brow, 1990, p. 1]. The failure of the CCA standard is one example of such resistance; ultimately, it delineated limitations
on the standard-setters' power. It is inevitable to the normative
nature of standard setting that the process should produce
standards which could fail. A failure in the standard-setting
process can be clearly understood when a narrative structure
identifies the significance of different events in the process of
resistance and change. Added to this are the perceptions of
those involved who, with the benefit of hindsight and contemplation, provide their own accounts of the failure which provides an understanding of events different from analyses of the
causes of failure based on reasons in company reports.
THE FIRST NARRATIVE: THE RESEARCH PROJECT
The first narrative relates the story of the research, why
and
it was
Published by how
eGrove,
1999developed and the methods used. This introduc-
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tion ensures that other scholars may gain sufficient information
not only to judge the results of the research but also to apply or
extend these methods if they are deemed beneficial.
The failure of the CCA standard was chosen as an oral
history subject because the 1982 promulgation of the CCA
standard was rejected on a scale unprecedented within New
Zealand's generally "obedient" accounting community.
The failure of current cost accounting standards has been
subject to scrutiny elsewhere. For U.K. events see Tweedie and
Whittington [1984] and Pong and Whittington [1996], while a
summary of continuing developments in Australia in the use of
current value accounting is provided by Jones and Love [1995].
Compliance with the standard in New Zealand was less
than ten percent of listed company reports over the two to three
years of financial reports studied [Peterson et al., 1984]. Unlike
other countries, the resistance was not so m u c h from practitioners as m u c h as companies and their boards, largely attributed at the time to the lack of acceptability for tax purposes
[Peterson et al., 1984]. Eventually, in October 1985, the standard was dropped. It went out with a whimper, not a bang; yet,
these events still continue to impact the development of accounting in New Zealand.
The resonance of this event is such that it is ideally suited
for oral h i s t o r y r e s e a r c h . J u s t as t h e orally t r a n s m i t t e d
whakapapa of the Maori 1 in New Zealand are not so m u c h genealogies as records of events and people whose resonance continued for m u c h time, so this event, the demise of the CCA
standard, has affected and continues to impact the development
of accounting. Oral histories have the capacity to pick up such
resonances, as in this case where the recall of events is filtered
through the current consciousness of the participants ten years
after the events.
Debate concerning the merits and problems with oral history methods are a well-trammelled ground for historians over
the last two decades. Since a 1991 review of the potential for
oral history in accounting [Collins and Bloom, 1991], there
have been other advocates of the merits of this method in accounting research. For example, oral history is advocated because it is a dynamic process which creates evidence about the
past and allows undocumented perspectives to emerge [Tyson,

1

Whakapapa are Maori genealogies relating individuals to various tribes
and/or ancestors.
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1996, p. 2]. Because it provides insights into how people felt
about what happened and focuses on individual experiences,
reactions, and aspirations, this approach enables participants,
rather t h a n historians, to reconstruct past events [Allen and
Montell, 1981, p. 20; H a m m o n d and Sikka, 1996, p. 79; Thompson, 1988, p. 99] and addresses the problem of belief transference by the historian [Merino and Mayper, 1993, p. 244; Tyson,
1996, p. 2]. The multiplicity of experiences of individuals involved in an event such as the CCA debate challenges simple
causal explanations for the failure of the standard. H a m m o n d
and Sikka [1996, p. 81] described the potential of oral history
was to show that "history is a lived experience which is full of
contradictions, contestation and unforseen consequences."
Nevertheless, the merits of the methodology are still debated, especially the subjective nature of the testimonies, because they are complex cultural products [Edwards, 1993, p.
28]. Specifically, the memory of past events may be subject to
biased reinterpretation, selective retention, or innocent amnesia. In addition, the context in which the interview is undertaken is very important to the perspective supplied. "We who
use life stories need to understand . . . they always have to be
structured, according to known conventions, in order to convey
the desire . . . of this teller to present a self to the listener, at
this particular moment" [Tonkin, 1990, p. 34].
It is not the purpose of this report to review fully the merits
and disadvantages of this method. Suffice it to note that the
oral history approach requires a conscious trade-off between
the potential and the problems in such a method, given the time
available and the opportunities presented in the ongoing research process. In this case, the research began in August 1993.
Assistance from the Oral History Section of the National Library of New Zealand included the Fyfe and Manson [1991]
guide, Oral History and How to Approach It, the ethical code
established by the National Oral History Association of New
Zealand, the legal release form, and the interviewee information sheet which has to accompany any tape deposited in the
archives. The use of a legal release form at the start of each
interview was particularly i m p o r t a n t as it r e m i n d e d interviewees that their agreements m e a n t tapes and transcripts
would move into the public domain. All interviewees signed this
form unconditionally although the form does allow for conditions on release if required.
An initial approach was made to those who were considered to be most cognizant of these events. Of the ten men iniPublished by eGrove, 1999

13

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 26 [1999], Iss. 1, Art. 15
Baskerville: Telling Power of CCA

5

tially approached or corresponded with, two did not reply. A
lengthy communication with one potential interviewee, who
considered that the research should focus only on technical
aspects of CCA, resulted in his declining the interview for the
proposed subject matter of this project. After starting the interviews, four more interviewees were approached, resulting in
eleven interviews between August 1993 and February 1994 (see
Appendix A). The length of interviews varied, most being approximately one hour.
It can be observed from Appendix A that the standard setters and academics interviewed formed a homogeneous group
of New Zealand pakeha2 males. This project did not attempt to
seek responses from rank-and-file practitioners or from corporate financial controllers. Although one of the strengths of oral
history is its capacity to allow other voices (especially of minority groups) to be heard [Hammond and Sikka, 1996, p. 79], this
would have resulted in a m u c h extended field of inquiry.
The objective of this project, as described in the letters to
interviewees requesting their participation, was to use oral history techniques in order to contribute to the historical record of
the CCA debate in New Zealand; in particular, asking about
recollections or reminiscences of the events surrounding the
dropping of the CCA standard and how this debate revealed
aspects of the relationship between practitioners and accounting standard-setting authorities between 1975 and 1985. The
emphasis in the research shifted to the first objective as there
was little interest by interviewees in the second objective. Comments in response to the questions concerning the second objective were perfunctory or disinterested.
The questions asked of each interviewee were:
1.

What events before the standard was promulgated indicated that there might be considerable noncompliance?
What key events caused the withdrawal?
Do you think CCA as an accounting standard is likely to be
resurrected during other periods of inflation?

2.
3.

2

This term means a white/Caucasian New Zealander. The uniformity of
the gender, race, and status of the subjects meant those interviewed all provided a sense that they were m e n living their lives "as their own." This emphasis is widely recognized by oral historians; for example, in Bertaux-Wiame's
[1982, p . 193] study, she noted it was from their work that m e n derive their
sense of identity, and present themselves "as the subjects of their own lives —
as the actors . . . in contrast with men's accounts, women will not insist on
what they have done; but rather on what relationships existed between themselves and persons close to them."

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/15
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What was the impact on the status of the profession?
What does this event tell us about what users want from
financial statements?

Interviews progressed in a relatively unstructured manner.
Sometimes after termination the interviewees would move on
to personal reminiscences or memories of different individuals
involved and subsequent events in their lives. In other cases, the
interviewees would answer largely on the basis of questions
asked, choosing not to recall or comment on issues they did not
consider within the scope of the questions.
Following the copying and transcription of all tapes, a copy
of the interview was sent to each interviewee with a progress report in August 1994. Master copies were lodged with a
copy of transcripts and a project report in the Oral History
Archives in Wellington, New Zealand upon completion of the
research.
The most effective method of analysis was utilization of a
"cut-and-paste" method, facilitated by holding data in multiple
files on a computer with duplication marked carefully. This cutand-paste into 16 topics reduced the 53,000 plus words in the
transcripts to about 23,000 words. The responses were then
reanalyzed to identify commonalities, differences, or particular
phrases which clearly illustrated responses to the topics.
The analysis of the transcripts was an emergent, evolving
process because as segments were identified within the data,
different connections between segments became apparent. The
researcher had to reread transcripts, given the new information
and new structures which were emerging within the data. Sorting and sifting led to seemingly interesting and meaningful discoveries. This process could continue ad infinitum in the absence of constraints in regards to money, time, or energy.
During the interviews, the interviewees raised related issues
including the international context, price controls, the price
freeze, inflation rates, the achievements and quality of the
Richardson Report, the personality of the prime minister (Sir
R. D. Muldoon), the "Waikato Project," 3 and the New Zealand
Society of Accountants Awards for Annual Reports.
It is apparent that some other questions could have been
used as a starting point. For example, the question "Why was

3
The Waikato Project on Inflation Accounting published purchasing
power and price indices, as well as providing education series for practitioners
and new graduates.
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CCA developed in the first place?" might have given a different
emphasis to their perceptions concerning why the standard was
eventually withdrawn. However, the original objective of the
research was to apply theories addressing the issue of the effect of withdrawal of a standard on the legitimation of the
profession through its standard-setting process. The emphasis
was not on the technical aspects of current value accounting.
During analysis it became apparent that the differences between the New Zealand and U.K. events were of significance.
The thesis topic changed from an initial single objective to two
foci — (1) an examination of the similarities and differences
between the attributed causes of the failure of the CCA standard from research at the time, compared with the attributed
causes from the oral history record; and (2) a comparison of the
differences between U.K. and New Zealand events. The resulting thesis was completed by the end of 1994.

THE SECOND NARRATIVE: THE CONSTRUCTION AND
WITHDRAWAL OF THE CCA STANDARD
A shared characteristic of the second and third narratives is
the objective to "gather the data and present them in such a
m a n n e r that 'the informants speak for themselves'" [Strauss
and Corbin, 1990, p. 21]. The resulting presentation of chunks
of transcript inserted into text allows to every degree possible
the spontaneous and meaningful ways in which the interviewees' memories were expressed.
The second narrative commenced a considerable time before the research started in 1993. In 1967, the Consumer Price
Index in New Zealand started to record annual changes over
4%, the s t a r t of a long period of steadily increasing inflation. It
did not fall below this level again until 1991. The start of the
CCA project was linked in interviewees' minds to this inflation
of price indices. The rapid increase was considered to be the
driver behind efforts which led to the promulgation of the
standard, and a subsequent perceived decrease was considered
(by some people) the cause of its failure. Eventually, the Consumer Price Index in New Zealand increased from 6-7% per
a n n u m in 1970 to 17% in 1980.
A n u m b e r of countries p u b l i s h e d C u r r e n t P u r c h a s i n g
Power (CPP) proposals throughout the 1970s. In Australia, the
Current Value Accounting exposure draft was based on revaluation to replacement cost. When inflation rose sharply in the
U.S. in the 1970s, the Securities and Exchange Commission and
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/15
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the Financial Accounting Standards Board in SFAS 33 required
supplementary statements, comprising a "real terms" mixture
of replacement cost and purchasing-power data. In January
1974, the U.K. Sandilands Committee was appointed, reporting
back on inflation accounting in June 1975. In the U.K., the
deliberations of the Morpeth Committee resulted in the development by the Accounting Standards Committee of ED 18,
eventually promulgated as SSAP 7.
ED 10, Accounting for the Changes in the Purchasing Power
of Money, was the first exposure draft published by the New
Zealand Society of Accountants (NZSA) in March 1975. The
draft was largely based on the U.K. SSAP 7 and similarly recommended the CPP approach. Inflation was over 10% per ann u m in New Zealand between 1975 and 1988, with the exception of the years in which the government initiated a price
freeze (mid-1982-1984). In March 1976, an analysis of the responses to ED 10 was published in the New Zealand Accountants Journal. It was clear that the vast majority of res p o n d e n t s were o p p o s e d to CPP, w i t h s o m e r e s p o n d e n t s
preferring to wait and see what was going to happen overseas.
Others urged that more research should be undertaken in New
Zealand or suggested there would be confusion over presenting
two sets of financial statements to shareholders, as required by
ED 10. Overall, the CPP method was seen as being seriously
deficient although many agreed that it was a step in the right
direction.
The National Party in New Zealand won the 1975 elections
under the leadership of Rob Muldoon, who was duly declared
prime minister. Muldoon was particularly remembered for being of strong character, and the significance of his opposition
to attempts to establish the CCA standard for taxable income
measurement after the standard as promulgated was frequently
mentioned by interviewees because he was an accountant and
had given support to efforts in the 1970s to develop a form of
inflation accounting.
ED 14, Accounting in Terms of Current Costs and Values,
published in March 1976, recommended that assets should be
shown in the balance sheet at their "value to the business," and
profit should be the result of matching costs with revenues,
both expressed in current terms.
The Americans . . . experimented by having some of the
big companies disclose the current values of their assets and, in other words, I think they probably had a
very
sensible
Published by eGrove,
1999 approach in that they tried to do it incre-
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mentally. Whereas we tried to do it, not only us, but
the U.K. and to some extent Australia, tried to go in
boots and all; whereas they just said 'No, let's experiment with the valuation, you disclose the current values of your assets,' and I think it just became more
apparent that that was a stumbling block. It is a very
basic one [Frank Devonport]. 4
In September 1976, the Richardson Committee, a committee appointed by the National Government, released the Report
of the Committee of Inquiry into Inflation Accounting. Considering CPP, CCA, and Continuously Contemporaneous Accounting
(CoCoA), the report recommended that some form of CCA be
required. The inflation rate was then close to 17%. In December
that year, the prime minister pledged support for the Waikato
Inflation Accounting Research Project. The project was ext e n d e d to t r a i n potential and new employees (accounting
graduates) of 120 companies in different "inflation accounting"
methods.
Throughout 1977 and 1978, the NZSA increased its involvement in "inflation accounting" education through publications
in the Accountants Journal and by offering seminars on CCA in
May 1977. However, it was not until December 1978 that GU 1,
Supplementary Financial Statements in Terms of Current Costs
and Values, was published by the NZSA. GU 1 followed the
Richardson Report recommendations very closely.
Parallel to these events was the publication of "inflation
accounting" standards elsewhere — SFAS 33, Financial Reporting and Changing Prices, was promulgated in the U.S. in 1979,
and in 1980 SSAP 16, Current Cost Accounting, was promulgated in the U.K. In New Zealand there were signs of resistance
to change and concern with the immediate effects of CCA on
company profits and taxation revenue.
At the end of 1980, there was a plea by the chairman of the
Accounting and Research Standards Board, Malcolm McCaw,
to members of the NZSA to maintain the commitment to developing a CCA standard. He said, "despite uncertainty in the
problems of transition it was essential for the Society to take a
firm step in the interests of the public, investors and those who
protected investors" [McCaw, 1980, p. 40]. Members were also
reminded that many accountants now considered that historic

4

Readers are referred to Appendix A for a description of the careers of the
interviewees.
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cost accounts were not sufficient to satisfy legal requirements
for a "true and fair view."
In response to GU 1, ED 25, Current Cost Accounting, was
prepared. Although it was very similar to the recommendation
of the Richardson Report and to the U.K. SSAP 16, a major
difference compared with SSAP 16 occurred in the calculation
of the gearing adjustment which took into account revaluation
surpluses on fixed assets.
Seven months later in March 1982, CCA 1, Information Reflecting the Effects of Changing Prices, was published by the
NZSA. It was almost identical to ED 25 and followed the U.K.
SSAP 16 in almost all respects excepting the composition of
monetary working capital and the current cost reserve items to
which the gearing adjustment was to be applied.
The awareness of the levels of noncompliance led to the
offering of a one-day series of workshops and the distribution
of a 20-minute video distributed through the NZSA. However,
in the first major analysis of 147 companies with a financial
year ending around March 1983 [Peterson et al., 1984], there
was only an 8.2% compliance rate. A further study [Cameron
and Heazlewood, 1985] noted an 8.6% compliance rate with
CCA 1 in the reports of 185 companies for reporting periods
ending between the end of March 1983 and February 1984. The
price freeze through price controls was continued for only a
few months after the Labour Party won the election in July
1983. Inflation rates during the freeze had been 6-7%. Inflation
rose again to 13-15% for three years before the sharemarket
"crash" in October 1987.
Two years later in October 1985, the NZSA decided that the
"standard" status of CCA 1 should be dropped, and that it
should be reduced in status to "recommended best practice." In
the U.K., SSAP 16 was also made nonmandatory. ED 38, Accounting for the Effects of Changing Prices, was developed to
replace ED 35 in the U.K., but eventually was not formally
issued. SFAS 33 was being reassessed in the U.S.
It's very difficult for a country, both for the profession
internationally and for the Government, to go down
one path where everyone else is standing still, or going
off somewhere else. . . . It's not a field in which New
Zealand can go it alone [Sir Ivor Richardson].
This narrative of the events indicates standard setting was
seen as a process whereby those controlling the standard setting wished to achieve a public good by improving financial
Published by eGrove, 1999
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reporting, but lost their "battle" because of factors beyond their
control, such as international events.
I think we did a better job than any of the other countries. The English, Scots had got sorely embarrassed by
their weak-kneed approach to the whole thing, they
lost the vote and so on and they couldn't even control
their own members. . . . The Australians never covered
themselves with glory at any stage. They probably were
rather pragmatic I suppose, they were aware that there
was no great enthusiasm out there in the profession,
certainly not amongst the companies, the companies
are the last people that wanted to be saddled with current cost accounting. . . . The Australians really fooled
around with it and didn't do a great deal [Rex Anderson].
New Zealand provided a scenario which was alternatively
described as being "an experimental niche" or "we couldn't do it
alone," typical of a cultural ambivalence c o m m o n to many aspects of New Zealand cultural or intellectual developments. It
became apparent in the process of the research that the drivers
to the rise and withdrawal of the New Zealand standard were
far more influenced by international events than indicated by
company reports in that period.
These drivers were different from those identified for the
U.K., w h e r e the rise in domestic inflation triggered w h a t
Mumford [1979, p. 98] described as a five-year cycle of events,
ending with a reduction in domestic inflation and interest in
reform dwindling. In the U.S., SFAS 33 had required supplementary disclosures to reflect CCA, but did not require a revised balance sheet. There were disagreements in the U.S. concerning t h e t r e a t m e n t of m o n e t a r y i t e m s a n d c o n t i n u i n g
opposition from practitioners. Inflation had fallen to 3.2% in
1983 [Kirkman, 1985, p. 37], and the promised review after five
years did not eventuate.
THE THIRD NARRATIVE: CAUSES OF THE FAILURE
OF THE CCA STANDARD
The third narrative is focused on the construction of a description of similarities and differences between the attributed
causes of the failure of the CCA standard in research in published articles at the time, compared with the attributed causes
from the oral history record. This comparison of the two
sources demonstrates that utilization of oral history methods
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/15
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provides a valuable and unique perspective which contrasts
with that provided from analyses of written data and company
reports.
The Account of Causes of Failure in Published Articles: There
were two initial studies of annual reports to identify the attributed causes of noncompliance. Peterson et al. [1984] evaluated
the response to CCA 1 after the publication of 147 major corporate annual reports for the next reporting period ending on or
after March 31, 1983. This study followed the adoption of the
standard by the NZSA in 1982. Of these 147 companies, only
8.2% published supplementary current-cost accounts. Cameron
and Heazlewood [1985] also analyzed reports for all accounting
periods commencing on or after April 1, 1982 (totaling 185
listed companies) and found an overall compliance rate of
8.6%. The major reasons given for the lack of adoption of CCA
in these research investigations were:
1.

2.

3.

4.

The benefit of CCA was questioned. This reason was variously stated: "served little practical or useful purpose," "not
warranted, confusing, misleading, not cost/beneficial, was
inappropriate," "gave no meaningful information." This
reason was cited by 49% of companies in the Cameron and
Heazlewood [1985] study and 27% in Peterson et al. [1984].
There was subjectivity and complexity in CCA according to
3 1 % of the companies studied by Cameron and Heazlewood and 24% in Peterson et al. CCA was seen as lacking
understandability and not enhancing comparability. The
use of price indices and multiple alternative approaches
was seen as confusing.
CCA was not mandatory, was not recognized for tax or
pricing purposes, and was not a Stock Exchange requirement. 2 1 % of reports in both the Cameron and Heazlewood
and the Peterson et al. studies suggested it was being ignored because it did not have legal, fiscal, or economic
validity.
There was a failure by other public companies to follow the
standard, a reason indicated in the Freightways Report
[Peterson et al., 1984, p. 90].

In only one case in the Peterson et al. [1984] survey did a
company mention that the system was not relevant because of
the "declining" inflation rate, while 3 of the 72 companies
in the Cameron and Heazlewood study [1985] noted this reason
for noncompliance. The artificial decline in the inflation rate
Published by eGrove, 1999
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was caused by the wage and price freeze. Further details of the
Cameron and Heazlewood results are provided in Appendix B.
Peterson et al. [1984, p. 91] found it "difficult to accept that
the reasons mentioned are valid ones for failure to comply with
the standard." In their view, the primary reason was that CCA
results in a reduction in reported profits, thus negatively affecting share prices and terms of loan finance. This view was substantiated by comments from the oral history interviews which
indicated that management did not want to be seen in a bad
light. For example, Bob Pope observed, "There were others who
did not like it because it did in fact portray a m u c h poorer
result in most cases."
The results of these two studies were supplemented by
Wong's 1988 research into 15 New Zealand companies which
utilized CCA to provide supplementary information to the financial accounts during the period from 1977-1981 (i.e., while
CCA was voluntary). These entities showed higher effective tax
rates, lower leverage, larger market capitalization, and more
capital intensity. All these results are consistent with positivist
theories which focus on incentives to change accounting policies.
Reviewing the causes of noncompliance, Cowan [1985, p.
52] divided the opinions of the accounting profession into two
groups, those who thought CCA was now a lost cause and those
who attributed its failure to lack of support from others inside
and outside the profession. He attributed the noncompliance to
the following factors:
1.

2.

3.

The proposals were not successful because New Zealand
had not considered an independent "locally developed" solution but had tried to improvise from methods of accounting for inflation advocated in other jurisdictions [Cowan,
1985, p. 53].
There were frustrated hopes as some preparers anticipated
that they would initially provide supplementary information using CCA rather t h a n replacing historic-cost-based
financial reports. Subsequently, when CCA was proven to
be a fully workable standard, it would then replace the
modified historic-cost basis. The lack of compliance frustrated this objective [Cowan, 1985, p. 53].
The NZSA had failed to appreciate its role in mediating
between theoretical or academic purists, and there were
constraints experienced by practitioners in applying a
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standard which may have been theoretically pure but was
too subjective for practitioners.
There were seen to be defects in the CCA model. It was too
subjective, limited in scope, too complex, and not integrated closely enough with previous techniques of asset
measurement.

Cowan [1985, p. 52] argued that the profession had to continue its advocacy of some system of inflation accounting in
order to mitigate the extreme misinformation flowing out of
accounts based on historic cost, even if it meant adjusting the
"product" to meet the needs of "consumers." "This is no time to
give up on inflation accounting. The problem which it addresses is much too serious." By then, virtually everyone else
had turned their backs on the proposals, and his pleas were
largely ignored.
Reasons for Noncompliance from the Oral History: The perceived
causes of noncompliance from oral history tapes are listed below, with the more frequently described factors listed first:
1.

CCA was not going to be permitted to be used for the calculation of taxable income after companies had seen it as a
mechanism to reduce taxable income. This cause was cited
by Frank Devonport, John Hagen, Roger Hopkins, Bob
Pope, Malcolm McCaw, Don Trow, and John Hagen. A related view was that the Government had not given a strong
enough signal of support, such as endorsement by the Securities Commission (noted by Rex Anderson, Malcolm
McCaw, and Bob Pope):
Well, no government was prepared to say they had
a tax rate of 900 in the dollar. If they accepted that
current cost accounting was the proper basis for
reporting financial accounts and for taxation levy,
they couldn't drop their tax bills, so they would
have had to, or adjust the tax base in some other
way, they were just not prepared to do it. It was
politically unacceptable. That was the crux of the
matter [Bob Pope].
If Muldoon had said you could have had it for tax,
then probably it would have rolled in. . . . People
would think they had got a big reduction in tax
[Frank Devonport].

Although it was recognized:
Published by eGrove, 1999
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We felt obliged to make some modifications to CCA
for financial reporting purposes for pragmatic tax
reasons. For example, if we had applied CCA across
the board for tax purposes there would have been
an element of taxation of capital gains. We felt that
really in the climate of the times that that would
not be acceptable across the board to the public;
and so we adopted a compromise of recognising for
tax purposes the benefits of the use of borrowed
funds, but only up to the point of the CCA deductions in other respects [Sir Ivor Richardson].
2.

CCA was either too complicated or complex, or it was too
radical and too fundamental a change, mentioned by John
Hagen, Frank Devonport, Roger Hopkins, and Rex Anderson:
It was more a growing belief by the business community or the financial community generally saying
'This was too complicated. We don't understand it.'
There was a sort of gathering storm of protest saying: 'Too complicated' [John Hagen].
This standard was the first one which drove to the
heart of the m e a s u r e m e n t process, and I think
again fundamentally that was something that the
Society couldn't handle, it was new to them. Here
we were putting up a Standard, which said you are
going to have to measure things a different way. It
is not a question of disclosure and reporting, not a
question of how you analyse and classify and report
to people, you are going to have to measure it differently and this cut right to the core of the accepted thinking [Roger Hopkins].

3.

CCA was not adopted because it showed a lower profit (as
noted by Malcolm McCaw) and reported less favorable results (according to John Hagen, Athol Mann, and Don
Trow):

The proposal not to use it for tax purposes was the
thrust of the dagger into the body of CCA that took
the life out of it. People had not realised, I don't
think, that that was the m o m e n t that CCA died, especially accountants who were keen to box on; and
I think, naively, accountants got a bit of surprise
when they found company directors did just not
want to produce CCA accounts, because it was contrary to what they had said they were going to do,
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/15

24

et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 1999, Vol. 26, no. 1
16

Accounting Historians Journal, June 1999

and one hadn't appreciated that these directors, as
they always are, always had been particularly in
those days, always wanting to show themselves as
good performers, never wanting to attract criticism,
always taking steps to minimise criticism....There is
no way that company directors in general were going to produce CCA information, particularly if say
only a third of the companies were going to do it,
because their result was invariably going to be a
worse result; it would have been the very odd company that might have had a better result, and they
didn't just want to put themselves into the category
of those who very clearly had a inferior result [Don
Trow].
4.

One reason given was that inflation elsewhere was falling
(John Hagen), falling in New Zealand (Malcolm McCaw),
or ceased to have the impact it had had on "true and fair"
(Bob Pope):
Then inflation round the world started to reduce,
and pressure for current cost data reduced. Unfortunately the battle was lost [John Hagen].
Inflation disappeared or ceased to have the impact
that it was previously having on true and fair reporting [Bob Pope].

5.

Another reason was that the indices were too subjective
(noted by Frank Devonport and Malcolm McCaw):
We have still got exactly the same problem that was
being faced then. This was the problem of measurem e n t . You see, even t o d a y we are a d v o c a t i n g
valuers to value or revalue assets and the valuers
are scrambling to try and produce a set of standards for valuation. You can go to two different
valuers to get the valuation you want. They differ so
much, and I think this is basically the same problem as you had with CCA [Frank Devonport].

6.

John Hagen and Athol Mann considered that noncompliance will follow if the market does not like the standard:

If I adopted CCA and you didn't, the n u m b e r s we
reported were distorted in the minds of the public
and to some extent by company directors; they said
'There are not sufficient companies using it, so
therefore we are going to stop using it, because it
shows us in a bad light even though we really do
Published by eGrove, 1999
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understand it and agree it was the right thing to do'
[John Hagen].
7.

Roger Hopkins and Rex Anderson thought it had been too
cumbersome and costly:
It was going to take resources and would cost
money to produce something that nobody really
saw any great use of [Rex Anderson].

8.

John Hagen described one of the causes as a case of the
theory being "miles ahead" of the practice:
It was a good example of a standard . . . the implementation of an accounting standard where the
theory was miles ahead of the practice and the academic part of the profession was miles ahead of the
companies, and there was no intention to take account of politics in accounting standards. . . . I
think it is because the standard setters at that time
did not comprehend sufficiently, in any way, that
you cannot j a m standards down peoples throats
and hope they will accept them. And if they don't
like them, then the business community will scuttle
them.

9.

Roger Hopkins noted that we had learned to live with
(modified) historic cost and allow for it:
They know how, for instance, allowances for depreciation on historical cost are not going to allow for
the cost of replacement, but they know that and
understand it and they make, just as the corporate
director used to do, the necessary adjustments, if
they want to transfer from that model into the real
world of decision making.

10. A further factor was conservative boards of directors:
I was sure in those days that a lot of Boards of
Directors just didn't want to even think about it.
They just didn't want to go through the hassle of
understanding what it was all about . . . (there was)
a desire to keep on the old ways, and, as I say, there
were a lot of members of our profession who gave
them some support too. . . . I think probably those
of us who were keen on it were so enthused with it
that we assumed that we had the right answer, and
everybody was going to abide by this [Bruce Christmas].
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/15
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11. Malcolm McCaw recalled that New Zealand was seen as an
"experimental niche:"
A lot of people overseas thought we were an interesting little experimental niche out there, and they
were interested to see what happened. In the meantime they weren't going to do anything; and banks
and those sort who would have been the ones to
benefit from this sort of policy, because they had
their own ways of working out, working out the
accounts and making adjustments to those forecasts to decide on companies and their future prospects et cetera.
12. Tony van Zijl considered that it was realized that the usefulness of the incremental information was close to zero:
Well, I think one of the things that happened was
that people started doing empirical research on the
incremental information content of that kind of information, and the consensus that emerged from
that was that it probably was close to zero. Now
t h a t doesn't m e a n to say t h a t the i n f o r m a t i o n
wasn't of any value, but rather that there were probably alternative sources for that information, so
that in terms, anyway, of usefulness to investors,
the information rated very low.
13. According to Athol Mann, companies would not utilize CCA
if their competitors were not:
In the interests of their own company, people simply weren't prepared to make a conversion unless
their competitors did, they couldn't afford, they felt,
to leave themselves out on a limb in relation to
accounts published under a CCA approach if their
competitors in the same industry didn't do the
same.
14. Rex Anderson recalled that at that time academics were
more inclined to continue debating rather than resolve the
issues:
The last thing they want to happen in an academic
argument, is for resolution to be reached. It's a
plaything, they like to go on; and the fact that
somebody knowledgeable by propounding his views
can slow the whole process down, in fact ruin it,
doesn't worry them, provided that they get their
own way.
Published by eGrove, 1999
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DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE
EXPLANATIONS FOR NONCOMPLIANCE
The data presented in the oral history narrative show a
variety of viewpoints, some of which provide an understanding
different from the existing consensus in the literature on the
causes of the failure of the inflation accounting standard in
New Zealand. Readers will develop their own comparisons
from the information provided and existing knowledge of explanations for the failure of such standards. This account will
therefore enable readers to develop further their own understanding of these events, given their individual preferences for
any weighting they may wish to place on the different sources.
The two sources are of a very different nature, resulting in
very different emphases. Most of the emphases from insights
provided by the oral histories were on political or contracting
costs, whereas the emphases from annual reports analyses were
on comparability, costliness, and usefulness. Although there
may be distortions from the effect of memory in oral history,
other sources of data have different problems of selectivity and
partiality. However imperfect sources may be, the comparison
is illuminating.
The comparison between the analysis of the reasons for
noncompliance from papers written in 1983-1985 and the oral
histories shows the major similarity in these two sources is the
"tax issue." Standard setters looked back with hindsight and
determined that the lack of CCA 1 acceptance for taxation purposes was its "death sentence." Comments were often phrased
in the death metaphor.
The major difference was a compelling insistence, especially in the comments of Frank Devonport, Roger Hopkins,
Rex Anderson, and John Hagen, that CCA was a fundamental
change in the approach to the measurement of income. If one is
expecting people's behavior to change (which it should do in
the light of a changed standard), then there are major political
considerations inherent in the standard-setting process which
have to be taken into account. This point was most emphasized
by John Hagen. The analysis closer to the events, as cited, suggested that CCA was "just a n o t h e r standard" being implemented, although some standard setters, on reflection, clearly
saw it as being essentially different to other new accounting
standards because of the extent to which it represented a fundamental change in accounting principles. The CCA standard was
part of the normative system of standard setting, as Kirk [1988,
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/15
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p. 17] noted, "a normative system, however, has definite limits
in its ability to point a policy-making body toward incontrovertible solutions to recognition and measurement problems. Good
intentions and hard work cannot overcome those limits."
Other reasons derived from the published analyses of the
reasons for noncompliance from papers written in 1983-1985
also appear in the standard-setters' perceptions. In addition, the
oral history reflected memories of an increasing lack of commitment by practitioners, and that CCA would reflect negatively
the performance of directors and managers. There were no significant differences in the views of those interviewees who had
been in public practice comp>ared with those w h o h a d led
largely academic careers.
It was also noted by interviewees that directors of larger
multinational companies in New Zealand were prepared to
"give it a go" in the early stages of the development of CCA,
which may be indicative that the thrust to international h a r m o nization was contributing to early support for the standard
from the corporate sector. Eventually the lack of compliance
overseas, coupled with the anticipated fall in inflation driven by
a drop in inflation in New Zealand's major trading partners,
was driving noncompliance in 1982-1983.
This contrasting analysis has highlighted that the reasons
provided by companies for not utilizing the CCA standard are
not all reflected in the reasons as understood by the standard
setters. It could be expected that companies would not attribute
noncompliance to the desire not to show management performance in a "bad light," or that it was too radical or too fundamental a change. It is of note that very few company reports
referred to the anticipated fall in inflation or the political (price
freeze) environment.
This comparison has demonstrated the usefulness of oral
history methods to identify contrasting dynamics behind standard setting where hegemonic forces may elude quantitative
analysis. Oral histories may not result in major revisions, yet
still "add value" to the extant records of an accounting phenomenon.
SEPARATION AND RECONSTITUTION
It is in our nature to reconstitute separate pieces of information into a coherent body of knowledge. The separation of
this accounting history research into three narratives was not
undertaken in order to prevent the coherency of such reconstiPublished by eGrove, 1999
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tution, but to demonstrate the inevitability of the imposition of
narrative in interpretative or explanatory paradigms.
Thus, the first narrative related the progress and completion of a successful research project. A feature of this research
was the change in the eventual focus for the thesis. This revised
focus was the outcome of the usually undocumented process of
ensuring appropriate scope and coherency to the ultimate research report. It can be assumed that the questions asked of
interviewees would have been different if the eventual focus of
the research had been differently identified to interviewees at
the start. However, if scholars had to remain on an unalterable
trajectory, the potential for discovery from data could be compromised or endangered. The potential of methods such as oral
history is to allow the data to reveal hypotheses previously unanticipated by the researcher, typical of grounded theory where
the theory is inductively derived from the study of the phenomenon it represents [Strauss and Corbin, 1990].
Some refusal to participate as described was not unusual in
such projects and reflects issues of control over the topic. It is
difficult to determine to what extent there was bias in the selection of participants, but the resultant data indicated a breadth
of views was obtained.
The second narrative related the rise and fall of the standard in a series of attempts by the standard setters which were
ultimately unsuccessful. The interviews revealed an importance
of the international context previously unrecognized in New
Zealand studies of the failure of the CCA standard [Peterson et
al., 1984; Cameron and Heazlewood, 1985; Cowan, 1985; Wong,
1988]. Economic pressures, in particular the inflation rate,
were observed to have less impact on the failure of the CCA
standard in New Zealand compared with other jurisdictions.
The third narrative combined archival data (written explanations for the failure) with the oral history data in order to
make a comparison. As such, it transversed the two paradigms
of accounting history as described by Tyson [1996, p. 2]. To
study causes of lack of compliance is typical of accounting history studies with an objective of ensuring the utility of accounting history. The third narrative reflected that standard setters
consider there are "lessons to be learned" from the failure of
the standard. Historical studies should provide a record of past
experiences which help in current standard-setting issues; yet,
standard setters continue to attempt to disconnect the CCA episode from current standard setting. For example, recently in the
U.K. the ASB announced in the progress paper on the exposure
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/15
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draft of the Statement of Principles for Financial Reporting
that, "The Board emphatically states that it has never had any
plans to impose a system of current cost accounting. . . " [Accounting Standards Board, 1996, p. 1] in response to many
expressions of concern that the ASB was trying to reestablish
CCA. Such strong denial of any likely role for CCA in future
standard setting indicates negative resonance from past events
is ongoing.
CONCLUSION
The isolation of the three components of this research into
separate narratives implies each has now been completed, but
in reality all three are ongoing. The data could sustain new
research outputs as the debate about current value accounting
is ongoing in New Zealand and elsewhere. The composition and
understanding of these events might also undergo reexamination and recomposition in the minds of those involved in the
events 20 years ago.
Narratives were chosen because they provide a flexible tool
with which to communicate events; narrative is not characteristic of particular fields of research. It may be less explicit in the
traditional scientific method of research description, but the
most rigorous scientific procedures for establishing a method
of scientific testing are sequential in structure and in the reporting thereof. It would have been possible to build up at least
six or eight narratives, like the layers of an onion, in order to
report fully this study of the failure of the CCA standard in New
Zealand. The richness from this record is to be found not in any
inner kernel of truth, but in the process of reaching the innermost layer as each narrative is read and contextualized, allowing its constitutive effect to be appreciated.
Results presented in this m a n n e r highlight that any such
research is a series of interlocking and overlapping events. Narrative is not only a direct and efficient means of communicating both causal and transactional elements in events, but also
clearly delineates delusions and failures. It is a limitation of
narrative that the conceptual complexity of events is simplified
into a singular process, but such limitations assist communication and comprehension.
The tool of narrative has sometimes been transformed into
a metaphor for "whiggish" tendencies of history — tendencies
to highlight successful endeavors which contributed to the ascendancy of the present while casting past failures into unrePublished by eGrove, 1999
31

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 26 [1999], Iss. 1, Art. 15
Baskerville: Telling Power of CCA

23

corded shadows. Undoubtedly narrative has been constructed
to this end, but such uses should not exclude recognition of its
value, or indeed its inevitability, in explanatory or interpretative
paradigms.
This study has provided an example validating Carnegie
and Napier's [1996, p. 8] view that the strengths of accounting
history are from its firm basis in the "archive," which includes
the oral records here presented. Furthermore, it demonstrates
that "accounting history is enhanced by locating our narratives
within an understanding of the specific context in which the
object of our research emerges and operates." Such enrichment,
through an increasing contribution of oral history studies in
different jurisdictions, will ensure a fertile database for future
accounting history studies.
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APPENDIX A
Interviewees
Appointments relevant
to the research
Rex Anderson

More recent
activities

NZSA, president, 1984-1985; practitioner; m e m b e r of the
ARSB, chairman, 1983,
Securities Commission,
Financial Subcommittee,
1985-1994
member, 1973-1988,
(chairman, 1983)

Bruce Christmas NZSA, president, 1980-1981; practitioner
Council member,
Professional Standards
Committee, chairman
Frank Devonport ARSB, 1968-1979, Financial professor at Canterbury;
Subcommittee, 1979-1992
continuing m e m b e r of
FRSB committees
John Hagen

ARSB, 1982-1989, Financial
Subcommittee, chair,
1977-1982

chairman of the Governmentappointed ASRB, 1994;
practitioner in Deloittes

Roger Hopkins

ARSB, 1982-1983

professor, Waikato, 19811984; Victoria University,
1990-present

Malcolm McCaw NZSA, president, Council,
1976-1985; ARSB,
chairman; expert advisor to
the Richardson Committee

consultant for Deloittes

Athol Mann

NZSA, president, 1976-1977; dean of Faculty of ComCouncil, 1968-1978;
merce, Victoria University,
1987-1996
Securities Commission,
1979-1986

Bob Pope

ARSB, 1972-1979, chairman, consultant to KPMG Peat
1975-1979; NZSA, Council,
Marwick
1975-1981, president,
1980-1981

Ivor Richardson Royal Commission on
Inflation Accounting,
chairman, 1976; formerly
partner in a Wellington
law firm

chief judge, Court of Appeal,
New Zealand

Don Trow

ARSB, 1968-1989; NZSA,
Council, 1976-1989

professor, Victoria University,
1972 - present

Tony van Zijl

NZSA, technical director,
1985

current m e m b e r of FRSB a n d
ARSB; professor, Victoria
University, 1989- present
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APPENDIX B
Reasons for Noncompliance from
Analyses of Company Reports
The following s u m m a r y is from the study by Cameron and Heazlewood [1985].
Their study of 185 company reports with reporting dates between 3/31/83 2/29/84 overlapped reports studied by Peterson et al. [1984]. In the Cameron
and Heazlewood study:
No. of reports

%

CCA mentioned but no reason given for
noninclusion

4

2.2

CCA mentioned and reasons given for
noninclusion

72

38.9

CCA not mentioned

93

50.3

Companies presenting CCA statements

16

8.6

185

100

Total

Of the 72 reports which disclosed reasons for noncompliance, 108 reasons
were given:
CCA serves little or no purpose.

16

CCA is not recognized for tax purposes.

13

CCA is confusing or misleading to members.

12

Application of CCA to the company's results would not be
appropriate.

11

CCA methods are too subjective.

8

There is as yet no agreed uniform method of accounting for
changes in price levels.

7

CCA statements were prepared but not presented.

7

CCA will not be implemented until it is more widely understood
and accepted.

7

Time spent on CCA is not cost-beneficial.

7

CCA is not warranted.

5

Primary accounts already reflect CCA principles in some form
or another.

4

CCA is no longer valid now that the rate of inflation has dropped.

3

CCA is not recognized for pricing purposes.

3

CCA results do not allow comparability.

2

CCA is not a legal requirement.

2

CCA does not give a true and fair view.

1
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN
SHIP-ACCOUNTING PRACTICES TO 1900:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THREE
VESSELS
Abstract: Accounting has always been utilitarian in nature. It adapts
to the changes in the business environment by meeting the need for
new types of information. The change in waterborne transportation
in the U.S. during the 19th century provides an example of such an
environmental change that led to a need for accounting adaptation.
With the advent of the steamboat, old accounting methods were
modified and new ones created to meet the changes in the business
environment. In the process, a standardized ship-accounting model
was developed. The model can be seen in the accounting records of
three ships that sailed at the beginning of the 20th century.

INTRODUCTION
In 1903, t h e p r o m i n e n t E n g l i s h a c c o u n t i n g a u t h o r ,
Lawrence Dicksee [1976b, p. 3], wrote: "One of the most ancient (and therefore one of the simplest) modes of transacting
business is through the agency of the ship." The early American
ship-accounting practices were, for the most part, this simple
agency model in which the value of the ship and cargo were
combined to act as a separate business transaction for each
voyage. The development of new accounting procedures to fit
the changing nature of ships and the shipping business in the
U.S. shows the adaptive nature of the accounting process as the
19th century progressed.
This need for a new ship-accounting model came with the
advent of the steamboat in 1807. Robert Fulton's Clermont
showed the world that steam could be used to travel faster on
the waterways of the American continent. Faster travel led to
Acknowledgments: The author would like to t h a n k the two anonymous
referees for their constructive comments and historical input that helped to
streamline this paper and give it a better and more coordinated focus.
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changes in the accounting practices of the shipping business.
Steamships began to make the aforementioned ship-agency accounting practice obsolete, especially for American riverboat
traffic. A ship owner could now make numerous trips with his
ship in the same period it took the old sailing ships to complete
one tour to some distant shore. The accounting relationship
between the business transaction and the ship could now be
severed. Ship accounting had to adapt to the changes occurring
in the industry. The questions involved in this transition are
simple. First, did a "standard" model of accounting develop for
American shipping during the 19th century? Second, was the
model used by the shipping companies accurately presented in
this study?
In an attempt to answer the questions posed above, this
paper compares the accounting practices of three ships that
sailed and traded at the turn of the 20th century. The first ship
studied was a Great Lakes steamer named the Adella Shores.
The Shores was p a r t of a family-owned p a r t n e r s h i p t h a t
shipped salt between Michigan and Chicago aboard a small
fleet of lake vessels. Next, the records of the riverboat or packet
named the Betsy Ann were reviewed. This ship was operated out
of Natchez, Mississippi, navigated the lower Mississippi River,
and was locally owned by a family corporation with multiple
b u s i n e s s interests. Finally, t h e r e c o r d s of the Richard A.
Bingham, a schooner that plied the lumber trade in the Caribbean, were studied. The schooner was personally owned by the
manager of a lumber company in Pensacola, Florida.
The varied modes of ownership of the three ships mirrored
that of the shipping industry in 1903. The book, Workers of the
Nation [Willets, 1903, pp. 569-581], said that there were 3,100
steamers, like the Shores, on the Great Lakes at this time. Of
this number, only 600 were operated as part of a fleet business.
The r e m a i n d e r of the ships were p r e s u m a b l y individually
owned and operated. Next, at this point in history, there were
only about 189 steamers, like the Betsy Ann, left on the Mississippi River. Willets indicated most of these were locally owned
and operated. Finally, the fleet of American-flagged, ocean-going schooners, like the Bingham, numbered greater than 16,000
in 1903. Willets did not discuss an ownership mode for these
vessels.
As a final note of introduction, the three ships all sailed
before the U.S. Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) issued
orders in 1910 to begin an effort to regulate the waterborne
traffic in the U.S. Regulations issued by the ICC focused on
Published by eGrove, 1999

37

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 26 [1999], Iss. 1, Art. 15
Heier: American Ship-Accounting Practices

29

accounting practices for depreciation and maintenance, as well
as balance sheet classifications for waterborne carriers affiliated with railroads [ICC, 1910, 1912]. The fact that these standards did not apply to any of the three ships reviewed for this
study allows for a comparison of their records with contemporary ship-accounting practices.
THE SHIPS AND THEIR OWNERS
The Great Lakes Shipper — The Steamer Adella Shores1: Samuel
Neff and Sons Shipping Company, the owner of the steamer
Adella Shores, was a family partnership comprised of the father,
Captain Samuel Neff, and his two sons, Captain Sidney Neff
and Charles Neff. The Milwaukee-based shipping company began operations in the late 1880s when Samuel Neff moved from
Oshkosh to Milwaukee. His two sons joined him in the business
in the early 1890s. Sidney acted as a ship captain while Charles
was responsible for the management of the business in Milwaukee. The Neff fleet of 1900 consisted of three wooden-hulled
steamships — the Adella Shores, the Minnie Kelton, and the
Edwin Tice. These three ships acted as the core of their small
Great Lakes fleet. In addition, the Neffs purchased two barges,
the Marion and the O. J. Hale, for the 1900 shipping season. The
auxiliary log of the O. J. Hale noted that she had sailed with the
Adella Shores between Chicago, Illinois and Manistee, Michigan. The ships were primarily used to transport salt from central Michigan to the port of Chicago for the National Salt Company, the forerunner of the Morton Salt Company. At the t u r n
of the 20th century, salt was an important commodity that was
used in a range of products from food preservatives to industrial solvents. The ships in the Neff fleet all had long and storied
histories, but only the records of the Adella Shores and the
barge O. J. Hale were used for this study.
According to data from the records of the Runge Collection, the Shores was a wooden-hulled steam barge that was
built in 1894 for the Shores Lumber Company of Ashland, Wisconsin at a cost of $65,000. The ship was 195 feet long and
displaced 734 gross tons. It was built by the Wolverine Boat

1
The history of the Adella Shores and the Neff Family comes from the
documents of the Wisconsin Marine Historical Society and the Milwaukee
County Historical Society. These records include the Neff Family Collection
and the Runge Collection which is a set of ship identification records and
histories.
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Company out of Gibraltar, Michigan. The shipping company of
Samuel Neff and Sons purchased the ship for the 1898 shipping
season for an undisclosed amount of money. At the time of the
purchase, Inland Lloyds indicated that the Shores had a value
of $35,000. After Samuel Neff died in 1904, the company's assets were split between his two sons. Sidney Neff owned the
Shores until his death in 1907. The Adella Shores was then acquired, in 1908, by E. M. Carleton of Cleveland, Ohio, and subsequently sank off Grand Island in Lake Superior on May 1,
1909. Fourteen sailors lost their lives in the accident.
The O. J. Hale was a wooden schooner built in Trenton,
Michigan in 1874. It was 138 feet long and displaced 326 tons.
When the Neffs purchased the ship for $1,500 in October of
1900, the masts were removed and the hull used as a barge for
shipping salt across Lake Michigan. No history was available
after the 1900 season.
The River Boat — The Packet Betsy Ann2: The packet (or flatbottomed riverboat) Betsy Ann was built in Dubuque, Iowa in
1899 by the Iowa Iron Works. The ship was the first steel-hulled
riverboat on the Mississippi-Ohio River system. The ship was
165 feet long with a beam of 33 feet. Its builder and owner was
Rufus F. Learned of Natchez, Mississippi. The boat was n a m e d
after his wife, Elizabeth. Learned, one of the richest m e n in
Mississippi, was the owner of a lumber company and plantation
in southern Mississippi. He operated the Betsy Ann through the
Natchez & Bayou Sara Packet Company. From 1899 to its sale
to Frederick Way in 1921, the Betsy Ann ran mail, passengers,
and goods between Natchez and Bayou Sara, Louisiana, about
100 miles south on the Mississippi River. From 1921 to 1931,
the riverboat spent most of its time cruising the MississippiOhio River system shipping cotton and ferrying passengers between Cincinnati, Ohio and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The Betsy
Ann was famous for its riverboat races in Cincinnati during the
1920s. In 1931, she was sold to John Hay of St. Louis, Missouri,
who used it for towing river barges. In 1940, the Betsy Ann was
dismantled and her hull used as a barge.

2

The history of the Betsy Ann was discussed by Frederick Way, Jr., and the
biography of R. F. Learned was published in Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Mississippi [Anonymous, 1891]. An additional source is Flesher and
Soroosh [1987]. The records of the Betsy Ann are part of the Learned L u m b e r
Company Collection, housed in the Special Collections Department of the University of Mississippi Library.
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The Ocean Traveler — The Schooner Richard A. Bingham3: The
schooner Richard A. Bingham was named for the infant son of
the owner-operator, Francis Frasier Bingham (F. F. for short)
of Pensacola, Florida. Born in Michigan in 1872, F. F. Bingham
moved to Pensacola in 1890 and began working for the Southern States Lumber Company where he eventually became one
of its directors. The company harvested the pine forests of western Florida and southern Alabama. The pine lumber was then
shipped from Pensacola to the east coast of the U.S. and to
Europe. The lumber trade made the city of Pensacola very rich,
and the port of Pensacola became second only to New Orleans
for shipments from the Gulf Coast. Pensacola-based ships also
made trips to Central America where the pine lumber could be
bartered for heavier woods such as mahogany. It was into this
market that the Bingham entered in 1903.
The log of the Richard A. Bingham indicated that the ship
was chartered (fitted out) on October 21, 1902, and formally
launched on January 10, 1903. According to the application to
the U.S. Customs Service for a vessel license, the Bingham was
a wooden-hulled, one-deck, three-masted schooner that was
about 90 feet in length and 26 feet wide. 4 The ship was built by
Robert H. Langford, a small shipyard in the Pensacola area.
The ledger of the Bingham indicated that the cost of the ship
totaled $7,355. This figure included $3,828 for construction,
$2,299 for rigging and sails, and $1,227 for equipment.
The Richard A. Bingham was operated by the A. R. Bingh a m S h i p p i n g C o m p a n y w h o s e "owner" was Amos Reed
Bingham, the father of F.F. Bingham. According to customs
records, the actual owner and operator was F.F. Bingham, but
his lumber company duties may not have allowed him to operate the ship directly. The Bingham's captain was Raymond L.
Merritt who, according to the bookkeeping records, shared in
the profits of each of the ship's four voyages. For her short life
of 350 days and only four voyages, the Richard A. Bingham had
a very interesting history including a reported mutiny. Three of

3

The r e c o r d s of t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n a n d s h i p p i n g a c c o u n t s are in t h e
Bingham Collection housed at the Special Collections Department of the Birm i n g h a m Public Library, B i r m i n g h a m , Alabama. The biography of F. F.
Bingham was told by Rucker and Woolsey [1991].
4
The Board of Navigation for the District of Pensacola, Florida through
the Application or Owners or Master Vessel for Official Numbers a Signal Letters,
issued the Richard A. Bingham, I.D. n u m b e r 111442 on January 23, 1903 (National Archives Document).
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the four trips that the Bingham m a d e were to the Central
American country of Belize, which was then a small colonial
outpost called British Honduras. On the fateful fourth voyage to
Belize, the Bingham was detained by customs authorities in
Frontera, Mexico. After this problem was rectified, the ship proceeded to Belize, unloaded its cargo of southern pine, and took
on mahogany for the return trip. The Richard A. Bingham went
down in a gale off the coast of Belize on December 18, 1903.
The partial log entry reads as follows: "Sailed Dec. 17 from
Belize to Pensacola and that night went on a coral reef outside
of Belize H a r b o r a n d b e c a m e a t o t a l loss. Crew saved"
[Bingham Account Book, 1903, p. 104].
As the historical vignettes show, each of the three ships had
a storied past of adventure, romantic voyages, tragedy, and, of
course, hard work. The work aspect can be seen in the related
accounting records that have survived nearly a century in various archives and libraries. These records show three distinct,
but similar methods of accounting for essentially the same activity — the commercial voyage of a ship. The similarities in
accounting procedures between each ship show that a "standard" ship-accounting model may have developed over the century preceding the travels of the Adella Shores, the Betsy Ann,
and the Richard A. Bingham.
SHIP-ACCOUNTING PRACTICES
A 19th Century Ship-Accounting Model: Comparing the accounting practices of these three ships would be a superfluous undertaking without a base-line accounting model with which to
compare the ships' practices. To detect the base-line model of
accounting practices available to these three ships, 16 books
published before 1900 were reviewed for their presentation of
ship-accounting practices. The books and relevant publication
data are listed in Appendix A.
The selection of the books came in three phases. First, a
review of Bentley and Leonard's classic work, A Bibliography of
Works on Accounting by American Authors [1970], was conducted. This work noted four specific treatises on ship accounting published in the U.S. before 1900, the authors of which
were Ely Stone [1839], Francis Clark [1837], Peter Duff [1846],
and James Fleming [1846]. These books were obtained and rev i e w e d . Next, t w o o t h e r t r e a t i s e s o n s h i p a c c o u n t i n g ,
Hemmeter's [1888] and the Improved Vessel Book [Anonymous,
1881], were reviewed. These books were found in the Great
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Lakes Historical Society Library. Finally, the remaining selections were general texts on accounting published during the
19th century. Some of that century's most prominent accounting authors, such as Bennet, Foster, and Marsh, were represented in the study.
Other books were consulted for the study, but only those
books which contained a discussion of ship accounting (either
ocean-going or riverboating) were used for the development of
the ship-accounting model. Two examples of other books consulted for the study included one by the notable team of Bryant,
Stratton, and Packard who wrote Bryant and Stratton's National
Book-keeping [1860]. Another was A.B. Mersevey's Book-keeping, Double Entry [1875]. Both books discussed sending and
receiving merchandise on consignment aboard a streamer, but
neither discussed the method of accounting for the ship itself.
Because of this omission, these books were not used to help
discover the base-line, ship-accounting model.
Though the list of books consulted for this study does not
purport to be an exhaustive review of all accounting books published in the 19th century, it does represent a fair sampling of
the contemporary thought on ship-accounting practices. This
assumption is based on three facts. The books consulted represented almost every decade of the 19th century so that a developmental pattern could be noted. Second, the books were written by p r o m i n e n t authors of accounting texts as listed by
Bentley. Finally, in many cases, such as Bennet's The American
System of Practical Bookkeeping [1976], the books were found to
have had multiple editions published over several decades of
the 19th century.
The review of the books provided 14 different principles,
methods, and disclosures used by the authors to explain how
ship accounting was to be completed. Table 1 shows the distribution by principles, books, and dates. The ship-accounting
model provided by the book reviews gives an excellent picture
of a "uniform system" of accounts for ships that was widely
discussed by the accounting authors of the day and presumably
represented actual practice.
The groups of accounting principles derived from the
books can be categorized into two sections — capital accounting and financial accounting. Outside of the double-entry requirements, the principles outlined by the study were all specifically adapted to the shipping industry. They applied equally
well to the three geographic areas sailed by the ships — the
rivers, the lakes, and the oceans. The model that apparently
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/15
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TABLE 1
A Review of Ship-Accounting Practices Noted in 19th Century Accounting Books

Double-entry accounting or a system that ties to
double-entry ledger required

Y

BOOK

Purchase of ship as a n asset with a ledger account

Y

ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLE

Shipments a n d profits accounted for against the
purchase price of t h e ship

Y

Y
Y

Y

Shipments, both revenues a n d expenses are
accounted, for as individual voyages, not in total
Specific listing of expenses
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Y
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A ledger account specifically for the ship
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Y
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Y

Crew Book

Y
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Note: The book number corresponds to the bibliographic listing from Appendix A.
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developed for ship accounting in the 19th century suited its
users well and was adapted to their special needs. The flexibility and adaptability of accounting development are clearly seen
in this ship-accounting model. A third category of accounting
principles will also be discussed, those comprising management
accounting. The accounting procedures of the three ships will
be compared and contrasted with this model as a base.
Capital Accounting Principles: The accounting procedures dictated by the "model" discussed above indicated that the physical vessel itself should be accounted for using the traditional
agency model. This model takes the cost of the vessel, adds to it
any revenues generated, and subtracts from it any expenses to
arrive at an ending balance or value. An example of this practice (Exhibit 1) comes from Crittenden in his book, Book-keeping by Single and Double Entry [1850, pp. 115-122]. This example presents a fictitious purchase of the Ship
Massachusetts
for a voyage to Canton, China from 1849-1850.
EXHIBIT 15
Ledger A Example for 1849
1849
July 2
July 12
July 16
July 16

To Thomas Harvey
(Purchase)
" Cash (Provisions)
" Bills Payable
(Insurance)
" Cash (Port duties)

25,000.00
1,160.00

1849
July 14 By Cash
(Passenger fees)

1,800.00

1,926.25
5.60
28,091.85

1,800.00

26,291.85
1850
Feb.28

28,091.85

Balance to
Ledger B

28,091.85

Ledger B Example for 1850
1850
Mar.l
May 6

"

June 29
June 29

To Balance from
Ledger A
26,291.85
" Adventure to Canton 2,069.68
" Cash (Crew's Wages) 3,808.67
"Interest
1,431.84
2,397.96
" Profit & Loss
36,000.00

1850
July 1

1850
May 9
May 9
" 29

5,000.00
By Cash (Freight
Fees Home)
8,500.00
" Sundries
(Trading fees while 22,500.00
in Orient)
" Bal to New a/c

36,000.00

22,500.00
To Bal. Fr. Old a/c

5

The explanation of the account entries was added by the author of this
paper.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/15
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The system discussed by Crittenden was very similar to
those highlighted by other accounting authors of the day. This
system may have been introduced some 30 years earlier in
Bennet's classic 1820 text, The American System of Practical
Bookkeeping. In a footnote to his Ship Ocean example, Bennet
wrote:
The Dr. side shows the cost of the vessel and the
charges attending her. The cr. what she produced by
the freight or sale. If the ship is not sold, Cr. the account first By Balance for her present value or for the
value of any share you have in her, and then To or By
Profit and Loss on the account. If the ship is sold the
account is to closed To or By Profit and Loss only
[Bennet, 1842, p. 69].
As the exhibit shows, the owners of the ship took all the
revenues and expenses directly against the value of the ship.
The actual cost of the ship itself did not change but was "adjusted" for the value of the expenses or revenues related to the
voyage or transaction. In fact, Crittenden actually used the
terms "produced value" or "costs value" regarding money paid
for or gained from the ship [Crittenden, 1850, p. 67]. 6 The owners then closed the account to profit-or-loss after the ship returned home. It must be noted here that the consignments of
goods shipped on the Massachusetts were accounted for separately from the ship and yielded a profit of $11,700. Finally, in
this case, the ship was not sold at the end of the "Adventure to
Canton," but was instead transferred to a new account so that it
could be used to take advantage of another overseas adventure.
It is interesting to observe, however, that when the ship was
"transferred" to another account, it was done so at a value of
$22,500, or $2,500 less than its purchase price. This reduction
shows that the ship owners understood that the ship was depreciating, but they did not set up accounts to match this process
directly against the revenues produced. Dicksee [1976a, p. 90],
about 40 years later, noted in his auditing book:
SINGLE SHIP COMPANIES almost invariably make
no provision for depreciation: the auditor need not
waste his time upon any effort to convince his clients
of the imprudence of this course, but he should not

6

The $1,438 "interest charge" to Ship Massachusetts
was credited to an
interest and discount account which was closed to profit and loss. This charge
wasby
foreGrove,
a loan on
the purchase of the ship.
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forget to append the necessary qualification to his certificate.
The Single Ship Company that Dicksee talked about is a
legal device where a single ship was incorporated into its own
company. A freight agent may incorporate several ships separately during a shipping season. This multiple incorporation
was done to limit his and his shareholders' liability against
claims from ships that might be lost. The losses from one ship's
voyage would not hurt the profits from another ship's voyage.
To some extent, this process institutionalized the "voyage report" form of ship accounting [Boyce, 1995, pp. 360-378].
Though the context of Dicksee's book defines a legal device
called a Single Ship Company, its application can be transferred to small shipping firms rather than larger companies like
the Goodrich Transportation Line or the C. Reisse Coal Company that had large modern fleets on the Great Lakes at this
time. Although both the Neffs and Binghams owned more than
one ship, their accounting methods mirrored those of Dicksee's
Single Ship Company regarding depreciation.
With the Neff records, capital accounting for their ships
may have been dictated by Wisconsin state law that taxed ships
as personal property based on size and age of the ship. The law
read as follows:
Chapter 48 Section 1042a of the Code of Wisconsin for
1898 presented the following rates for determining the
value of a wooden ship for property tax purposes based
on the age of the ship.
one to five years old
$ 9 per net ton
five to ten years old
$ 7 per net ton
ten to fifteen years old
$ 6 per net ton
fifteen years and upward old
$ 4 per net ton
Wooden Barge fifteen years or
upward old
$ 3 per net ton
[Sanborn and Berryman, 1898]
Though the shipping companies may not have been concerned directly with depreciation, Wisconsin state law appeared
to have allowed for the concept by reducing the value of the
ship over time as its hull grew older and began deteriorating.
The type of capital accounting outlined by the model could
be identified in two out of three of the vessels used in this
study. For the Adella Shores, the m a n n e r by which the Neffs
accounted for her cost was unfortunately not found in her
records; however, the capital accounting for the Shores' comhttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/15

46

et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 1999, Vol. 26, no. 1
38

Accounting Historians Journal, June 1999

panion barge, the O. J.. Hale, was provided and is shown in
Exhibit 2. This exhibit shows that the cost of the O. J. Hale was
shown as a current expense rather than capitalized. This practice was probably due to the transient nature of ship ownership
at the turn 20th century, and, as ship histories showed, the high
probability of accidents. These arguments may have been the
reason why none of the books reviewed for this study mentioned the concept of depreciation.
It should be noted here that neither the Neff records nor
the Runge Collection identified the reason for the $4,200 in
repair charges. The charges could have resulted from either a
recent accident involving the ship, or more likely, they represented the additional cost of placing the vessel into service,
expenses such as dismantling the masts and refurbishing the
hull to create a barge. In either case, modern accounting would
have probably shown this adjustment as a capitalization rather
t h a n an expense.
EXHIBIT 2
Financial Statement of the Barge O. J. Hale
November 1, 1900
1900 NO. 1 STATEMENT
BARGE "O. J. HALE"

NOV. 1ST
1900
AMOUNT

HARBOR TOWING
CREWS WAGES
PROVISIONS
TRIMMING
MISCELLANEOUS
ARTICLES
REPAIRS
DAMAGE
CARGO DAMAGE
LAY UP EXPENSE
TONS OF SALT
TOTAL RECEIPTS
TOTAL EXPENSES
NET LOSS
PURCHASE PRICE [OF O.J. HALE]
(1900 NOV. 1 AT COST)

Published by eGrove, 1999

494.10
663.40
120.34
26.95
1.60
4201.52
7.50
83.00
50.78
83.84
3356.52
5649.19
2292.67
1500.00
3792.67
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As the ship histories indicated, F. F. Bingham kept a ledger
on the cost of the construction of the Richard A. Bingham. The
cost of the Bingham ($7,355) was used as part of the general
recapitulation of the A. R. Bingham Shipping Company. The
entries were titled Resources and Liabilities in the ledger. The
form of these nearly 50 entries was a standard "balance sheet"
with some indication that expenses and revenues were part of
the adjustments. The focus on this recapitulation appeared to
track changes in the net worth of the company. The Richard A.
Bingham acted as the ledger's primary "debit," or asset, and the
purchases of lumber from Southern States Lumber represented
its primary "credit," or liability. These "balance sheets" were
compiled on an intermittent basis, ranging from weekly to
every six months, although they loosely corresponded to the
arrival of various ships owned by the company.
The Betsy Ann also had a compilation account, which was
more a current expense account that was closed periodically.
Unlike the Bingham, it did not include the cost of the ship and
the relevant net worth. There was not any indication of how the
Betsy Ann herself was accounted for in the specific records reviewed for this study.
Financial Accounting Principles: Francis Gedney Clarke [1837]
in his book, Shipmaster
Guide and Commercial
Assistant,
pointed out that it was the shipmaster's or captain's responsibility to keep account of both the ship and the shipment for the
absentee owners. Often they gave him a cash advance with
which to conduct business for the owners and pay sailors during the voyage. His responsibility was to make an accounting of
those revenues and related expenses. This type of arrangement
was noted in the logs and ledgers of the Richard A. Bingham
whose captain, Raymond Merritt, was obligated to deal the pine
lumber he brought south in favor of the mahogany he was to
bring back. Captain Merritt received part of the trip's profits,
besides his salary of $65 per trip.
Fleming [1846, p. 117] made it clear that the ship's personnel (especially the captains and bookkeepers) were surrogates
for the owners and had the responsibility to account for and
protect all of the goods consigned to the ship. Stone [1839, p.
24], in his book on steamboat accounting, made stewardship of
the customer's assets a foremost concern. He wrote as follows:
In receipting for goods sent on board, great care
should be given and exercised in examining their conhttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/15
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dition, the n u m b e r of packages, and their shipping
marks etc; for any error in this respect by receipting
more t h a n actually received or by acknowledging the
packages in good order when in fact they are not so, so
lays the boat and owner's liable to be sued for damages
or deficiencies which do not in fact exist, but for which
there may be no remedy.
With the Betsy Ann and the Adella Shores, the owners of the
ships acted as freight agents and received fares as such. In the
case of all three ships, the type of business engaged in by the
shipping company helped to dictate the type of accounting procedure used.
The review of books summarized in Table 1 suggests that
the ship-accounting process could range from a sophisticated
ledger and journal system to a more basic, single-entry accounting system. All the books agreed that the central focus of the
financial accounting system dealt with the individual trips or
voyages of the ship. The primary document was the Voyage
Report or Trip Report. There may also have been related documents that supported the Voyage Report and accounted for specific areas of the business, such as the crew's wages, cash disbursements, commodities shipped, and fuel usage. Finally, a
recapitulation that noted the profits or losses of the trip was
prepared for the ship's owners. Dicksee [1876a, p. 90], explained the importance of this document as follows:
The Auditor of Single Ship Companies must bear in
mind that, as regards to fraud, there is no such thing as
'safety in numbers' here, for the accounts are usually
all in one person's hands — let him, therefore, not omit
to examine the Voyage Account Book in detail.
The best example of this type of accounting comes from the
flagship of the Neff fleet, the Adella Shores (Exhibit 3). The
Shores' Trip Report was a wealth of information for the owners
of the ship. It included a listing of revenues and expenses of the
trip, a manifest of the cargo shipped, and a report of the fuel
consumed by each ship. Unfortunately, this statement does not
include the destination and purpose of the trip. According to
the records of the O. J. Hale, that information was part of the
ship's Captain's Log. The Improved Vessel Book [Anonymous,
1881] contained a Voyage Report very similar to the one presented for the Adella Shores.
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EXHIBIT 3
Financial Statement of the Adella Shores June 1, 1900
No. 2 Statement of the Steamer Adella Shores June 1, 1900
Trip 9
Repairs
Miscellaneous Articles
Fuel
Loading Salt
Unloading Salt
Stove Coal
Provisions
Cooperage
Shortage
Laundry
Crew Wages
Loading Lumber
Unloading Lumber
Commission
Harbor Towing
Freight Receipts
Net Gain\trip
Draft of Water
Draft - lumber
Draft - rock salt
Tons of Coal
Barrels of Salt
Lumber - ft
Tons - Rock Salt

.61
104.25
72.18
140.35
3.00
24.07
24.06
7.60
.88
122.21

Trip 10
3.11
1.07
69.54
85.85
150.23
40.90
25.75
15.00
122.21

499.21
721.80
222.59
12.8-13.3

513.66
513.66
258.99
13.6-13.8

30
8020

13.3-14.2
20
8285

Trip 11
22.86
2.99
511.54
73.00
121.65
3.50
106.72
9.90
1.41
537.83
385.09
294.67
10.00
6.00
2087.16
4092.44
2005.28
12.5-13.5
13.0-13.5
1571/2
8110
921.133

Total
Totals
25.97
4.67
685.33
231.03
412.23
6.50
171.69
59.71
22.60
2.29
782.25
385.09
294.67
10.00
6.00
3100.03
5586.89
2486.86

2071/2

1304

As noted above, the vast majority of all of the books required a Voyage Report or Trip Report. However, the method
and appearance of this accounting varied from book to book.
For example, Fleming's Steamboat
Book-keeper's
Assistant
[1846] required an actual ship's ledger. The Richard A. Bingham
used a lengthy, double-entry ledger (Exhibit 4) similar to
Fleming's requirements. In addition, the ledger of the Bingham
acted as the Voyage Report and the Ship's Log to inform the
owner of i m p o r t a n t events. The accounting system of the
Bingham included a separate ledger for the outbound trip from
Pensacola and inbound return trip to Pensacola. A cash ledger
to keep a record of the captain's spending on the trip was also
included in an accounting format.
The Bingham ledger highlights an accuracy shortfall in
turn-of-the-century accounting. The credit column of this exhttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/15
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hibit should have added up to $1,010.03, not $993.38. Correct
addition would have made the profits of the voyage $490.64
instead of the $502.69 actually reported. Such accuracy problems may have been the reason for Dicksee's admonition for the
auditor to check the Voyage Reports for small shipping companies more closely.
EXHIBIT 4
American Schr. Richard A. Bingham
Trip #1 Pensacola to Belize with Pine
& Return with Mahogany
1903
Jan

Feb
Jan
Feb

DR
19
31
31
2
5
31
28
3
4
24

26
7

To: Loading
"Mchugh
"Water
"Bill Health
"Medicine Chest
loading
"McHugh
"clearance
"serum25, wood75
med. 20
"fumigation
"light harbor dues
"measuring deck
"inward pilotage
"labor discharging
Riggers 1000
fresh stores
To: Captain
wages bill
Mate
Cook
cub
Mike
Liberstein
Merrit
R.L. Merrit- Profit
F. F. Bingham

1903

3
87
2
2
4
95
5
1
1
8
15
5
28
45
12
13
1

00
83
00
44
40
20
45
50
20

22
18
15
15
22
65
62
439

50

993

38

Ma
r

2
5

Fe
b
Ma
r

2
5
6
6

CR.
Mcortenovercharge
Cr. Lumber
Lumber
Freight
shingles

2

25

2
977
8

40
38
00

993

38

62
50
75

50
25

50
83
86

The Trip Report of the Betsy Ann (Exhibit 5) was more
detailed than the other ships and was completed on a series of
preprinted forms by the packet's clerk, Charles Gordon. The
system used by the packet company was very similar to the
system that was outlined in George Soulé's New Science and
Practice of Accounts [1976]. His book required separate preprinted sheets for the accounting of goods shipped, passengers,
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expenses, cash, crew expenses, and fuel. Though the Natchez &
Bayou Sara Packet Company combined several of these sheets
into one, the system was essentially the same. Even with its
sophistication, the basic plan of the accounting system still
goes back to that outlined by Ely Stone in the late 1830s in his
classic book, The Steamboat Clerk [1839].
EXHIBIT 5
Statement of the Receipts and Expenditures
STEAMER BETSY ANN
For TRIP 467 and Week Ending July 2 0 t h , 1902
RECEIPTS
From 35 Cabin Passengers Down
" 85 Cabin Passengers Down
" 145 Cabin Passengers Down
" 50 Cabin Passengers Down
From Freight, Down
" Freight, Up
" Rent Bar
" Sale Coal
Expenditures
Stores
Fuel
Officers
Mates Crew
Cabin Crew
Engineer's Crew
Deck
Expense
Mate
Engineer

Office
Pantry
General Expense
Agency
Rebates and Bills Returned
Extra Labor
Last Friday
Chas Gorden, clerk

63
124
81
29
291
44

25
50
00
25
01
05

333
213
127
26
48
64
295

13
75
20
85
85
05
40

27
5
6
40
73
34
2
15

35
90
90
70
89
08
20
94

187

75

110

25

335

06

15
648

00
06

1316

19

Stone's book was a compilation of procedures used by
steamboats on the Ohio River. These accounting procedures
evolved from the first Fulton steamboats that sailed the Mississippi-Ohio River system in the early 1800s. For example,
records from the second steamboat on the river, the Vesuvius
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/15
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(1814-1822) 7 , showed both trip and freight accounting in the
only records left from the Natchez Steamship Company. According to Flesher and Soroosh [1987], the Betsy Ann represented an exception to this system of individual trip reports
because her trips were so short (two to four days) that the
accounting was performed weekly for all of the trips completed
that week rather than on the traditional trip-by-trip basis. The
Trip Reports of the Betsy Ann were then integrated into the
general accounting system of the owners.
The Voyage Reports were often summaries of other documents compiled by the ship's bookkeeper. For example, the
Betsy Ann had a full range of supporting documents, including
a crew's list and payroll, expense list, and cash receipts/cash
disbursements book, all of which were then tied to the accounting system of the Learned Lumber Company. On the other
hand, b o t h the Adella Shores and the R. A. Bingham were
limited in their supporting documents and seemed to put most
information into one report. For the Bingham there was a
captain's cash report but no general summary of all the voyages
for a given year was recognized in the account books. The
company's balance sheets that were discussed previously may
have acted as a form of recapitulations of voyages with the
purpose of finding the current net worth of the company rather
t h a n current income.
The Adella Shores did not have the sophisticated accounting
system of the Betsy Ann, but as Exhibit 4 above indicated, it
was very comprehensive. The supporting documentation available in the library collection showed that the Neffs did have a
cash disbursements journal as part of their ships' logs. The
Adella Shores log has been lost but the one for her sister ship,
the O. J. Hale (Exhibit 6), revealed that the captain was responsible for the payment of all expenses on the voyage, ranging
from groceries to crew wages.

7

The records of the Vesuvius are housed at the Mississippi Department of
Archives and History and include a small leather-bound book which acted as a
freight register. These records are among the oldest steamboat records in the
U.S.
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EXHIBIT 6
Partial Log of the O. J. Hale
Trip 12 Barge O. J. Hale. Loaded at Terkley & Douglass
From: So Chicago To:
Sept. 12
Left So. Chicago with Adella Shores
13 Arrival Manistee
14 Left Manistee
15 arrives Ludington at Shelters
17 left Ludington [with] Str Adella Shores
18 arrive Chicago
W. Marks, Cook
H. J. Wilson, Master Seaman
Sept. 11 to Sept. 18
Sept. 11 to Sept. 18
included 8 days at $ 70 per m o n t h
Included 8 days at $45 per m o n t h
— $18.64
— $12.00
J. Johnson, Seaman
G. Claussen, Seaman
Sept. 11 to Sept. 18
Sept. 11 to Sept. 18
included 8 days at $45 per m o n t h
Included 8 days at 45 per m o n t h
— $12.00
— $12.00
Wages of Master and Crew

$54.64

Sept. 11 To William Runsfle - Provisions
$ 2.83
" "11 To Petersons Bro. - Groceries
$ 1.46
" " 15 To A Prairies - Groceries
$ 1.30
(at Ludington)
$ 5.59
Whole Amount —
$60.23
Sept. 19 John Johnson, Seaman 1 day $1.50 per
1.50
Sept. 19 G. Claussen, Seaman 1 day $1.50 per
1.50
Whole Amount —
$63.23
Sept. 18 Payout from Capt. S. O. Neff
By Cash

$60.00

Finally, the Neffs did compile reports of total income for all
their ships and related general office expenses for each m o n t h
(as shown in Exhibit 7) and for the entire year as well. Though
Charles Neff may have used two columns to "balance out" his
accounts at the end of the year, this exhibit, along with the
previous Neff Voyage Report, shows that he used a very simple
accounting system that can be properly classified as single entry.
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EXHIBIT 7
General Statement of Samuel Neff and Sons Shipping
Company — October 1, 1900
1900 General Statement
Receipts
Str Adella Shores
Str. Minnie Kelton
Str. Edwin S. Tice
Str. Marion
Gain

Oct. 1st 1900
Loss

850.80
1028.44
547.38
43.31
2383.31
2426.62

Gain for September
General Expenses
Net Gain

Gain

2426.62

2383.31
276.35
2106.96
2383.31

2383.31

Management Accounting Principles : A modern textbook defined
accounting as "the process of identifying, measuring, classifying and accumulating, summarizing, and communicating information about economic entities that is purely quantitative and
is useful to decision makers" [King et al., 1997, p. 688]. The
ship-accounting procedures discussed above did identify, measure, and, in a limited way, communicate economic information
about the shipping business. However, evidence that shows that
the owners used this information to control operations and
make informed business decisions is sketchy at best.
The ship-accounting model discussed in this paper did have
several devices for control and analysis. First, the captain's control over all financial and nonfinancial activities during a voyage helped to give a sense of accountability to the absentee
owners. Next, the Voyage Report or Trip Report could either be
used as the accounting of one business transaction, as foreseen
by Bennet [1976] and Crittenden [1850], or be used as a micromanagement tool for the control of the company's overall financial operating activities. For example, the records show that the
owners of the ships tracked the profits of the individual trips as
well as the combination of all trips. Finally, the nonfinancial
measures listed in the records could be used for controlling and
monitoring operations.
Of the three ships, the Richard A. Bingham had the best
example of a managerial accounting application. This sophistication can be seen in Exhibit 8, where the bookkeeper of A. R.
Published by eGrove, 1999
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Bingham Shipping Company determined that it was important
to show the cost and income per day of the voyage.
EXHIBIT 8
Summary - Out and Back

Gross Earnings

per day

Net Profit

per day

Gross Expenses per day

Trip #1
71 days

Trip #2
67 days

Trip #3
69 days

24.55

17.29

31.68

F. F. Bingham's
share

10.77

4.22

9.10

Including RLM's
shore profit

13.78

13.07

22.58

Mr. Bingham's need for this type of information is difficult
to surmise. One assumption is that he was viewing each voyage
as a modern opportunity cost. Was he second-guessing himself
about where he could have sent the ship for better profits?
Could Bingham have made better profits elsewhere? The answers to these questions are unknowable. In any case, the practice of pegging costs or revenues to a base was widespread at
this time. For example, the ICC required railroads to track passenger miles and loaded ton miles [ICC, 1907]. The concept of
revenues or costs per passenger mile is still a mainstay for
break-even analysis for modern airlines.
The Adella Shores, in Exhibit 3 above, shows some evidence
of the usage of nonfinancial, managerial accounting measures.
The exhibit indicates record keeping for the fuel usage of the
ship and the draft of water that the ship would draw in certain
situations. The second set of information was important because each harbor was dredged at a different depth. The harbor
pilot who guided the ship to the dock area needed to know the
draft of the ship when it was empty and fully loaded to eliminate the threat of grounding. The Betsy Ann showed n o such
managerial accounting methodology in its financial statements.
However, all of the ships provided sufficient information to
determine such information as a unit-cost per mile.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
As this paper shows, American ship owners developed and
used a "standard model" of ship accounting during the 19th
century. This system developed before the ICC began standardizing ship accounting in 1910. The ship-accounting model
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/15
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could be seen in the accounting textbooks and manuals published during the 19th century. It was a system that was very
utilitarian in nature and developed according to the needs of an
ever-changing shipping industry. Though the ship accounting
was widely standardized in procedures and nature, it was not
necessarily standardized in presentation and style, with each of
the three ships presenting its own version of a Ship or Voyage
Report. Finally, as Table 2 below shows in summation, there
was substantial usage of the 19th century ship-accounting
model by the three ships reviewed for this study. The Richard A.
Bingham most closely matched the procedures in the model.
The other two ships, the Adella Shores and the Betsy Ann,
showed substantial compliance with the model as well.
TABLE 2
A Review of Accounting Practices Noted
in 19th Century Accounting Books
ADELLA
ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLE

SHORES

R. A. BINGHAM

BETSY

ANN

SAMUEL NEFF

F.F. BINGHAM

R.F. LEARNED

NO
YES

YES
YES

Shipments and profits
accounted for against the
purchase price of the ship
Shipments, both revenues
and expenses, are
accounted for as individual
voyages not in total

YES (0. J. Hale)

YES

YES
UNKNOWN
(No p u r c h a s e
account found
with records)
NO

YES

YES

YES

Specific listing of expenses
Captain made debtor of
the voyage transactions

YES
NOT
APPLICABLE
Captain was owner
of ship in this case

YES
YES

The profits are closed to
balance not the ship
account

UNKNOWN
(No balance sheets
found in records)

YES

YES
NOT
APPLICABLE
The ship was
owned by a
corporation.
UNKNOWN
(No balance
sheets found
in records)

Ship's Ledger

NO

YES

YES

Voyage Report
Cash Book

YES

YES
YES
NOT
APPLICABLE
No steam engine
aboard ship.

YES
YES
UNKNOWN
Purchase of fuel
mentioned but
no a m o u n t s
given.

YES

YES

Double-entry accounting
Purchase of ship as an
asset with a ledger account

Fuel Book

Crew Book
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TABLE 2 (Continued)
A Review of Accounting Practices N o t e d
in 19th Century Accounting Books
ADELLA
ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLE
Freight Book
Passage Book

Rating of comparison
between ship practices
and 19th century shipaccounting model — bases
on applicable items

SHORES

R. A. BINGHAM

BETSY

ANN

SAMUEL NEFF

F.F. BINGHAM

R.F. LEARNED

YES
NOT
APPLICABLE
(Did not take
passengers)

YES
NOT
APPLICABLE
(Did not take
passengers)

YES
YES

Nine out
of twelve
75%

Twelve out
of twelve
100%

Nine out
of twelve
75%

The actual presentation of accounting records by the ships
may have been different from that presented in the textbooks.
However, the accounting model used by them was the same
basic model introduced by Bennet [1976] and Gibson [1827] 75
years earlier. The same model was repeated and improved u p o n
throughout the 19th century by authors such as Stone [1839],
Duff [1846], and Soulé [1976]. Though some records of the
three ships were incomplete, making a clear picture of the total
accounting methodology by each ship impossible, the available
records show that there was a "standard" ship-accounting system that met the information needs for the owners of the Adella
Shores, Betsy Ann, and Richard A. Bingham at the turn of the
20th century.
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"DISCOVERING" INDIGENOUS
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Abstract: This study examines the historical usage of accounting as a
technology of government within the domain of government-indigenous peoples relations in Canada. Our thesis is that accounting was
salient within the chain of circumstances that influenced the discovery/identification of indigenous peoples as a governable population.
By the 1830s, accounting techniques had come to occupy a central
place in the military machinery of empire. When the cost-cutting
and reformist sentiments prevalent in Britain during the early 1800s
encouraged the reconsideration of the military costs of empire, accounting techniques were one of the methods used in the attempt to
interrogate military expenditures. Partially as a result of these interrogations, indigenous peoples came to be identified as a site for cost
cutting by British bureaucrats. However, it was at the level of the
colonial administration in the Upper and Lower Canadas that the
c o m p e t i n g d e m a n d s of " g o v e r n m e n t " e n c o u r a g e d i n d i g e n o u s
peoples to be viewed as a potential site for government. And it was
once this "discovery" was made that accounting and other techniques were utilized in the attempt to t u r n indigenous peoples into a
governable population. This study contributes to our understanding
of accounting by documenting the ways in which techniques such as
accounting were central to the military machinery of empire and
British imperialism. The study also contributes to our understanding of the historical antecedents that shape current-day usages of
accounting as a technology of government within the domain of
government-First Nations relations.
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The sun never sets on the British Empire [source unknown].
INTRODUCTION
The "discoveries" of America by Columbus in 1492, the
province of Newfoundland by Cabot in 1497, and the province
of Quebec by Carrier in 1534 [Wright, 1993, p. 122] marked the
beginning of 250 years of struggle between the imperial powers
of France and Britain for control of the territory we now call
Canada and its inhabitants. Both France and Britain courted
the indigenous peoples as important military allies in the periodic skirmishes that occurred. When the British Empire ultimately prevailed over France in 1760, it subsequently issued a
Royal Proclamation in 1763 recognizing the rights of aboriginal
peoples to unceded lands and stating that the negotiations between Britain and aboriginal peoples would be on a nation-tonation basis [Royal Proclamation, 1763]. In the subsequent war
of independence with the United States, aboriginal peoples
were encouraged to side with Britain in return for parcels of
land in Upper Canada [Report on the Affairs of Indians in
Canada, 1847, S3, p. 5.1]. l
In the 250 years since this Royal Proclamation, relations
between the remnants of the British Empire and First Nations
peoples have certainly changed. Nation-to-nation relations have
been replaced by paternal relations in which the government of
Canada has attempted , through coercive tutelage [Dyck, 1997],
to "govern" [Foucault, 1991] the affairs of First N a t i o n s
peoples. The recent Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples
[1996], for example, documented the ways in which the Canadian government has attempted to assimilate and otherwise
manage the affairs of indigenous peoples [see particularly Volu m e 1, Chapters 8-10]. Through the bureaucratic mechanisms
of the Department of Indian Affairs and the supporting "Indian
Act," the state has attempted to exercise action at a distance
over First Nations peoples. Within these attempts at governance, accounting techniques such as funding and taxation relations have been used to encourage/discourage certain behaviors
[see also Reform Party, 1997].
In certain ways these shifts in relations parallel more general shifts in the "art of government." Miller and Rose [1990, p.
2] commented that the modern state has come to rely on tech-

1

We subsequently refer to this Report as RAIC with Sections I and II being
published
in 1844
and Section III in 1847.
Published by eGrove,
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nologies of government to align economic, political, and social
objectives. Through "apparently humble and m u n d a n e mechanisms" such as "techniques of notation, computation and calculation," along with professional expertises [Miller and Rose,
1990, p. 8], government is exercised in the attempt to enable
action at a distance — to incite, induce, and seduce populations
to behave in certain ways [Foucault, 1984, p. 171]. Since the
19th century, these techniques of rule have supplemented and
mostly supplanted more direct forms of sovereign power in
core countries [Foucault, 1991, p. 102]. However, as Fanon
[1963] stated, within the colonial context force continues to
form the backdrop for more subtle forms of governance.
If, as we suggest, Canada's indigenous population has come
to be viewed by the state as a population to be "governed," how
did the slippage from a nation-to-nation relationship to a paternal relationship occur and how did First Nations peoples come
to be targeted as a site for government? Furthermore, when
were accounting techniques introduced as a technology of government? In answering these questions, this study suggests that
the following circumstances contributed to the "discovery" of
indigenous peoples as a population to be governed. By the
1830s, accounting techniques had come to occupy a central
place in the military machinery of empire. When the cost-cutting and reformist sentiments prevalent in Britain during the
early 1800s encouraged the reconsideration of the military costs
of empire, accounting techniques were one of the methods used
in the attempt to interrogate military expenditures. Partially as
a result of these interrogations, indigenous peoples came to be
identified as a site for cost cutting by British bureaucrats. However, it was at the level of the colonial administration in the
Upper and Lower Canadas that the competing d e m a n d s of
"government" encouraged indigenous peoples to be viewed as a
potential site for government. 2 It was once this "discovery" was
made that accounting and other techniques were utilized in the
attempt to turn indigenous peoples into a governable population.
This study contributes to our understanding of accounting
in two ways. First, the study documents the ways in which
techniques such as accounting were central to the military ma2

Throughout this study we use the term Canadas as a short-form for the
Maritimes, Upper Canada, and Lower Canada. Although similarities undoubtedly exist with the m a n n e r in which indigenous peoples were treated in the
western territories, our analysis focuses on the aforementioned three regions.
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chinery of empire. Authors such as Headrick [1981] have argued that the "hardware of imperialism"— technical innovations such as the Gatling gun, the steamboat, quinine, etc. —
contributed to the success of European imperialism. More recently it has been recognized that the "software of imperialism"
— professional expertises such as geography, accounting, etc.
— also played a role in imperialism [Said, 1993; Bell et al.,
1995; Neu, 1997]. The current study contributes to this line of
inquiry by documenting the intertwining of accounting within
the military machinery of empire.
Second, the study locates the m o m e n t a n d m a n n e r in
w h i c h accounting techniques first c a m e to be focused o n
Canada's indigenous population. Within the domain of presentday, government-First Nations relations, government policy appears to be directed at encouraging action at a distance. But
how did accounting techniques come to penetrate this domain?
The analysis provided seeks to "identify the accidents, the
minute deviations. . . . that gave birth to those things that continue to exist" [Foucault, 1984, p. 81]. This study contributes to
our understanding of the historical antecedents that shape current-day usages of accounting as a technology of government.
In doing so, the study illustrates the persistence of accounting
as a technology of government within the domain of government-First Nations relations.
GOVERNING THE EMPIRE
Imperialism means thinking about, settling on, controlling land that you do not possess, that is distant,
that is lived on and owned by others [Said, 1993, p. 5].
By all accounts, the 19th century was the age of the British
E m p i r e [cf H o b s o n , 1902; H e a d r i c k , 1 9 8 1 ; D a v i s a n d
Huttenback, 1986]. The amount of territory controlled by Britain and the population under its tutelage increased sevenfold
and twentyfold respectively:
The British Empire alone, already formidable in 1800
with a land area of 1.5 million square miles and a
population of twenty million, increased its land area
sevenfold and its population twentyfold in the following hundred years [Headrick, 1981, p. 3].
Although other European imperial powers were also expanding
during this time period, between 1800 and 1914 the a m o u n t of
the world's land surface controlled by Europeans increased
Published by eGrove, 1999
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from 35 percent to 84 percent [Headrick, 1981, p. 3]. Britain
was perhaps the most successful [Barclay, 1976, p. 1].
In a t t e m p t i n g to explain the success of i m p e r i a l i s m ,
Headrick [1981, p. 9] suggested that imperialism occurred
when both adequate motives and means were present for imperial expansion. Economic motives were assumed to be adequate
motives for the expansion of the British Empire [Hobson, 1902,
p. 59]; business interests at least benefitted from imperial expansion even if the British taxpayer ended up absorbing the
costs of empire [Davis and Huttenback, 1986, p. 317]. Adequate
means referred to the existence of technologies that supported
imperial expansion and control [Headrick, 1981, 1988].
Headrick [1981] argued that the adoption of new technologies for military purposes provided the means for imperial expansion. For example, the development of steam gunboats
aided in the colonization of India [pp. 17-42]; the identification
of quinine as a protection against malaria along with steam
gunboats assisted in the colonization of Africa [p. 73]; and the
development of breech-loading and repeat-firing guns throughout the colonies allowed for the subjugation of indigenous
peoples [p. 115]. Additionally, technologies such as steamships,
railways, and communication cables furthered both military
and economic purposes. These technologies have been referred
to as the "hardware of imperialism" [Bell et al., 1995].
Parallelling the development of such hardware was the development of "softer" expertises and disciplines, what Bell et al.
[1995, p. 2] referred to as the software of imperialism. Disciplinary knowledges such as geography, medicine, and accounting helped imperial powers come to "know" the territories and
inhabitants under their control [Said, 1979, p. 84; Bell et al.,
1995, p. 4]. These techniques sorted, sifted, and classified, allowing knowledges of "distant places...to be mobilized [and]
brought home to centres of calculation in the form of maps,
drawings, readings" [Miller and Rose, 1990, p. 9].
Miller and Rose [1990, p. 8] used the phrase "technologies
of government" to denote the roles played by softer and indirect
techniques such as accounting in the act of governing at "home
and abroad:"
We use the term technologies to suggest a particular
approach to the analysis of the activity of ruling, one
which pays great attention to the actual mechanisms
through which authorities of various sorts have sought
to shape, normalize and instrumentalize the conduct,
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/15
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thought, decisions and aspirations of others in order to
achieve the objectives they consider desirable.
Miller and Rose [1990, p. 16] specifically mentioned techniques
of accounting (i.e.; techniques of notation, computation, and
calculation) and discussed the implementation of discounted
cash flow analysis in Britain. Although the focus of Miller and
Rose's [1990, p. 9] analysis was on the usage of technologies of
government within imperial centers, they acknowledged the
roles played by these technologies in the colonies. Likewise,
Said [1979, p. 40] discussed the role of softer technologies
within the processes of colonization, and Neu [1997] examined
how accounting techniques in colonial Canada were used to
control and contain indigenous peoples. These studies hinted at
the ways in which technologies of government were intertwined
with the hardware of imperialism. The current study builds on
these insights in examining the intertwining of accounting with
the military apparatuses of empire. 3
MILITARY MACHINERY AND ACCOUNTING CALCULATION
Following the Napoleonic Wars in the early 1800s, economic retrenchment became the principal objective of British
government in the attempt to reduce the national debt [Spiers,
1980, p. 74]. Not surprisingly, the military became a primary
target for such reduction given that military expenditures were
the main items of public expenditure. "Expenditure on the
a r m y a n d o r d n a n c e fell f r o m 4 3 , 2 5 6 , 2 6 0 £ in 1815 t o
10,699,865£ in 1820; thereafter it slipped below 10£ million,
plummeting to just under 8£ million in 1836" [Spiers, 1980, p.
74]. Coinciding with this crisis of expenditure was an increase
in anti-military sentiment at home and the emergence of a
strong reform sentiment [Sweetman, 1984, pp. 15,17]. Together
these sentiments encouraged a "deluge of official action," including bills and the formation of select committees to examine
various aspects of public policy and government administration.
Colonial military operations were neither spared from
these reform and cost-saving sentiments nor from official government actions. On February 18, 1834, the British House of
Commons ordered "that a select Committee be appointed to
3
We treat the notion of governmentality and technologies of government
as a "field of investigation" (Miller and Rose, 1995) and theorize these techniques within the broader notion(s) of imperialism/colonialism.
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inquire into the Military Establishment and Expenditure in the
Colonies and Dependencies of The Crown" [Report, 1834, Vol.
1, p. 1]. The Committee gathered evidence, interviewed witnesses, and presented the first volume of its report to the House
of Commons in August 1834. The second volume was completed and presented to the House of Commons in 1835. In
these reports, the Committee examined military establishments
and expenditures in the colonies of Gibraltar, Malta, the Ionian
Islands, the Western Coast of Africa, the Cape of Good Hope,
and the Island of Ceylon [in Vol. 1] and New South Wales, Van
Diemen's Land, and the North American Provinces [in Vol. 2].
The published report of the Select Committee contains the Select Committee's analysis and recommendations along with
minutes of evidence from witnesses and supplementary appendices. 4
The Report is an exceptional document produced at a specific juncture in time, partially in response to the demands for
administrative reform and increased economy in the military.
More specifically, the Report illustrates how, at least at this
m o m e n t in time, the military machinery of empire relied on
techniques such as accounting. In his examination of the administration of the British military during this time period,
Sweetman [1984, p. 3] made a similar point when he commented that the "development of improved techniques of accounting . . . created the impetus for efficiency which reflected
throughout the [military] administrative system."
The m a n d a t e of the Select Committee and the Reports
themselves illustrate this intertwining of the hardware and software of empire. The mandate of the Select Committee was to
inquire into both the adequacy of military establishments and
the cost of these establishments. Throughout the minutes of
evidence, witnesses were repeatedly asked to juxtapose and balance these two goals. And in the final Report, the first two
recommendations explicitly dealt with the adequacy of force
and the cost of maintaining this force:
Resolved, That it is not the Intention of this Committee
. . . to relieve the Executive Government from the Duty
which constitutionally belongs to it, of providing . . . A

4
In subsequent discussions we refer to the published output of the Select
Committee as "The Report," which consists of the Select Committee's analysis
and recommendations, along with the minutes of evidence and supplementary
appendices.
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force sufficient for the Security of His Majesty's Possessions abroad [Report, Vol. 1., p. iii, emphases added].
and:
Resolved, That the Committee are of the Opinion, That
the strictest Economy should be observed in every
branch of Military Expenditure of the Colonies; and
that any surplus Revenue that may remain after defraying their Civil Expenses. . . be applied to the payment
of their Military Charges [Report, Vol. 1, p. iii, emphases added].
Thus, the mandate of the Select Committee and the final Report
itself set up as mutual goals the maintenance of effective and
efficient military force in the colonies [cf. Report, Vol. 2, pp. 26,
44].
It was these notions of efficiency and economy so prevalent
in reformist discourses at this time [cf. Sweetman, 1984, p. 13]
which provided the rhetorical space for accounting techniques.
In attempting to assess the economy of military operations in
distant places, the Committee turned not only to eyewitnesses
b u t to accounting techniques and records. Consistent with the
comments of Miller and Rose [1990, p. 8], [ a c c o u n t i n g records
provided the Select Committee with a short-form representation of distant events. By providing this information to decision
makers in the imperial center, accounting helped to render
these distant locales "governable."
Throughout the Report is the recognition that accounting
is a "useful" technology with regards to governing military operations. The Report contains an extended discussion of the
accounting records for individual detachments and whether
these records provide appropriate information [Report, Vol. 2,
pp. 63-64, 83]. In keeping with the emphasis on economy, questions posed by the lawyer for the Select Committee to a bureaucrat from the military asked whether accounting methods promoted economy:
Q.

If those two are able to keep the accounts in the
whole of Newfoundland for 276 rank and file, how
is it that so large a staff is kept in those parts of
Canada where detachments from only 10 to 50
men exist?

A.

. . . The same description of accounts are necessary for a detachment of 50 men as are necessary
for a regiment of 800, provided the regiment of
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800 is at one post; but if the regiment is scattered
over different p a r t s of the country, t h e n t h a t
would impose additional labour upon the commissariat, because each detachment would require the
same description of accounts to be rendered in
duplicate, and the same description of vouchers
[Report, Vol. 2, p. 63].
The notion of economy also motivated discussions regarding
the prevention of fraud [Report, Vol. 2, pp. 57, 73] and discussions regarding how often the accounts of different detachments/regiments/commissariats were audited and by w h o m [p.
65]. From these examples, it appears that accounting techniques were viewed as an integral tool in the government of
military operations.
The Report itself not only discussed accounting techniques
but used accounting numbers. [Accounting data were interspersed throughout the Report, usually with the effect of making visible certain aspects of military operations. For example,
included in the appendices were tables listing the cost to Britain of military operations in different colonies.
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FIGURE 1
AN ACCOUNT of the AMOUNT paid by Great

Britain

for the MILITARY EXPENDITURE

Source: Appendix to Report from Select Committee on Military Expenditure
[1835]

Other tables enumerated the n u m b e r and distribution of effective forces, including a breakdown of officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers in Canada [Report, Vol. 2, p. 96],
whereas yet other tables summarized the "pay, allowances,
emoluments, advantages and salaries" accruing to different
military personnel in different locations [Report, Vol. 2, pp. 90Published95].
by eGrove, 1999
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Source: Appendix to ReportfromSelect Committee on Military Expenditure [1835]
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This cost information was then referred to in the questioning of
witnesses regarding the appropriate military force at a particular location.
In these ways, accounting information represented to the
Select Committee the state of affairs in the colonies and thereby
provided a starting point for examining issues of military
economy. This information also created the illusion that it was
possible to compare the military efficiency of disparate locales.
For example, a recurrent theme in the questioning of military
officials by the Select Committee was the differential cost of
military personnel in Nova Scotia vis-a-vis the rest of Canada:
It appears by the Returns that the n u m b e r of troops in
Nova Scotia and in Canada are nearly equal; that there
is not a difference of above 200 between the a m o u n t of
troops in Canada and Nova Scotia: be kind enough to
explain to the Committee why there is such a difference between the amount of the expense of the commissariat at Canada and Nova Scotia; and state why it
should be three times the a m o u n t at the one place as it
is at the other, for nearly the same n u m b e r of troops
[Report, Vol. 2, p. 55]?
Although the locales under consideration were quite different,
the Committee kept returning to the issue of cost differences,
asking the witnesses to explain why two jurisdictions in the
same general geographic area [i.e., North America] had such
different costs [cf. Report, Vol. 2, pp. 53, 55, 72]. This reliance
on accounting data to compare locations is not surprising
since, as Miller and Rose [1990, p. 7] commented, programs of
government depend on apparently "stable, mobile, combinable
and comparable" data because such data render the domain
under consideration "susceptible to evaluation, calculation and
intervention."
Accounting information not only provided a starting point
for comparing the military efficiency of different locales as represented in n u m b e r s but also for interrogating the military
judgments of the expert witnesses. For example, cost data pertaining to the governor of Newfoundland's ship provided the
starting point for the following line of questioning directed at
the former governor of Newfoundland:
Is there not a vessel or yacht for the governor's use at
Newfoundland? Yes, there is . . . What is the a m o u n t of
expense? The contract for the vessel is 2,300£ a year
[pp. 32-33] . . . do you consider it absolutely necessary
Published by eGrove, 1999
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that a yacht should be kept up, or so large a vessel as at
present? I think that it is quite necessary that the vessel
should be kept up. The size at present is not more than
adequate for the purpose for which she is wanted. She
is not wanted exclusively for the governor's use; she is
r e q u i r e d w h e n n e c e s s a r y to send d e t a c h m e n t s of
troops to different parts of the islands, and she should
be able to carry them...and she has been sent to cruize
when complaints have been made of the conduct of the
French with respect to the fishery and to prevent smuggling and other duties [p. 40].
In this example, accounting data made visible certain aspects of
military operations in the Canadian colony. Select Committee
members focused their questions on these aspects, asking the
military witnesses to justify in military terms the appropriateness of these expenditures.
In another instance, accounting data were used to frame
the decision as to whether "regular forces" or the militia should
be used to defend Canada. These kinds of questions were directed toward a lieutenant colonel stationed in Nova Scotia:
Q.

Is the militia force a popular force in Nova Scotia?

A.

I should say it is certainly

Q.

How are the officers and men paid when embodied?

A.

They are paid by a vote of the House of Assembly...

Q.

Is not the pay very inferior to that which they can
obtain by labour or by any work as artisans or
labourers?

A.

The pay is very inferior . . .

Q.

Then taking that into consideration, and taking
into consideration the difficulty of finding employment for emigrants...do you think there would be
any doubt of finding a sufficient n u m b e r of men
for the militia at as low a rate of pay as British
soldiers?

A.

Emigrants without money would e n l i s t . . .

Q.

Supposing the experiment were tried . . . do you,
in a military point of view see any objection to
employing a proportion of that force, and releasing an equivalent proportion of the regular force
of the country?
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A.

If it were possible to have the militia as perfectly
trained as our militia were during the late war, I
should see no objection to a certain portion, but I
doubt that being practicable [Report, Vol. 2, pp.
28-29].

The above line of questioning illustrates the ways in which the
Select Committee forced its military witnesses to justify their
military judgments in terms of cost efficiency. The issue of cost
as constructed through accounting reports continually framed
and set the parameters for military judgments.
As hinted in the above examples, accounting techniques
and data provided a "map" of distant military operations, making visible the military configurations of these distant locales.
The maps formed by apparently stable, combinable, and comparable accounting data [Miller and Rose, 1990, pp. 7, 9]
brought home to the "centers of calculation" information about
colonial m i l i t a r y a r r a n g e m e n t s , t h e r e b y allowing "local"
knowledges to be mobilized by imperial powers [Said, 1979, p.
44]. Accounting numbers helped operationalize the discourse of
economy [cf. Power, 1992, p. 478; Neu and Taylor, 1996, p. 451]
and thereby created a discursive framework in which military
decisions were viewed and ultimately had to be justified. This
same data also provided the Select Committee with a starting
basis for questioning and interrogating the opinions and judgments of military witnesses. By continually juxtaposing the
"truths" as m a d e visible by accounting n u m b e r s with the
"truths" enunciated by military personnel, the Select Committee sought to understand the state of military operations in
these distant colonies.
The foregoing analysis illustrates the ways in which the
military machinery of empire at this juncture relied on accounting techniques. Accounting techniques had penetrated the domain of military operations and appeared to function not only
as the guidance system for the empire's military machinery but
also as a useful technology for interrogating the military costs
during this period of economic retrenchment. In the next sections, we analyze how indigenous peoples came to be viewed as
a site for cost cutting and, subsequently, as a population to be
governed.
A SITE FOR COST CUTTING
Relations between Canada's indigenous peoples and the
British military date back to at least the 1600s. In 1670, Charles
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II issued a code of instructions to the governors of the Canadian colonies instructing the military to "at no time give any
just provocation to any of the said Indians that are at peace
with us" [RAIC, 1844, p. a.3]. Throughout the subsequent colonial skirmishes, the British military sought to cultivate indigenous peoples as allies in their battles with the French and in
the subsequent War of Independence. Following the capitulation of the French in North America in 1760, Britain formally
recognized the rights of indigenous peoples in the Royal Proclamation of 1763:
And whereas it is just and reasonable and essential to
our interest and the security of our Colonies, that the
several natives or Tribes of Indians, with whom we are
connected, and who live under our protection, should
not be molested or disturbed in the possession of such
part of our dominions and territories, as not having
been ceded to us, are reserved to them, or any of them
as their hunting grounds.
Not only did the Proclamation recognize the rights of indigenous peoples to unceded land, it stated that negotiations between Britain and indigenous peoples would be on a nation-tonation basis [Milloy, 1983].
Even after the defeat of France, the British military continued to cultivate indigenous peoples as allies. The annual distribution of "presents" to indigenous peoples was the primary
method of maintaining this military support:
From the earliest period of the connexion between the
Indians and the British Government it has been customary to distribute annually certain presents, consisting chiefly of clothing and ammunition. . . . The objective at that period was doubtless in the first instance to
conciliate the Indians, to ensure their services, and to
supply their wants as warriors in the field; and afterwards, in times of peace, to secure their allegiance towards the British Crown, and their good will and
peaceful behaviour towards the white settlers [RAIC,
1844, p. 6].
The military connection between indigenous peoples and the
British empire was formally recognized in 1816 with the transfer of jurisdiction over Indian affairs to the Commander of the
Forces. The Indian Department, as it came to be called, was
responsible for the yearly distribution of presents and other
matters pertaining to relations between the military and indigenous peoples:
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The system of dealing with them was essentially military. For a long time they were under the head of the
military department, and were considered and treated
as military allies or stipendiaries [RAIC, 1844, p. 6]
Therefore, relations between the military and indigenous
peoples were not i m m u n e to the cost-cutting sentiments of the
times. The cost-cutting sentiments prevalent in Britain encouraged the continual whittling away of the budget for the military
[Sweetman, 1984, p. 17] which, in turn, impacted upon military
operations in the Canadian provinces. As early as 1822, the
Colonial Secretary for the Canadian provinces "contemplated a
reduction of the Indian Department, with a view to its ultimate
abolition" [RAIC, 1844, p. 7]. In 1829, the Lords of Treasury
and the Secretary of State issued an order that "the whole expense of the [Indian] Department should not exceed 20,000£."
In 1832, an accounting allocation change was recommended
that the charges for the Indian Department be separated from
other charges relating to colonial operations in Canada when
being presented to Parliament for approval:
Previously to this period the charges for the presents,
including those given on account of the annuities payable for lands surrendered, had been yearly granted by
the British Parliament in a separate vote, while the
salaries and pensions of the officers of the Indian Department had been paid from the military chest. This
course being considered irregular, Lord Goderich proposed that for the future, the land-payments or annuities payable for land surrendered, which were confined to Upper Canada, should be charged on the
Casual or Territorial Revenue of that Province, while
the remaining charge, having been originally incurred
with the view of securing the services of Indians in
wars, for British, and not exclusively colonial interests,
ought, according to His Lordship's view, to be provided
by the Imperial Parliament [RAIC, 1844, p. 8].
This shift in policy, which was implemented in 1834, had the
effect of making visible the costs of maintaining current relations with indigenous peoples. These cost-cutting sentiments
and accounting policy changes would reemerge in the 1835 Select Committee Report, contributing to the Report's ultimate
conclusion that the Indian Department should be abolished.
During the inquiry phase of the Select Committee, the Indian Department was subjected to the same scrutiny as other
military operations. For example, accounting data regarding
Published by eGrove, 1999
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costs provided the starting point for asking a senior military
official about the functions of the Indian Department vis-a-vis
the commissariat:
Q.

It appears by the Returns that there are 40 m e n at
Penetanguishene, and yet there are two deputy
commissary-generals at an expense of 273£, and
223£; there is an issuer and a labourer at 79£;
making a total of 650£ for the mere commissariat:
how can they be employed?

A.

Penetanguishene is now the great depot in Upper
Canada, from whence presents are issued to the
Indians; but that will not justify, in my opinion,
keeping permanently there so great a commissariat establishment [Report, Vol. 2, p. 52].

The answer to the above question suggested an overlap in the
duties of the two departments. Following up on this suggestion,
the Select Committee asked subsequent expert witnesses (e.g.,
deputy assistant commissary-general located in the Canadas)
questions regarding the micro-details of present distribution
and whether both departments were necessary:
Q:

Have you yourself attended any of those [present]
distributions? . . . At what place? . . . How many
Indians attended? . . . At what months in the year?
. . . What were the articles distributed? . . . Did you
take all those things up with you, or is there any
depot kept there? . . . On your arrival there, what
measures are taken, and how is the distribution
regulated? . . . Do any observations occur to you,
as to a better and cheaper mode of distribution
t h a n that which is now used [pp. 73-74]?

Q:

Can you give us any information as to the distribution of presents, and how far the duties now performed by the commissariat may be performed by
the Indian Department, or the duties of the Indian
Department performed by the commissariat?

A:

I should think the commissariat would be quite
competent to distribute the presents without any
Indian Department, which is quite an expensive
machine [p. 77].

and:

As the above questions illustrate, once the Indian Department
had been identified as a potential site for cost cutting, subsequent questions honed in on the actual duties performed by the
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department and the overlap with duties performed by the commissariat.
Given the parameters of the Select Committee's m a n d a t e
and the direction of the questions, the Report's final conclusion
regarding the Indian Department is not surprising:
Resolved: That the Committee are of the opinion from
the Evidence taken, and to which they refer, that the
Indian Department may be greatly reduced, if not entirely abolished, a n d they therefore call attention of the
House to the same; and also to the expenses of articles
annually distributed to the Indians, and whether any
arrangement may not be made to dispense with such
distribution in future, or to commute the presents for
money [Report, Vol. 2, p. iii].
The evidence indicated that the military support provided by
indigenous peoples was less needed in the 1830s t h a n in earlier
periods. This diminished need, coupled with the discourse of
economy and the emphasis throughout the Committee's process
on cost cutting, made the final recommendation that the Indian
Department be abolished quite predictable.
The preceding analysis proposes that concerns regarding
the costs of maintaining Britain's empire indirectly contributed
to the identification of indigenous peoples in the Canadas as a
site for cost cutting. Specifically, it was the interrogation of
military costs in the colonies by the Select Committee that
made visible the costs of the Indian Department. However, it is
important to note that the identification of the Indian Department as a site for cost cutting by British bureaucrats is not
synonymous with indigenous peoples coming to be identified as
a site for governance, notwithstanding that it contributed. As
the next section proposes, it was colonial administrators with
responsibilities for the Canadas who, in attempting to balance
the competing demands of "government," encouraged this shift.
DISCOVERING INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
The recommendation of the Select Committee that the Indian Department be abolished was, perhaps, the most visible
signal to colonial a d m i n i s t r a t o r s t h a t the "economics" of
Canada's indigenous peoples needed to be addressed. However,
as we propose, it was the intersection of this funding issue,
along with the other "problems of government" confronting colonial administrators, that encouraged the discovery/identification of indigenous peoples as a potential site of government.
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At this juncture in time, the Canadas were undergoing significant changes. Following the American Revolution, "thousands of Loyalists poured into the Maritimes, sharply increasing pressures on the Aboriginal land and resource base" [Royal
Commission, 1996, p. 6]. Likewise, the early 1800s witnessed
the influx of immigrants from Britain, Ireland, and Scotland as
the British government and charitable organizations provided
generous aid to would-be settlers [Francis et al., 1988, p. 215].
As the Colonial Magazine [1840, p. 305] noted, in Upper Canada
"during a period of thirteen years from 1823 to 1836, the increase of population was 200,000 alone, viz. from 150,000 to
350,000." This influx of immigrants radically changed the relative numbers of settlers vis-a-vis indigenous peoples. By 1812,
the nonaboriginal population in Upper Canada outnumbered
the aboriginal population by 10:1, a ratio that increased further
in the subsequent decades [Royal Commission, 1996, p. 6]. In
turn, the activities of the settlers created problems of government for colonial administrators.
The increase in immigration led to increased pressure for
land. In the Maritimes, "the landless new immigrants pursued
agriculture and the export of timber, and although parcels of
land had been set aside for the Indian peoples of the region,
squatting and other incursions on the Aboriginal land base inevitably occurred" [Royal Commission, 1996, p. 6]. Changing
economic activities, from the fur trade to agriculture, led to
increasing incompatible pursuits of settlers and indigenous
peoples, who were being marginalized from the development of
agriculture [Royal Commission, 1996, p. 7]. As wheat farming
a n d t i m b e r b e c a m e the b a c k b o n e of the Upper C a n a d i a n
economy during the 1815-1860 period [Francis et al., 1988, p.
223], increased calls came for the discouragement of nomadic
lifestyles and the containment of indigenous peoples on specific
tracts of land.
As Canada's population and economic activity were expanding rapidly during this period, Britain was becoming increasingly reluctant to bear the costs [cf. Cook and McNaught,
1963, p. 316]. Thus colonial officials were faced with the problem of reconciling three interrelated but potentially conflicting
policy objectives. First was the need for greater fiscal responsibility. Second was the related issue of the need to control and
contain indigenous peoples and to prevent their interference
with settlement activities. Indigenous peoples were, by the
terms of the Royal Proclamation, assuming rights of occupancy
on land that colonial officials wished to sell to settlers [Royal
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Commission, 1996]. Abolishing the Indian Department in the
n a m e of cost cutting, however, would be contrary to the increased containment of indigenous peoples. The third objective
was in response to reformist sentiments of the day, from a
multitude of sources, that emphasized the need to "protect and
civilize" indigenous peoples.
Protestant sects which were in the throes of evangelical
m o v e m e n t s stressed t h e n e e d to C h r i s t i a n i z e i n d i g e n o u s
peoples [Milloy, 1983, p. 56; Tobias, 1983, p. 40]:
Many of these sects established missions among the
Indians, similar to those the Jesuits and other Catholic
orders had been carrying on for generations. Such Missions were intended not only to teach the Indian a new
religion, but also to encourage him to adopt European
or American values [Tobias, 1983, p. 41].
In Britain, the Humanitarians argued for the protection and
civilization of the Indian as did romantic writers on both sides
of the Atlantic [Tobias, 1983, p. 41]. These sentiments tempered
the economic solutions being contemplated by colonial administrators. As we argue below, it was by attempting to reconcile
these diverse objectives that indigenous peoples came to be
identified as a site for governance.
In responding to the specific recommendations of the Select Committee and these more general problems of government, Lord Glenelg, Secretary of State for the Colonies, stated
that the recommendation to eliminate the distribution of presents was inappropriate at the current time (1835):
I feel bound, after m u c h consideration, to express my
opinion, that the time has not yet arrived at which it
would be possible, consistently with good faith, altogether to discontinue the annual presents to the Indians [RAIC, 1844, p. 9].
The rationale for this opinion was the belief that such a decision would be "impolitic" and that elimination of presents
would hinder efforts to "civilize" indigenous peoples (i.e., would
be contrary to other government objectives). However, the annual distribution of presents could be modified to help accomplish this goal with the aim of eventually "diminishing their
amount, with a view to the ultimate abrogation of the existing
custom" [RAIC, 1844, p. 9]. Toward this end, Glenelg directed
the governors of the Canadian colonies to examine ways of
modifying the type of presents distributed with the aim of encouraging
both
"civilization" and self-sufficiency:
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Looking, however, to the moral and religious improvement of the Indians, and their instruction in the arts of
civilized life, as the principal object to be kept in view
in our intercourse with these tribes, I a m anxious that
your enquiries should be specifically directed to the
practicability of effecting a commutation of the presents for some object of permanent benefit to the parties now receiving them.
Although Glenelg did not specifically mention the objective of
controlling/containing i n d i g e n o u s peoples, the m a n n e r in
which the distribution of presents was subsequently modified
had this effect [Neu, 1997].
The solution to the dilemmas of government proposed by
Glenelg articulated a changed view of indigenous peoples. By
voicing the sentiment that the type of presents distributed could
be manipulated to encourage the "civilization" of indigenous
peoples, while at the same time satisfying the demands of settlers that indigenous peoples be contained, Lord Glenelg simultaneously constructed indigenous peoples as a population to be
governed and proposed the appropriate technology for government funding relations. Although isolated attempts at governance via the manipulation of presents had occurred prior to this
[cf. Neu, 1997, p. 22], Glenelg's statement defined and fores h a d o w e d B r i t i s h g o v e r n m e n t policy t o w a r d i n d i g e n o u s
peoples for the next 20 years.
It is important to note that the proposed solution indirectly
addressed the three competing dilemmas of government. The
specific costs associated with the Indian Department would be
reduced over time and, if successful, indigenous peoples would
both be contained and civilized. Furthermore, over the longer
term, this strategy of containment would make it easier for
colonial officials to buy and resell the land previously occupied
by indigenous peoples since this land was n o longer central to
their subsistence. Thus, the proposed solution partially reconciled the competing demands facing officials at this juncture.
Throughout the chain of events leading to the discovery/
identification of indigenous peoples as a potential site for governance, accounting techniques were salient. Accounting techniques were implicated in the Select Committee process and in
the ultimate recommendation that the Indian Department be
abolished. Glenelg's solution also proposed the manipulation of
funding relations as a method of reconciling the competing
policy objectives. As we will see in the next section, accounting
techniques also assisted in the translation of this generalized
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plan into practice. Throughout this chain of events, accounting
techniques and numbers appear to have functioned as an "ideological circle" [Smith, 1990] in that accounting calculations
both framed the problem and suggested a potential solution
that was consistent with the original framing [cf. Neu and Taylor, 1996, p. 452].
To state that accounting was salient to the process of discovering indigenous peoples as a potential site of governance is
neither to suggest that discovery occurred at a single m o m e n t
in time [cf. Foucault, 1984, p. 80] nor to assert a form of accounting-centrism whereby it is presumed that accounting is
unilaterally responsible for this shift. The preceding analysis
highlighted the idiosyncratic chain of events and circumstances
which encouraged Glenelg's articulation. Undoubtedly Glenelg's
construction of indigenous peoples as a potentially governable
population echoed and harmonized [cf. Lehman and Tinker,
1987, p. 509] with other dominant constructions of the times
[cf. Royal Commission, 1996] and thus should be viewed as, in
part, an explicit (albeit "official") statement of the Zeitgeist of
the times. However this being said, it seems safe to assert that it
was d u r i n g this general j u n c t u r e in time t h a t indigenous
peoples came to be viewed as a potentially governable population. As the preceding analysis documents, accounting was intertwined with this chain of events and, thus, salient to the
discovery.
IMPOSING GOVERNMENTALITY
While Lord Glenelg's s t a t e m e n t s identified indigenous
peoples as a potential site for governance, other government
bureaucrats soon realized that to govern a population, one had
to first "know" that population. Said [1979, p. 36] nicely captured this dialectic between knowledge and colonial government when he noted that:
Knowledge of subject races . . . is what makes their
m a n a g e m e n t easy and profitable; knowledge gives
power, more power requires more knowledge, and so
on in an increasingly profitable dialectic of information and control.
Said's comments point to the ways in which knowledge of indigenous peoples is a prerequisite for effective and efficient
colonial government.
Apparently one of the first steps in obtaining the knowledge
necessary for effective government of indigenous peoples was
to request
a census
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In the spring of 1837, the Lords of the Treasury, with
the view to enable His Majesty's Government to determine what ulterior arrangements it might be expedient
to adopt for the purpose of encouraging the Indians to
a d o p t agricultural p u r s u i t s , and acquire h a b i t s of
settled industry . . . issued the following set of queries,
which were transmitted to the Governor of either Province, and answered in considerable detail [RAIC, 1844,
p. 11].
1st. The n u m b e r of tribes and of Indians resident
within the British Territory
2nd. The pursuits of each tribe, with the n u m b e r of
fixed locations occupied by the Indians
3rd. The situation of the locations of the settled parties
or of hunting grounds occupied by the other Indians
4th. The extent of lands set apart at the different locations, for the use of the Indians, or of the hunting
ranges
5th. The persons employed in the superintendence of
the settled Indians, or of the other Tribes, with the
designations and salaries, and a summary of the duties
they have to perform
6th. The n u m b e r and description of the Clergy or
teachers attached to each tribe or party
7th. Whether the expenses of the tribe or party are
defrayed by the Parliamentary grant or from the land
payments, out of the Territorial Revenue of the Crown.
As the above questions indicate, this census sought to represent
the population of indigenous peoples with an emphasis on how
large the population was, where they resided, how they lived,
and, perhaps most importantly, how expensive they were to the
Crown.
This usage of a census was the first systematic attempt to
gather information on indigenous peoples; however, this technique had been used previously in Britain. The period 18011831 marked the introduction of the population census in Britain [Lawton, 1978, p. 12]. Cullen [1975, p. 13] argued that the
introduction of a population census was intended to provide
rhetorical support for Britain's military endeavors:
More accurate information would enable the government to form more effective policies, particularly with
regard to the recruitment of the armed forces. The cenhttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/15
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sus . . . would show a substantial population increase,
thus demonstrating the nation's growing prosperity
and allaying domestic discontent.
In the three decades following the introduction of a population
census, this technique of government was a favored starting
point for addressing issues of the day:
The many environmental, social and economic problems of the nineteenth century — health and disease,
housing and sanitation, employment and unemployment, deprivation and poverty — gave rise to an abundance of Royal Commissions and Committees of Enquiry and local government investigations a n d
committee reports. But, in these and related matters,
the census of population must often be the starting
point of investigation [Lawton, 1978, p. 21].
The census was applied to various populations within society —
national crime statistics began to be published in 1810, education statistics in 1818, and the health of factory children in
1816 [Cullen, 1975, pp. 13-16]. In this regard, the transference
of this technique to indigenous peoples can be seen as an outgrowth of this trend within Britain itself.
The history of the population census within Britain implies
that the notion of a census was a popular solution to "problems
of government" at this juncture. Starting from its deployment
as a technique to justify the viability of the military, the census
came to be viewed as a prerequisite for other government action. In terms of indigenous peoples, this was also the case. The
1844 Royal Commission Report on the Affairs of the Indians in
Canada contains the results of the 1837 census of indigenous
peoples and frames the recommendations in light of the census
results. This [ac]counting of indigenous peoples, we propose,
can be read as an attempt to produce a m a p of the indigenous
population, to generate a certain type of knowledge which allowed Britain to govern indigenous peoples effectively [Said,
1979, p. 36]. Although this form of accounting differs from the
type of accounts generated by commercial enterprises, the function is similar to gather and represent information at a pointin-time in order to exercise control (whether we refer to this
control as governmentality or stewardship). Interestingly, the
usage of techniques of census on indigenous peoples presupposes a subject population and assumes a paternal relationship
whereby the colonial government has the right to attempt to
govern indigenous peoples. As mentioned previously, this reprePublished by eGrove, 1999
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sents a change from the nation-to-nation relationship enunciated in the 1763 Royal Proclamation.
While the transfer of the [ac] counting techniques of census
to indigenous peoples can be traced to techniques of government used in Britain at this juncture, we are unsure whether
the suggestion by Lord Glenelg to use funding relations as a
technology of government was a transfer of an existing technique or a "made in the colonies" solution. Issues of lineage
aside, following Lord Glenelg's letter to the governors in 1835,
accounting techniques of governance were applied to the indigenous population.
The areas of agriculture and education were the initial sites
in which the Crown attempted to change behavior via the manipulation of presents. For example, in an 1836 letter to the
governors of the Canadian provinces, Lord Glenelg [1836, p.
433] recommended shifting a portion of the funds spent on
presents to the area of education:
[His Majesty's Government] are prepared, should you
think such a measure practicable, and if the consent of
the Indians can be obtained to it, to sanction the application of at least a portion of the sums now expended
in the purchase of stores and presents, to the erection
of school houses, the purchase of elementary books,
and the payment of resident schoolmasters, for the
benefit of Indian tribes.
Likewise in a subsequent letter, Lord Glenelg suggested that
with the view of encouraging indigenous peoples to abandon a
wandering lifestyle that agricultural implements be substituted
for other presents "giving [indigenous peoples] agricultural
implements, but no other Description of Presents" [Glenelg,
1838, p. 235]. The policy direction provided by Glenelg was
consistent with the interests of settlers that indigenous peoples
be "encouraged" to abandon traditional pursuits which conflicted with settlement.
These policies regarding the manipulation of presents were
reiterated and reaffirmed in the 1844 Report on the Affairs of
the I n d i a n s in C a n a d a . This R e p o r t r e c o m m e n d e d major
changes to the Indian Department and an increased emphasis
on agriculture and education, with the manipulation of presents being the primary method of encouraging these changes.
Subsequent to this Report, the annual issue of gunpowder was
withheld:
On the 30th of January, 1849, the Earl of Elgin rehttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/15
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ported the arrangement made by Lord Metcalf in 1845,
with most of the settled Tribes, where by the annual
issue of gunpowder was withheld on the understanding
that the sum saved would be applied to promoting education among them [Report of the Special Commissioners, 1858, p. 2].
Such manipulations continued until 1858 when the British Parliament recommended that the annual issue of presents be discontinued. These examples strongly suggest that presents dist r i b u t e d to i n d i g e n o u s p e o p l e s w e r e u s e d as a specific
technology of government in an attempt to encourage certain
types of behavior, notably the pursuit of a "settled" and "civil i z e d " lifestyle. I n t e r e s t i n g l y , F o u c a u l t ' s d i s c u s s i o n of
governmentality seems to envision this very type of manipulation in that he states that it is often "customs" (i.e., a wandering
lifestyle) that techniques of government are directed at changing. "The things with which government is to be concerned with
are in fact men, but men in their relation to that other kind of
thing, customs, habits, ways of acting and thinking" [Foucault,
1991, p. 93]. It was through the usage of accounting techniques
of governance that Britain attempted to satisfy the competing
demands for the minimization of costs, the civilization and protection of indigenous peoples, and their control and containment on segregated reserves.
Although the preceding analysis has focused on the use of
accounting techniques to accomplish governmentality, other
techniques of government were also deployed. For example, the
appointment of Indian agents responsible for the affairs of specific tribes was used to implement government policy, helping
to accomplish the goals of containment and civilization [Milloy,
1983, pp. 59-60]. Likewise the establishment of the first residential schools during the 1840s, with their explicit objectives
of "weaning [indigenous peoples] from the habits and feelings
of their ancestors..." [Grant, 1996, p. 59] and the increasing
involvement of missionaries in the administration of the affairs
of indigenous peoples [cf. York and Pindera, 1992, pp. 88-89],
complemented the aforementioned accounting techniques in
achieving governmentality. Consistent with Miller and Rose's
[1990, p. 97] observation that governmentality is accomplished
via heterogenous technologies operating in heterogenous sites,
governmentality was accomplished in the case of indigenous
peoples by a variety of mechanisms, including accounting, operating in different locales.
Published by eGrove, 1999
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CONCLUSION
Explanations of the success of British imperialism during
the 1800s often emphasize the importance of technology [cf.
Headrick, 1981, 1988], political values [cf. Lloyd, 1996] or econ o m i c motivations [cf. Hobson, 1902]. The c u r r e n t study
supplements these explanations by documenting the role(s)
played by accounting techniques within the military machinery
of empire. Our thesis is that accounting techniques, at least in
the early 1800s, were firmly embedded within the military machinery of empire and served to frame the military decisions of
the day. Drawing upon the theoretical work of Foucault [1991],
Miller and Rose [1990, 1995], Said [1979, 1993], and others, we
theorize accounting as a technology of government that helped
to facilitate action at a distance. More specifically, we propose
that accounting contributed to British imperialism by returning
to the centers of calculation information that rendered distant
territories and their occupants governable.
In the context of Canada's indigenous peoples, the current
study sought to analyze the moment(s) at which indigenous
peoples came to be viewed as a governable population rather
than as a distinct nation and when/how accounting techniques
came to penetrate this domain. Our analysis suggested that the
c o m p e t i n g p r e s s u r e s of f i n a n c i a l r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n in t h e
Canadas, the demands from settlers that indigenous peoples be
contained, and reformist discourses emphasizing the importance of civilizing indigenous peoples encouraged the identification of indigenous peoples as a governable population. In
response to these pressures, Lord Glenelg proposed the manipulation of funding relations (i.e., the annual distribution of
presents) as a method of accomplishing these disparate objectives. This public statement by the Secretary of the Colonies
simultaneously constructed indigenous peoples as a governable
population and proposed the technology of government that
would encourage the desired behavior. Subsequent to this pronouncement, the [ac]counting techniques of census were transferred from the imperial center in the attempt to come to
"know" indigenous peoples, and funding relations were systematically manipulated in the attempt to satisfy the competing
policy objectives. Thus, as a consequence of this chain of
events, we see in the 1830-1858 period the slippage from a
nation-to-nation relationship between Britain and indigenous
peoples to a paternal relationship. Intertwined with this slippage was the identification/construction of indigenous peoples
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/15
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as a governable population, and the penetration of this domain
by accounting (and other techniques) functioning as technologies of government.
The study resonates with the current day in that it makes
visible the lineage of p a t e r n a l views regarding indigenous
peoples and the persistence of accounting technologies of governance within this domain. However, while the current study
is suggestive of parallels between the 1830s and the 1990s, more
research is needed to understand how accounting techniques of
governance have changed/evolved over this time period. Foucault [1991] and Said [1979], for example, implied that techniques of regulation/government may become more precise
over time as the knowledge gained from previous attempts
helps to refine the technologies. Yet Miller and Rose [1990, p.
10] provided the caution that "whilst 'governmentality' is eternally optimistic, 'government' is a congenitally failing operation." Consequently, more research is needed to understand
how the accounting technologies of government directed at indigenous peoples have changed since the 1830s, whether these
technologies have become more precise in terms of the effects
they are intended to induce, and the m a n n e r in which these
technologies are resisted by those targeted by them.
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Abstract: The article reviews recent developments in accounting historiography in relation to the underlying positioning of the participants. It finds that accounting history has located itself within the
tradition of social science, which subsumes events into generalizations and generalizations into theory. It reviews the efficacy of
causal theories of h u m a n behavior and proposes an alternative nontheoretical approach.

INTRODUCTION
In a thought-provoking, short article, Slocum [1995, p. 21]
suggested that the phenomenon of history repeating itself occurs when the need for survival, coupled to the desire to take
the easiest course, determines the path that is chosen. The implication is that there is a pattern to h u m a n activity, and that it
is possible to theorize causal relationships. This chain of reasoning underlies the various accounting historiographical paradigms which seek to explain accounting activities and accounting change in terms of the pursuit of wealth through rational
decision making (economic rationalist), the subjection of the
forces of production through capitalism (Marxist), or the exercise of power through knowledge and symbolic representation
(Foucauldian). The resultant causal structures are not the same.
Authors maintain that the economic-rationalist paradigm tends
towards a mechanistic view of cause and effect, whereas the
other schools are more dynamic in that they focus on the processes of change by which new situations and practices are
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brought into being [Hopwood, 1981, p. 294; Mouck, 1995, pp.
74-78]. The Foucauldian emphasis on discontinuity [Fleischm a n and Tyson, 1997, pp. 92-97], that it is anachronistic to
interpret the past as an extension of the present, in no way
prevents the "dynamics that come to drive the power-knowledge interaction" [Hoskin et al., 1997, p. 3] from being theorized. Rather, the question becomes, when did conditions exist
for them to operate? When did the modern world begin [Hoskin
et al., 1997, p. 2]? These three models are merely illustrative
rather than representative of the full genre of theoretical studies, which is extremely diverse. Young [1995], for example,
adopted the theoretical concept of "regulatory space," Walker
[1995] that of "critical-conflict," and Walker and Shackleton
[1995] "British corporatism" to explain historical events within
a single volume of Accounting, Organizations and Society.
The purpose of this article is to highlight the limitations of
a theoretical approach to accounting history. It is therefore
unashamedly reactionary, as theoretical history has gained
ground in recent years [Fleischman and Tyson, 1997, p. 97].
Undoubtedly, the discipline of accounting history has been
stimulated as a result, although some "traditional" accounting
historians have felt that they are being "goaded and ridiculed"
by the "energetic proponents of the new" [Funnell, 1998, p.
142]. The article commences by reviewing trends in accounting
historiography over the last 25 years, before moving on to consider the nature and limitations of causal theories of accounting behavior. It argues that (1) the terminology that has been
applied to research directions in accounting history is confused;
that (2) accounting historiography has become more theoretical
u n d e r the stimulus of "critical" scholarship; that (3) causal
theories are undermined by the volatile elements of accident
and personality which are not susceptible to prediction; and
that (4) the present emphasis on theorizing causation is a reflection of the accounting discipline's own search for identity,
coupled to the anthropic fallacy of historical reasoning, which
places the historian at the center of the historical universe and
uses the past to justify his/her view of the present.
HISTORIOGRAPHY
In recent years, accounting history has moved closer to the
center of accounting research, and the nature and aims of the
discipline have come under increasing scrutiny. Table 1 illustrates the range of classifications that have been applied to
Published by eGrove, 1999
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accounting history over the last 25 years, as scholars have attempted to rationalize accounting history's place in accounting
research. These classifications and their linkages are useful because they illumine the underlying historiographical trends.
TABLE 1
Chronological Categorization of Accounting History
Author

Classifications

1970
AAA

Intellectual,
Utilitarian

1974
Goldberg

Accounting practice
Accounting thought

1975
Johnson

Economic history

Growth of
organizations

Accounting history

Evolution of
accounting
procedures

1977
Baladouni

1981
Yamey

Author

Classifications

Linkages

1987
Hopwood

Technicalrationalist

Progressive
improvement

Critical

Complex
dynamics

Traditional

Discovers the
past;
Evolutionary

Sociohistorical

Contextualizes
the past;
Discontinuous

New positivism

Tests
predictions

1989
Napier

Cultural,
Technological,
Social
Descriptive

Interpretive
1981
Parker

Evolutionary,
Revolutionary

1981
Hopwood

Processes and
consequences of
change

Development
of technical
practice
1986
Johnson

Linkages

Littleton
school

New

Situation
specific
Wider setting

1990
Previts,
Parker, &
Coffman

Narrative,
Interpretational

1990
Flesher &
Social, economic, Samson
and institutional
1991
context;
Miller,
Theoretical
Hopper, &
Laughlin
Noncontextual;
1993
Atheoretical
Merino &
Mayper
Technical;
Mechanistic;
Evolutionary

Descriptive,
Interpretive,
Predictive

Organizational
Problematic;
Discontinuous

New

Interdisciplinary

Traditional

Disciplinary

Traditional

Economic
rationalist;
Hierarchical
documentary
model

Critical

Hidden
discourses;
Nonprivileging
of primary
sources
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TABLE 1 (Continued)
Chronological Categorization of Accounting History
Author

Classifications

Linkages

Author

Classifications

Linkages

1993
Miller &
Napier

Genealogies
of calculation

Outcomes of
the past

1996
Funnell

Traditional

Traditional
accounting
history

Evolutionary
origins of
the present

Positivist;
Econocentric;
Objective,
knowable
reality

New
Traditional

Mechanical/
technical

Nonpositivist;
Sociocentric

Postmodernist
Revisionist

Organizational
context

No reality
separate from
text; Facts
are dethroned

Marxist/
Foucauldian

Political
insights

Critical/
New/
Postmodernist

Nonprimacy
of facts;
Data
substituted
with theory;
Wider variety
of contexts

Traditional/
Old

Knowable
objective
reality;
Archive
based;
Narrower
economic
focus

Traditional

Narrative

New

Counternarrative

1996
Cooper
& Puxty

Conventional
1996
Fleischman,
Mills, &
Critical
Tyson
Traditional
1996
Fleischman,
Kalbers, &
Parker
Critical

1996
Carnegie
& Napier

Early studies

1997
Fleischman
& Tyson

Descriptive
Interpretive

Economic
rationalist
Foucauldian;
Marxist/labor
process
History
glorifying
accountants &
accounting

Utilitarian
studies

Informing
the present

Critical/
economic
decision-making
studies

Encouraging
particular
modes of
explanation

1998
Funnell

Different layers of meaning can be deduced from the table.
First, as new research methodologies have manifested themselves, the exponents of the "new" have been keen to draw a
distinction between their brand of history and what has gone
before, the "traditional." However, the nature of this dichotomy
is confused, which the table's linkages clearly show. For instance,
the 1999
Foucauldian and Marxist worldviews have been 95
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characterized as "critical" because they try to render the familiar economic-rationalist view unfamiliar, by focusing on the
hidden, unarticulated aspects of the accounting discipline [Merino and Mayper, 1993, pp. 238-239]. Thus, the economic
rationalist viewpoint has been said to constitute "traditional"
history, although the term also applies to studies which are
descriptive in nature rather then interpretive [Fleischman et al.,
1996b, p. 66], and which chart the technical development of
accounting practice without contextualizing it [Hopwood, 1981,
p. 295]. In this scheme, the discovery of technical data by "traditionalists" is still regarded as useful, albeit at the least publishable level of historical activity [Flesher and Samson, 1990,
p. 3], because it provides fodder for the "contextualisers" to
theorize [Napier, 1989, p. 250]. But, this implies a lack of interest on the part of traditional historians in causal relationships,
which is quite inconsistent with the notion that they are also
economic rationalists. Carnegie and Napier [1996, p. 14] acknowledged this situation by linking critical and economicrationalist studies together as b o t h encouraging particular
modes of explanation. Furthermore, "traditional" accounting
histories have also been critiqued as those which follow an evolutionary or Darwinian model of accounting improvement from
a less perfect past to a more perfect present [Hopwood, 1987,
pp. 209-210; Napier, 1989, p. 244], a view also known as the
"Whig interpretation of history" [Butterfield, 1973, p. 9], implying a causal model based on the natural selection of accounting
techniques in which the "strongest" survive. It follows that
there is some confusion in the terms that have been applied to
accounting history over the last 25 years, which have multiplied
as researchers have attempted to resolve disagreements over
research aims and to rationalize the place of history in mainstream accounting research.
Second, Table 1 illustrates the extent to which research
directions in accounting history have become an issue in the
1990s. This paradigmatic diversity is both a reflection of its
increasing maturity as a discipline and the continuing rise in
numbers of new entrants, since 1980, who come from different
backgrounds, replete with their own baggage and agendas.
Miller et al. [1991, p. 396] cited anthropology, economics, history of science, organization theory, and sociology as providing
examples. Parker's [1980, pp. 26-28; 1988, pp. 76-81] accounting history bibliographies give some indication of scale. In the
nine years to 1977, he cited about 170 authors, compared to
about 510 in the seven years to 1987. Cooper and Puxty [1996,
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p. 306] referred to the "proliferation" in the n u m b e r of histories, historians, and ideological frameworks. In any discipline,
new knowledge is largely incremental to the knowledge base
and beliefs of the researcher. Looking at causation, interpreting
the evidence will usually take place against a model that is
dependent upon the researcher's objectives and background.
Diversity in accounting history is therefore inevitable, and it is
fruitless for individual schools to claim preeminence for their
own point-of-view. Moreover, the large cluster of articles in the
1990s reflects the increased opportunities for publication arising through diversity. From a pragmatic viewpoint, it is not in
the interests of accounting academics to close down particular
lines of inquiry. Indeed, conflicting worldviews allow accounting historians to examine or reexamine issues from different
angles and to draw contrasts, either in partnership or in opposition [e.g., Tyson, 1992; Fleischman et al., 1995; Hoskin and
Macve, 1996].
Third, research directions in accounting history, as reflected by Table 1, are not divorced from trends in accounting
theory. The idea of accounting progressing through time towards an ideal state is consistent with a normative-deductive
approach to accounting theory. If Mouck [1995, pp. 55, 60] is
correct that this type of study peaked in the 1960s and early
1970s as a result of the "unprecedented concern" in U.S. business schools at the time over the lack of scientific theory in
management education, its subsequent decline has coincided
with the overt rejection of the Darwinian model by most accounting historians. In 1975, Johnson [1975, p. 449] wrote
about the "evolution of accounting procedures in large corporations" as an impetus to national economic growth, whereas by
1986, he was referring to the possibilities offered by the "new"
accounting history that was by then challenging the evolutionary view [Johnson, 1986, pp. 74-75]. In 1981, Parker [p. 281]
defended the notion of evolution on the grounds that "no accounting historian has discerned revolutions in accounting
practice," but all subsequent entries in Table 1 tend to regard
that idea as passe. This is not to say that the evolutionary model
in accounting history is as defunct as the table suggests since
the Foucauldian focus on discontinuities in management accounting history has been paralleled by a search for continuities between the modern world and the past by their critics
[e.g.; Edwards et al., 1995, pp. 34-35]. Moreover, discontinuity
and evolution need not preclude each other. In a true Darwinian sense, evolution does not imply progressive improvement,
Published by eGrove, 1999
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but the adaptation of species to suit their environment best.
There will be extinctions and new starts along the way as the
environment changes, as well as continuity and development.
The main evolutionary question in accounting, then, concerns
the way accounting has interacted with the environment (i.e.;
social, political, economic, calculable, etc. contexts) in which it
has operated at particular points in time and space, which is
relevant to Marxists, economic rationalists, and Foucauldians
alike. Has the interaction between accounting and its contexts
been dysfunctional, congruous, or synergetic? Evidence of congruity/synergy would support the idea that accounting evolves.
An example might be the growth of power systems in U.S. society from around 1800 in response to "the rise and rise of sustained cognitive growth" as the use of writing, examination,
and numerical grading spread [Hoskin et al., 1997, p. 3].
Returning to the theme that developments in accounting
theory and historiography are linked, the best example is shown
by the post-1980 references in Table 1 to "critical" accounting
history, which reflect the current vogue in "critical" or socialbased accounting research. As Funnell [1996, p. 38] observed:
Central to m u c h of the critical accounting research
which has sought to question the legitimacy of existing
institutions, distributions of power and the role of accounting in sustaining a n d p e r p e t u a t i n g d o m i n a n t
capitalist forms of discourse has been an emphasis on
history.
The n u m b e r of references to critical studies in the table is a
measure of the impetus that critical accounting research has
given to accounting history in recent years.
Finally, Table 1 shows that the debate over research aims
has moved from looking at what we do and why we do it, to
what we ought to be doing. Accounting historiography has become more schematic in the process. The early articles cited in
the table followed in the wake of the American Accounting
Association's (AAA) [1970] report on accounting history by defining the scope and utility of the discipline. Goldberg [1974]
developed the AAA Committee's arguments concerning the benefits to be derived from accounting history [pp. 406-408] and
suggested the interrelationship between accounting practice
and t h o u g h t as a worthwhile field of study [pp. 409-410].
Johnson [1975, p. 444] supported the AAA's contention that
accounting history would lead to a better understanding of economic history, focusing on the contribution that accountants
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could make by studying the development of organizational
methods in large corporations. By 1977, however, Baladouni
[1977, pp. 59-67] was developing more sophisticated cultural,
technological, and social frameworks, which he hoped would
provide a "methodological backbone" to facilitate empirical and
theoretical research in accounting history. The range of classifications in the table shows that from then on methodological
issues have assumed a greater significance as the hitherto
dominant "rule of economics" [Funnell, 1996, p. 39] has come
under increasing challenge from social theorists. The economists have responded by defending their position. By questioning the nature of accounting history u n d e r the stimulus of
"critical" scholarship, there has been a tendency to theorize it,
which has culminated in the paradigmization of cause and effect along fairly rigid lines of demarcation.
Most of the authors cited in Table 1 are active historians at
a field-level, and there is no reason to suppose that the fieldwork of authors in general has not been affected either offensively or defensively by these historiographical trends. Witness
the call in Fleischman et al. [1996a, p. 332] for an eclecticism
that has been backed by collaborative ventures or Tyson's
[1998, p. 224] rebuttal of Foucauldian terminology. Proof, however, would entail reviewing all the accounting history studies
now being published over a series of years. Anderson [1998]
cited some 280 for 1995-1996 alone. It would be insufficient
just to review the articles appearing in the mainstream accounting history journals, as these are now in a minority. Out of the
total of 280, only about 60 were published in Accounting Historians Journal; Accounting, Business and Financial History; and
Accounting History. Furthermore, to concentrate on a narrow
band of articles would be especially futile if journal titles act as
"Baudrillardian signs," possessing value and meaning in themselves [Cooper and Puxty, 1996, p. 292], and by implication,
tend to attract articles of the same type.
CAUSALITY
Whitley [1988] examined the role of scientific models in
accounting theory and drew a distinction between those derived
from natural sciences and those based on the social, both of
which he found present. The essence of a good, natural-scientific theory is that it both accurately describes a large class of
observations on the basis of a model containing only a few
arbitrary elements, and that it makes definite predictions about
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the results of future observations [Hawking, 1988, p. 9]. This
type of model has been used by positivist accounting researchers to explain and predict the workings of financial markets,
and has been extended into the behavioral field by "positive
accounting theory" [Whitley, 1988, pp. 632-634]. Essentially
economic-based, such studies derive from the same naturalscientific root t h a t u n d e r p i n n e d the "normative apriorist"
movement of the 1960s and early 1970s [Whitley, 1986, pp. 171172; Mouck, 1995, p. 64]. Social models, on the other hand, are
more value-laden because of their need for descriptions and
terms that have "positive or negative connotations, both in the
scientists' own culture and in the one being analyzed," and are
of more limited applicability because of variations in cultural
norms [Whitley, 1988, pp. 637-638]. However, this difference
has not prevented social researchers from sharing the natural
scientist's aim of using events to establish causal relations that
can be generalized [McClelland, 1975, p. 86; Fleischman et al.,
1996b, p. 63]. Haddock [1980, p. 150] described how "the claim
t h a t history should approximate a social science adhering
closely to the methods of the natural sciences" first "attained
the status of an orthodoxy" in the mid-19th century, and how it
has continued to be "a central and contentious issue." According to Stone [1981], "the climatic years of the conversion of
historians to an interest in the social sciences" were the late
1960s [p. 15], although he warned of the "growing mood of
skepticism abroad about the value to historians of m u c h of the
newest and most extreme social science methodology" [p. 43].
The increased theoretical bent of accounting history since the
1980s grounds it firmly in that tradition.
T h e focus of t h e social s c i e n t i s t is o n t h e p r e s e n t
[Fleischman et al., 1996b, p. 63]. Knowledge of the past is not
relevant for its own sake, but because it helps to illuminate the
present and feeds into current issues. Such an opinion would
be shared by many general historians [Evans, 1997, p. 61], but
with accounting historians there is also the need to justify oneself in the accounting discipline where historical perspectives
do not have a mature tradition. Indeed, the need for validity
could explain the current emphasis on theoretical studies, as
the term "atheoretical" has tended to become derisory in accounting history literature. Arguably, the postmodernist view
that the past is essentially unknowable will never gain serious
ground in accounting history, as this would render the discipline redundant to accounting researchers. For the same reason, historical studies which view the past as an object in itself
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tend to be dismissed as "antiquarianism." Accounting practice
is regarded as a dynamic process, devised in historical situations. A study of the practice in relation to the situations enables one to question the m a n n e r in which the circumstances
have changed and to assess the implications for modern practice [Whitley, 1988, p. 640; Edwards, 1989, p. 5]. Proponents of
this view argue that we can learn from the past and see history
as being capable of supporting contemporary research into
policy making and standard setting, for example [Previts et al.,
1990, p. 3].
Some accounting historians go one step further and would
like to be able to predict the future. Evans [1997, pp. 53-62]
traced this idea back to the 1860s, but expressed severe misgivings about history's predictive ability. Not many accounting historians have attempted to predict the future [Parker, 1981, p.
284], but various statements of intent by journal editors have
suggested it as a desirable goal. Flesher and Samson [1990, p.
3] wrote that those studies which offered "the possibility for
predicting or influencing future events" would be the ones that
stood the best chances of publication. Whilst stopping short of
advocating "predictions," Carnegie [1996, p. 5] did refer to the
"considerable potential" that critical and interpretive research
has for providing "insights into accounting's present and future." The stated objectives of papers that are published in Accounting, Business and Financial History include helping to predict p o s s i b l e future d e v e l o p m e n t s . Are s u c h p r e d i c t i o n s
possible? Goldberg [1974, pp. 408-409] and Baxter [1981, p. 5]
argued they are not. Other writers have sounded a cautionary
note [Edwards, 1989, p. 6]. Perhaps the answer depends on
whether one takes a typical historical or typical social-scientific
perspective, the latter being the more deterministic of the two
[Mills, 1993, p. 802; Fleischman et al., 1996b, p. 64]. Theoretical
histories derive useful insights by making predictions about
past relationships, and it will be interesting to see whether the
current trend towards theoretical history results in more predictions of future ones.
One of the main difficulties of causal theories of h u m a n
behavior is that they do not acknowledge freewill or personality
as a potential source of forecast error. This charge has been
countered on the grounds that causal theories predict only the
choices dictated by h u m a n dispositions rather t h a n the resultant outcomes [McClelland, 1975, p. 71]. The distinction is a fine
one, however, as such theories tend to assume a reduction in
the n u m b e r of acceptable choices, given similar dispositions
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exposed to similar stimuli [McClelland, 1975, p. 86]. Thus,
"counterfactual" analysis changes the stimuli to predict what
would have happened if historical circumstances had been different [McCloskey, 1987, p. 16]. Accident is another source of
forecast error not recognized by historical predictions. Evans
[1997, pp. 129-138] identified accident as a key factor in "the
study of causes." Wars provide many examples where accident
and personality have rendered the course of events unpredictable. For instance, the Battle of Britain was lost by Germany as
a result of the accidental bombing of civilians in London on
August 23, 1940, which prompted retaliatory raids on Berlin,
and diverted the war away from British airfields towards British cities [Shirer, 1964, pp. 931-934]. Accounting itself is not
i m m u n e from these unpredictable catalysts, witness the lasting
impact of Nazi economic planning on French financial reporting [Standish, 1990, p. 350]. Walton [1995, p. 8] commented on
the important part that wars have played in generating accounting change, and Nobes and Parker [1995, pp. 19-20] listed accident as one of seven key determinants of the nature of accounting in any particular country. What would have been the effects
on future accounting practice had the Battle of Britain resulted
in the German occupation of Great Britain? What shape would
accounting have taken had not the Moslem advance into western Europe been halted at Tours in 732, given the importance
of both Frankish rulers and the Roman Christian Church to its
subsequent development [Oldroyd, 1997, pp. 18-22]? What effect did the unexpected collapse of Polly Peck International plc
have on the regulation of U.K. financial reporting in the 1990s?
Arguably, it led to more restrictive practice by U.K. standard
setters in an attempt to restore confidence in the accounting
profession [Oldroyd, 1994, p. 37]. What has been the influence
of particular individuals on the development of a new profession/theoretical discipline? The current interest in biographical
studies in accounting history literature suggests that it has been
great. The "crucial discontinuity" in Hoskin and Macve's [1988,
p. 46] Foucauldian thesis concerning the development of modern "managerialism" in the U.S. depended on the meticulous
nature of Sylvanus Thayer.
Accident and personality impact primarily on events rather
t h a n systems. Accounting has been described as a social system
[Lee, 1990, p. 75]. Such a view underplays the significance of
particular happenings. Eventually one ends up at the same
place through deterministic forces which govern the interaction
of h u m a n i t y with itself and the environment. Hoskin a n d
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Macve [1988, p. 66] spoke of the demise of the "memorable
man" under the welling-up of disciplinary knowledge within
society. However, any systematic view of the world of accounting must take inertia into account. Lee [1990, p. 97] described
inertia as "the self-referential and recursive nature of accounting," an i m p o r t a n t characteristic that can be overcome by
events which are not always susceptible to prediction. Accounting inertia is both the reluctance to adopt new practices and
ideas and the corresponding hesitancy to discard old ones. The
inclination to follow what has been done before imbues past
practice with its own m o m e n t u m . Fligstein [1990, p. 9] observed the same phenomenon in relation to business organizations. He found that organizations tend not to change until they
are faced with a crisis. Arguably, inertia in accounting has increased as accounting has become embedded in the institutional, legal, and regulatory framework. Examples of inertia
might include the delay in the adoption of double-entry bookkeeping in industrial accounting or the persistence of Victorian
corporate style reporting to shareholders. Accounting legislation drafted by the European Community has displayed a tendency to adapt old rules. The same has been apparent in Eastern Europe following the demise of the U.S.S.R [Walton, 1995,
p. 3]. In short, there are many models that are possible to explain accounting activities beyond those that have been articulated already. By focusing on the resistors/catalysts of change,
inertia could provide as complete a model as any other except
that predictions would be tenable only in the indeterminate
short-term where the level of forecast error is reduced. Accounting history would assume a central importance as a catalyst of change through its role in questioning the appropriateness today of "time-honoured concepts and ideas" [Edwards,
1989, p. 6].
POSITIONING
Causal theories of accounting behavior suffer from the
anthropic fallacy of historical reasoning, which uses the past to
justify the historian's view of the present, thereby placing him/
her at the center of the historical universe. The anthropic principle in physics states that we see the universe the way it is
because if it were different, we would not be here to see it
[Hawking, 1988, p. 183]. At one level, any theory of the universe
must include the evidence of humanity's existence. At another,
humanity is placed at the center of the universe because the
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nature of the cosmos is contingent on our ability to witness it.
There may be other universes or regions of the same universe
obeying different laws, but if there are no observable consequences, they can afford to be ignored [Hawking, 1988, p. 125].
From an historical perspective, our understanding of the past is
contingent on our location in the present, and history is useful
to us because it helps identify and explain who we are. The
tendency to place ourselves at the center of history accounts for
the disparate nature of the historical universe. Children are
taught their own history at school. The recent debate over the
e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a n a t i o n a l history c u r r i c u l u m in British
schools emphasized the keen interest of government that British children should learn the important "landmarks" in British
history. Protestant schools in Northern Ireland learn British
history and Catholic schools Irish. Ultimately, accounting history exists as a distinct region of the historical universe because
of the existence of the accounting profession. As Funnell [1996,
p. 39] observed, the problem is that the academic community is
uncertain whereabouts in the present accounting is located, at
the heart of economic or social and political theory, and so the
past is being used by accounting researchers to jostle for position and to justify their own perceptions of where we stand
(Figure 1). Accounting history is useful to researchers as a medium for obtaining evidence to support particular worldviews.
FIGURE 1
The Anthropic Fallacy
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If history in general is prone to the fallacy of taking one's
present position back into the past in order to find material to
justify it, the flaw is accentuated in theoretical histories. This
was observed by Merino and Mayper [1993, p. 245], who said
that the danger of imposing current beliefs on the past "increases exponentially when researchers use a theoretical framework." The efficacy of causal theories depends on their ability
to predict the results of future observations. The theoretical
historian, therefore, comes to a problem having already predicted what the outcome will be (in this respect history becomes intrinsically uncritical) and looks for supporting evidence. Bryer [1987, p. 3] unwittingly summarized this view.
Reviewing a paper on what he described as "the final stages of
the transition from feudalism to investor capital," he wrote:
If we can agree this [that there is a fundamental difference between the feudal and capitalist modes of production], then we have a conceptual and an historical
basis for understanding the lords' 'ways of thinking',
their 'aristocratic attitudes' (and platitudes), the overlap and contradiction of these notions of surplus in the
aristocratic mind.
Marxism shows us how to interpret historical evidence before
we have started to look. There is no suggestion of deliberate
deception or that theoretical historians ignore available data or
data sources. But, given the incompleteness of the historical
record, together with the difficulties in accurately interpreting
historical data, it is often possible to find evidence to support
whatever claim. Maximizing wealth, commodifying labor, and
regularizing relationships within the organization are not, after
all, incompatible. In reality, there may be several reasons for a
particular action, or what applies in one situation may not be
valid in another, or the weighting of factors may vary between
situations. An alternative, nontheoretical view of the accounting
universe is that it is composed of interlocking causal relationships, which cannot necessarily be subsumed within unifying
theories (Figure 2).
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FIGURE 2
Interlocking View of Causation

The best that can be achieved in history is an hypothesis rather
than a causal theory. The task of the historian is to select the
hypothesis which best fits the available evidence, given or constructed, neutral or biased [Hammond and Sikka, 1996, p. 79],
while recognizing its intrinsic limitations together with his/her
own.
CONCLUSION
The article has reviewed recent developments in accounting
historiography in relation to the underlying positioning of the
participants. Accounting history has become more schematic
u n d e r the impetus of "critical" studies. It has located itself
within the tradition of social science, which subsumes events
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into generalizations and generalizations into theory. Causal
theories are undermined by the unpredictable catalysts of accident and personality which impinge on accounting inertia. It
follows that predictions can only be tenable in the indeterminate short-term where the level of forecast error is reduced.
Furthermore, causal theories surfer from the anthropic fallacy
of historical reasoning, which uses the past to justify the
historian's view of the present, thereby placing him/her at the
center of the historical universe. The difficulty with accounting
is that it is uncertain whether it is located at the center of
economic or social and political theory, and so accounting
theorists are using the past to jostle for position. An alternative,
nontheoretical view has been proposed in which it is accepted
that the best that can be achieved in history are hypotheses
whose intrinsic limitations are recognized.
Are there any implications for future research? First, theoretical history is fine and can yield useful insights, providing its
limitations are recognized. Essentially, the article is a plea for
more modest claims to be made on behalf of theoretical history.
History is a multicellular creature, and the essence of historical
inquiry lies is recognizing there are other points of view. It is
not suggested that all views "are equally valid," or that it is
impossible to resolve differences through "diligent search of the
available evidence" [Fleischman and Parker, 1997, p. 218]. But
uncertainty will remain. Second, the limitations of causal theories reinforce the need for more empirical studies to get as close
as possible to the individual circumstances in which accounts
were produced, the uses to which they were put, and the full
range of participants involved. Despite the increased risks of
belief transference, many theoretical historians use archival
data to test their predictions. There are also those archivists,
however, who through attempting "to stand apart from the
paradigmatic debates" are in danger of becoming marginalized
[Fleischman and Tyson, 1997, p. 102], and it is their work particularly that the article supports. Finally, using the past to
cross-reference our position in the present fulfills a psychological need, which explains why all societies produce histories,
either in written form or oral tradition. The great science fiction writer, Isaac Asimov [1986, p. 59] wrote:
There never can be a m a n so lost as one who is lost in
the vast and intricate corridors of his own lonely mind.
. . . There never was a m a n so helpless as one who
cannot remember.
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The relevance of accounting history goes deeper than the utilitarian view which measures it in terms of in-feeds to modern
practice. If this were all there is, the past would become less
useful to us the further it were removed from the present, and
one could agree with Stevelinck [1985, p. 1] that "there is little
of interest to the present-day accountant in the study of primitive and obsolete accounting practices" of the ancient world.
However, this view runs contrary to the historical imperative of
going as far back in time as possible in the search for roots.
Witness the genealogies of King David in the Bible going back
to Adam and Eve or the genealogies of Anglo-Saxon kings going
back to the Norse gods. Accounting history helps us to know
w h o we are, where we came from, and how we got here
[Baladouni, 1977, p. 54]. One should be careful in dismissing
any historical study as antiquarianism. Furthermore, if, as this
need for identity suggests, the raison d'être of accounting history is the existence of accountants, its future existence as an
academic discipline ultimately depends on the future success of
the accounting profession. If the profession were to decline,
accounting historians would be returned to other types of historians, those who would remain interested in history, but only in
so far as it impacted on their own place in the historical universe and their own fields of vision.
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Abstract: A consumption-based tax system has attracted a variety of
supporters, including proponents of tax simplification and policy
makers in search of more or alternative revenue sources. Such a
system could involve the use of a value-added tax (VAT) or a sales
tax. Policy makers and legislators should consider the history of the
background of the VAT. A cursory review of the development of
sales taxes is presented as a background for the problems that might
be encountered in adopting the VAT. This review of the historical
development shows that there are n u m e r o u s and complex issues
requiring careful study.

INTRODUCTION
When thousands of hard pressed taxpayers and others
have reached the stage of desperation, when they are
willing to try anything — any patent medicine or panacea — then they are in a mood which makes them easy
victims not only of their own self deceptions but also of
the alluring promises of others always anxious to find
opportunities to shove their tax burdens off their own
shoulders regardless of where they fall. In such times
the majority of the people are not inclined to weigh
alternatives carefully and may accept very questionable
measures [Blakey, 1935, p. 70].
Legislators and policy makers are considering a n u m b e r of
alternative tax system proposals, including a flat-rate income
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tax, a national sales tax, a value-added tax (VAT), and other
consumption-based systems. A consumption-based tax system
has attracted a variety of supporters, including proponents of
tax simplification and policy makers in search of more or alternative revenue sources [Anderson, 1994, p. 77]. Such a system
could involve the use of a VAT or a sales tax. Blakey issued the
above warning in 1935, alarmed over the rapid spread of sales
taxes in the U.S. He would surely have cautioned us to study
past experiences when considering alternatives.
Policy makers and legislators should consider the history of
consumption taxes. The primary focus of this paper is on the
background of the VAT. A cursory review of the development of
sales taxes in the U.S. is presented as background for the problems that might be encountered in adopting a VAT. No other
study could be found that examined the history and past experiences with VAT and sales taxes in the U.S. and other countries.
This analysis is particularly important in light of the sweeping
tax reforms that are being discussed in Congress. The question
addressed in this paper is, what can be learned from the European and American experiences with consumption taxes? Specifically, what events trigger the passage of a consumption tax?
VAT DEFINED
Trebby [1990, p. 8] defined a VAT as "a tax on the value
added by a firm during the production and distribution process
to the goods and services that it purchases from other firms."
Aaron [1981, p. 2] defined "value added" as "the difference between the value of a firm's sales and the value of the purchased
material inputs used in producing goods sold." He continued by
stating that value added is the sum of a firm's wages and salaries, interest payments, and before-tax profits.
A comparison of a VAT and a retail sales tax reveals that
"the VAT is a multistage tax; the retail sales tax is a single-stage
tax" [Price and Porcano, 1992, p. 45]. Table 1 provides a comparison of a VAT and a retail sales tax using hypothetical data
relating to the production and sale of an oak basket.
Assume a tree farmer cuts down an oak tree (at no cost to
the farmer). He sells enough of the wood to make one oak
basket to a sawmill owner for $8.00. The sawmill owner cuts
the wood into oak strips and sells them to a basket weaver for
$12.00. The basket weaver weaves the strips into a basket and
sells it to a craft-shop owner for $20.00. The craft-shop owner
sells the oak basket to a customer for $30.00.
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TABLE 1
Comparison of VAT and Retail Sales Tax
Stage

5% Retail
Sales Tax

Product

Price

Value Added

5% VAT

1

log

$ 8.00

$ 8.00

$ .40

2

strips

12.00

4.00

.20

3

basket

20.00

8.00

.40

4

basket

30.00

10.00

.50

$1.50

$1.50

$1.50

Total Tax

The total VAT paid is $1.50 or 5% of the sum of the values
added at each stage. Note that the VAT generates the same
amount of tax revenue as a retail sales tax of equal percentage.
The major difference is that the VAT is assessed at the various
intermediate stages of production whereas the retail sales tax is
assessed only at the point of sale to the final consumer.
BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM
Many states face budget deficits and financial problems
[Barney et al., 1992, p. 61]. Factors contributing to these crises
include the obsolescence of state tax structures [Bucks, 1992, p.
557], the instability of tax revenues [Gold, 1991, p. 277], and
the inability of state revenue growth to keep pace with the
growth of the general economy [Kirchheimer, 1992, p. 79].
States are also facing the possibility that the federal government, in an attempt to reduce the federal budget deficit, will
shift responsibility for many social services to state governments.
Policy makers are considering alternatives for fundamental
state tax reform. A national task force composed of several state
government organizations examined various reform options.
The organizations represented on the task force include the
National Governors' Association, the Multistate Tax Commission, the Federation of Tax Administrators, and the National
Association of State Budget Officers. Task-force members view
the VAT as a viable option for restructuring state tax systems
[Hoerner, 1992, p. 698]. Bucks [1992, pp. 557, 560-561] suggested that the obsolete elements of state tax systems relate to
economic activity flowing across state lines. He proposed a
c o m m o n system of taxation of interstate and international comhttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/15
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merce — a National Enterprise Tax. One basis for this c o m m o n
system of taxation is the VAT.
Some states have conducted studies of their own tax structure and looked at the VAT as an option for tax reform. The
KPMG Peat Marwick Policy Economics Group [1992, pp. 527530], conducting a study of the New Hampshire state and local
revenue structure, concluded that the VAT was an effective tax
reform strategy for both the short-run and long-run problems
of that state. According to the Texas Deputy Controller of Public Accounts, efforts to balance the state's budget over the next
decade will possibly include a new tax source such as the VAT
[Hubbard, 1992, p. 645]. The Florida Taxation and Budget Reform Commission commissioned a study in which the Price
Waterhouse Business Tax Model simulated two options, one of
which replaced the corporate income tax with a VAT.1
Advocates of tax reform and simplification are promoting
new tax structures. They note that the present tax structure is
too complex, is inefficient, imposes a heavy compliance burden,
and does not encourage savings [Nellen, 1995, p. 44]. Four major reform proposals recently suggested are the VAT, a national
retail sales tax, a flat tax, and the USA Tax Act of 1995. The VAT
is supported by House Ways and Means Chairman Bill Archer
of Texas as a means to encourage savings by taxing consumption. The national retail sales tax is proposed by Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana. Bills calling for a flat tax, generally a
system with a single tax rate, have been introduced by Senator
Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania and House Majority Leader Dick
Armey of Texas. The USA Tax Act of 1995, introduced by Senators Sam N u n n of Georgia, Pete Domenici of New Mexico, and
Bob Kerrey of Nebraska, replaces the current income tax with
an individual income tax that allows a deduction for net new
savings and adds the VAT as a business tax [Willens a n d
Phillips, 1995, pp. 39-41]. While not supporting any of the current tax reform proposals, a recent report of the National Commission on Economic Growth and Tax Reform, chaired by Republican Jack Kemp, pointed out faults of the current tax
structure and called for a single tax rate with many deductions
[AICPA, 1996, p, 27]. In addition to these proposals for tax
reform, the National Commission on Restructuring the Internal
1
The other option m a d e two additions to the existing corporate tax structure. It added a m i n i m u m tax based on the size of the business and also
provided for subchapter S treatment for qualifying corporations [see Price
Waterhouse, 1991, pp. 273-274].
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Revenue Service (IRS) has published a study calling for significant changes in the way the IRS is structured and governed
[AICPA, 1997a, p. 21].
State governments are looking for a tax structure that will
enable their tax revenues to keep pace with economic growth.
Most states have balanced-budget constraints that increase the
importance of volatility of tax revenues as a consideration in
restructuring state tax systems. Policy makers are considering
the VAT as a viable option. A review of the literature reveals a
thorough examination of many issues related to the VAT. One
area of interest not widely addressed in the literature is the
historical development of the VAT and the debate over a national sales tax.
VAT BACKGROUND
Popularity of the VAT: Tait [1988, p. 3] called the rise of the VAT
an unparalleled fiscal phenomenon. In describing how the VAT
has swept the world, he used the simile, "VAT may be thought
of as the Mata Hari of the tax world — many are tempted, many
succumb, some tremble on the brink, while others leave only to
return, eventually the attraction appears irresistible." The VAT
is no longer a tax associated only with European countries; it
has spread to every continent [Tait, 1988, p. 3; Trebby, 1990,
pp. 6-18]. Each year brings new adopters. Canada has implemented a Goods and Services Tax (GST) which is a VAT similar
to that used in most European countries [Payne, 1991, pp. 2526].
The VAT is truly an international phenomenon. T h e VAT
is the standard form of sales tax throughout most of the world.
Nineteen of the 23 countries comprising the Organization for
E c o n o m i c C o o r d i n a t i o n a n d D e v e l o p m e n t (OECD) h a v e
adopted some type of VAT. Japan (in 1989) and Canada (in
1990) were the latest OECD countries to j u m p on the bandwagon. The VAT is also used in most Latin American countries,
several southeast Asian countries, Korea, many African countries, the Caribbean, and New Zealand. It is a revenue generator
for governments worldwide [Due, 1990, p. 383, 1991, p. 269;
Price and Porcano, 1992, p. 45].
The attractiveness of the VAT has not gone unnoticed in
the U.S. It has attracted considerable attention at the national
level. Chambliss [1989, p. 24] wrote: "Next to nuclear disarmament, no topic has taken up more seminar time at Washington
think tanks and policy boutiques than the VAT."
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/15
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The VAT has also received m u c h notice at the state level.
State legislatures, facing severe budget deficits and financial
problems, look to VAT as a potential new revenue source. Two
states, Louisiana and Michigan, have adopted a form of VAT.
Other states have considered adoption (Texas, Florida, and the
Territory of Guam) [Reinstein et al., 1990, p. 589; Due, 1991, p.
272;Ebel, 1991, p. 305].
Judicial, Legislative, and Political Considerations: In Trinova
Corporation v. Michigan Department of Treasury [1991], the
U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the states have the authority to
adopt a VAT and that such a tax does not interfere with interstate commerce. This decision held that a VAT imposed on a
taxpayer doing business within and without the State of Michigan did not violate either the due process clause or the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution [1991, p. 836]. In discussing the ramifications of this decision, Weindruch and Repp
[1991, p. 22] concluded that "more states may be willing to
adopt a form of a VAT in lieu of a corporate income tax as a
means of generating a greater and more stable source of revenues."
The adoption of a national VAT is viewed as an intrusion
into an area of taxation historically reserved for the states. The
General Accounting Office (GAO) [1989, p. 45] reported that 45
states have a broad-based consumption tax that generates a
significant portion of their total tax revenues. State government
officials fear that the adoption of a national VAT would make it
difficult to increase state sales tax revenues. They also fear that
a federal VAT would increase the pressure on states to conform
with the federal tax base. Brown [1991, p. 6] pointed out that
state government officials oppose a federal VAT because it
could inhibit or interfere with state use of this tax base in the
future. Bucks [1992, p. 561] proposed that the states jointly
establish a c o m m o n system of taxation using the VAT to safeguard state powers by slowing or blocking federal entry into
consumption-based taxes.
The VAT Compared to the Sales Tax: Pechman [1987, pp. 204,
206] compared the VAT to the retail sales tax. While pointing
out that the two taxes are similar on both economic and equity
grounds, he concluded that the retail sales tax presents fewer
administrative problems because it involves fewer taxpayers
and less complicated calculations to determine tax liability. Although the administrative costs of the VAT are m u c h higher
Published by eGrove, 1999
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than those of the retail sales tax, any efficiency advantages of
the retail sales tax may be offset by resulting inequities. The
administrative burden of collecting, accounting for, and remitting the sales tax rests on a small segment of society — the
retail sellers. While the VAT is similar to the retail sales tax, it is
collected differently, applies more broadly, and may provide
rebates to consumers not residing in the taxing district [Utz,
1993, pp. 142, 144].
From an economic theory viewpoint, the VAT is viewed as
very similar to a retail sales tax. The VAT may be inferior to the
retail sales tax on efficiency grounds because of its higher administrative and compliance costs, but political considerations
may favor the VAT because it is less visible to the ultimate
consumer [Break, 1985, p. 154; Holcombe, 1988, pp. 214, 216217].
The primary differences between a sales tax and a VAT are
the taxpayers (suppliers or demanders) and the timing of revenue flows to the government [Holcombe, 1988, p. 214]. There
are different collection points for the respective tax liabilities.
The retail sales tax is collected by the retail seller on a destination basis while the tax liability is based on the retail selling
price. The VAT is levied at each stage of production and distribution. It is paid directly, rather than indirectly, by all firms
involved in the production and distribution process and is collected on a source basis [Brown, 1991, p. 3]. These considerations suggest that the retail sales tax and the VAT could differ
in terms of volatility because of differences in collection points
and the timing of revenue flows to the government.
SALES TAX HISTORY
Origin of the Sales Tax: The origin of the sales tax is "shrouded
in the dimness of ancient times and it or some variant has been
present in certain forms in all or nearly all systems of public
finance of which we have detailed knowledge" [Blakey, 1935, p.
64]. Many of the ancient types were more like selective sales
taxes or excise taxes than general sales taxes. There has been
m u c h confusion over the distinction between sales and excise
taxes [Blakey, 1935, pp. 63-64, fn.. 3]. Sales taxes existed in
ancient Egypt [Adams, 1982, p. 17]. The early Roman Republic
assessed a sales tax on the sale of slaves at auction [Adams,
1982, p. 57]. Caesar Augustus used the sales tax as a supplement to an inheritance tax. In 40 A.D., Caligula abolished the
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/15
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sales tax altogether with a flourish of trumpets [Adams, 1982,
pp. 76-77].
The revival of the use of general sales taxes "is generally
dated from the adoption of the war and post war emergency
general turnover taxes of Germany (July, 1918) and France
(June, 1920) and the manufacturers' sales tax of Canada (May,
1920)" [Blakey, 1935, p. 64]. Similar taxes have been considered
by Congress, but a general sales tax has never been adopted at
the national level in the U.S. Thirty or more foreign countries
adopted sales taxes in the 1930s [Blakey, 1935, p. 64]. Sales
taxes were "confined almost wholly to foreign countries until
1930, one might almost say until 1933, but the cumulative pressures of the [Great Depression] forced the acceptance of such
taxes by numerous American commonwealths" [Blakey, 1935,
p. 63].
Implementation
of State Sales Taxes: The sales tax became the
major revenue source for states in the 1930s [Pechman, 1987, p.
259]. It continues to be one of the largest sources today as the
general sales tax and the personal income tax each provide
more than 30% of total state tax revenues [Gold, 1994, p. 703].
According to a recent report, general sales taxes generated
$132.7 billion for the states in 1995, the individual income tax
$126.3 billion, and all other taxes $142.5 billion [AICPA, 1997b,
p. 23). In 1902, almost half of state revenue was derived from
property taxes and the remainder from excise taxes [Pechman,
1987, p. 259]. "The rapid development of general sales taxes is
one of the most striking of post war [World War I] phenomena"
[Blakey, 1935, p. 63]. The revival of the sales tax was almost
completely confined to foreign countries until the depression of
the 1930s forced its adoption by a n u m b e r of states. During this
time, many were hailing the sales tax as the savior of our public
finances [Blakey, 1935, p. 63]. Opposition to the sales tax was
countered with the claim that it was an emergency measure
and, hence, only temporary. However, critics of the time were
skeptical given past experiences with taxes. One o p p o n e n t
noted that efforts were underway to make the sales tax permanent in states where it had been limited and to increase the
rates in several states [Bloomfield, 1935, p. 593].
Blakey cited a n u m b e r of reasons for the rapid spread of
sales taxes but in general it was the inability to balance budgets
[Blakey, 1935, p. 64]. He argued that there were better major
sources of revenue than sales taxes for federal and state governments. However, if sales taxes were to be used, the Federal
Published by eGrove, 1999
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government could administer the system more uniformly and
efficiently. Blakey [1935, p. 69] was amazed at how rapidly the
sales tax movement was spreading to state and local governments. He asked these questions:
Are we to believe that this tax is the panacea for our
financial ills? Or if not panacea, is it the best available
fiscal measure to pull us through the present emergency? Moreover, does it have features of permanent
value for Federal, state or local purposes? In particular
what have been the experiences of those governments
which have adopted the sales tax?
These are the same questions policy makers and the public
should be considering in the current debates.
Discussions about National Sales Tax: Just as state governments
were looking to the sales tax as the remedy for balancing budgets, the Hoover administration and Treasury Secretary Ogden
Mills proposed in 1932 a national sales tax, euphemistically
called a manufacturers' excise tax. This proposal encountered
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opposition from Congress because of the tax's regressive nature. Bipartisan opposition, as reflected in this 1933 cartoon,
led to the defeat of the proposal [Kennon and Rogers, 1989, p.
265].
Again in 1942, Treasury Secretary Morgenthau proposed a
sales tax to the Senate Finance Committee, but it was flatly
rejected. Several groups testified before the House Ways and
Means Committee in support of a national sales tax, including
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. The Committee was flooded
with postcards from consumers in opposition. Although some
Republicans favored the sales tax, it was not included in the
Committee bill [Kennon and Rogers, 1989, pp. 301-302]. A national sales tax was thought to be a way to meet the high costs
of World War II as Uncle Sam points out to the Ways and
Means chairman in the following cartoon [Kennon and Rogers,
1989, p. 299]. A 5% "Victory Tax" on income over $624 was
apparently seen as more palatable.
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Curiously, business and labor groups have not shown a
consistent or uniform position toward sales taxes. Supporters
hoped to shift tax burdens from property, incomes, inheritances, or business. Public employees saw the tax as a way to
protect their jobs. Major opposition came from associations of
retail merchants, who were sometimes joined by wholesalers
and manufacturers, labor, and agricultural organizations. However, this opposition was often disjointed. Several agricultural
groups testified against a national sales tax in 1932 but advocated state sales taxes in hopes of decreasing or eliminating real
estate taxes [Blakey, 1935, p. 65].
Again in 1951, when Congress was desperately looking for
revenues to counter an anticipated deficit and increased defense spending, the Ways and Means Committee rejected a proposal for a sales tax. Some form of sales tax had been advocated
by business groups as an alternative to increased corporate
taxes [Kennon and Rogers, 1989, pp. 310-311].
One of the four major tax reform proposals currently being
considered is a national retail sales tax. Senator Lugar proposes
a 17% national sales tax on the retail price of taxable goods and
services [Willens and Phillips, 1995, p. 40].
A study by the AICPA pointed out that state governments
using a retail sales tax exempt many types of goods and services. These exemptions include necessities, such as food, clothing, and housing; certain types of services, such as financial
services and governmental services; and goods and services provided by charities. They increase administrative burdens, escalate compliance costs, and impede economic efficiency. Retail
businesses must decide which items are exempt and then distinguish taxable from nontaxable sales. In addition, most states
provide preferential treatment in the form of tax relief for certain sectors. This complexity results from political considerations. The AICPA study concluded that "there is nothing in the
history of the Federal tax legislative process to suggest that a
Federal consumption tax would be untainted by special interest
provisions" [Sullivan, 1995, p. 13]
VAT HISTORY
Origin of the VAT: Concerning the origin of the VAT, Lindholm
[1980, p. 24] wrote, "the roots of the value-added tax are embedded in U.S. economic theory and data." The U.S. has imported most of its taxes. For example, the income tax was imported from England, the inheritance tax from France, the sales
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tax from Spain and Holland, and the property tax from China
and Europe. However, if adopted in the U.S., the VAT would
not be an imported tax [Lindholm, 1984, pp. 119-120]. The idea
goes back to the 1920s when gross national product (GNP) data
was first gathered. U.S. economists proposed the VAT out of a
desire for a neutral tax that would generate substantial revenues without seriously distorting the resource allocation function of the free market system. The VAT is conceptually a tax on
GNP, the market value of all final products produced in the
economy. When U.S. economists provided the statistics making
it possible to calculate GNP and measure current production
activity, the VAT became the next logical step [Lindholm, 1980,
p. 25].
Crum [1982, pp. 25-42] agreed that the VAT did conceptually and theoretically originate in the U.S. He contended, however, that the VAT emerged m u c h earlier than the 1920s and
provided evidence to support his contention. He argued that the
individual elements of the VAT are traceable to colonial times.
The most active research and discussion on the VAT occurred in the U.S. and, to a lesser degree, in Germany. T.S.
Adams, the father of the 1913 income tax legislation, created
the early climate favorable to the reception of the VAT. His
writings provided strong support for the VAT as the best approach to the taxation of businesses [Lindholm, 1980; Crum,
1984, p. 5]. Adams described the VAT as the most appropriate
tax on business activity and advocated its adoption in 1922
[Trebby, 1990, p. 7].
Adams was not alone in creating a favorable climate for the
VAT. In 1934, Gerhard Colm, a leading U.S. government tax
expert, published an article in Social Research explaining and
r e c o m m e n d i n g the VAT. He also cited the works of Paul
Studensky, a U.S. tax researcher, as providing an ethical and
philosophical foundation for the VAT. This favorable reception
led to the introduction of Senate Bill 3560 on March 11, 1940
by Senator C. Joseph O'Mahoney of Wyoming. This legislative
proposal, although unsuccessful, called for the enactment of a
VAT by the federal government [Lindholm, 1984, p. 121].
History of VAT in Europe: Although the U.S. and Germany were
most active in researching and discussing the VAT as a national
tax, France was the first country to adopt and implement it
[Lindholm, 1984, p. 121]. While Japan passed legislation in
1950 to establish a national VAT, the legislation was repealed
before it became effective [Crum, 1984, p. 5]. France officially
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adopted the VAT on April 10, 1954 to allocate a part of the
business sector's productivity to the public sector [Lindholm,
1980, p. 25]. However, the tax was not truly a VAT because it
extended only through the wholesale level. Denmark adopted
Europe's first true general VAT in July 1967 [McLure, 1972, p.
60].
The VAT then began to sweep throughout the continent.
The rapid adoption of the VAT by European countries was an
important factor in the economic integration process of Western Europe. This process began with the establishment of the
European Economic Community (EC) following the Treaty of
Rome in March 1957. The abolition of all customs duties and
quotas in trade between EC members was an important step
toward a common market. However, the most essential step
was the development of a c o m m o n system of taxes to replace
the various taxes utilized by EC members. The various taxes
were the source of distortion in competitive economic conditions among the member countries [Schiff, 1973, p. 5].
The Commission of the EC established the Fiscal and Financial Committee (FFC), chaired by Professor Fritz Neumark.
The FFC, in the Neumark Report, recommended that all EC
members replace their various taxes with a VAT that was identical in structure, rates, exemptions, and other details to every
degree possible [Schiff, 1973, pp. 5-6].
All members of the EC agreed with the recommendation.
January 1, 1970 was established as the target date for VAT
adoption by all members of the EC [Crum, 1984, p. 5]. Table 2
reports the VAT adoption date by selected European countries.
Some m e m b e r countries adopted the tax before the target date.
The final column in Table 2 is the 1996 standard VAT rate. Note
that all countries have increased their rates, some substantially.
The provision in the Neumark Report calling for uniform
tax rates was considered an infringement of national sovereignty, and the establishment of the tax rates was therefore left
to the individual countries. This resulted in varying rate structures among them both at the point of adoption and subsequently [Schiff, 1973, pp. 6-7].
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TABLE 2
VAT Rates and Dates of Adoption
Selected European Countries

Country

Date of
VAT Adoption

Standard VAT
Rate at Date
of Adoption

Denmark
France
Germany
Netherlands
Norway
Sweden
United Kingdom

July 1967
January 1968
January 1968
January 1969
January 1970
January 1969
April 1973

10.0%
13.6
10.0
12.0
20.0
11.1
10.0

1996
Standard
VAT Rate
25.0%
20.6
15.0
17.5
23.0
25.0
17.5

Sources: Tait, 1988, p. 40 and Ernst & Young
http://www.taxcast.com, 1996.

As to why the FFC in its Neumark Report recommended
the VAT as the c o m m o n tax system, Tait [1974, p. 6] concluded
that "it evolved through successive attempts to reduce the inequities of the cascade turnover tax which was the sales tax commonly used by the countries now forming the EEC." A "cascade
tax," like the VAT, is a consumption-based tax. It is levied when
a sale is made, but it does not allow any deduction or credit for
taxes previously paid. Its effect is cumulative and provides advantages to large integrated business enterprises
[Economist,
1968, p. 58].
While many European countries did have substantial cascade taxes prior to the adoption of the VAT and while most of
the significant problems and defects with the cascade taxes
were in fact overcome with the new VAT, it is possible that the
decision to adopt the VAT was not reached primarily on the
basis that it would pose fewer problems than the unsatisfactory
cascade tax. Another contention is that the decision to adopt
the VAT in Europe was made because of the its universality and
general uniformity, its ability to raise substantial a m o u n t s of
revenue, and its efficiency in terms of dealing with exports and
imports [Cohen, 1971, pp. 399-400].
As the VAT swept across Europe, it became a fashionable
European tax and accounted for an important share of total tax
revenues [Tait, 1988, p. 24]. Table 3 provides information on
the VAT's contributions to total tax revenues for selected European
countries
Published
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countries, VAT revenues, as a percentage of total tax revenues,
remained constant or increased over the period. In France and
Norway, however, VAT revenues fell as a percentage of total tax
revenues.
TABLE 3
VAT as Percentage of Total Tax Revenue
1970-1990
Selected European Countries
Country

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

Denmark
France
Germany
Netherlands
Norway
Sweden
United Kingdom

18.8%
25.5
17.1
14.6
23.8
10.3
0.0

16.9%
23.4
14.6
14.4
20.5
12.0
8.8

22.2%
21.1
16.6
15.8
18.1
13.4
14.4

22.0%
20.0
15.8
16.2
18.2
13.9
15.2

20.7%
18.8
16.6
16.5
18.8
14.9
16.6

Source: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development,
1996, p. 88.

Member countries of the OECD were increasing the reliance on direct taxes from 1965 to 1975 [Tait, 1988, p. 22] Direct
taxes are assessed according to certain taxpayer characteristics.
Taxes based on income levels (e.g., individual income, corporate income, and payroll taxes) are direct taxes. Indirect taxes
are those taxes assessed according to the characteristics of
transactions (e.g.; sales taxes, the VAT, and excise taxes) [Utz,
1993, p. 31].
There was dissatisfaction with this trend of increasing reliance on direct taxes. The VAT, an indirect tax, was proposed
and adopted partially as a means of halting the increase in
direct taxes. France and Norway were less successful in containing the growth in direct taxes [Tait, 1988, p. 22]. In France,
for example, social security taxes on employees and employers,
as a percentage of total tax revenues, increased from 34.2%. to
44.2%. Income taxes increased from 15.8% to 17.3%. In Norway, social security taxes on employees and employers, as a
percentage of total tax revenues, increased from 11.9% in 1969
to 26.2% in 1990 [OECD, 1992, pp. 109, 135].
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History of VAT in the U.S. at the Federal Level: Following the
recommendation of the Neumark Commission concerning the
adoption of the VAT by the EC, interest in the tax again surfaced in the U.S. The Research and Policy Committee of the
Committee for Economic Development, a nonprofit organization of leaders in business and education, studied the VAT in
1966. The committee proposed that the VAT replace the corporate income tax, but the proposal was shelved following m u c h
debate over tax incidence. There was general agreement that
the burden of the VAT would fall on consumers, but the theoretical and empirical uncertainty as to the incidence of the corporate income tax seriously hampered the debate [McLure,
1984, p. 185].
In 1970, P r e s i d e n t Nixon suggested t h a t the VAT be
adopted to replace local property taxes used primarily to finance public education. He appointed a task force on business
taxation to study the VAT [McLure, 1984, p. 186]. The task
force members rejected the immediate adoption of the VAT by
a vote of 13 to 2. However, they also voted that future revenue
needs be met by adopting VAT rather than by increasing corporate and personal income taxes [Lindholm, 1984, p. 121]. Again,
there was debate about tax incidence, but in this case, the debate was over the incidence of the property tax. The proposal
suffered in part due to the administration's diminishing interest
in the VAT as the events of Watergate unfolded [McLure, 1984,
pp. 185-186].
In 1973, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations studied the VAT and concluded that its disadvantages
outweighed its advantages. In 1975, the AICPA issued a report
on a study concerning the VAT. The report cited the necessity
for increased tax revenues but recommended less reliance on
traditional income and payroll taxes. To raise the additional
revenues, the report called for the adoption of a national sales
tax in lieu of a VAT [Trebby, 1990, p. 7].
In 1979, Representative Al Ullman, former chairman of the
House Ways and Means Committee, introduced House Resolution 5665 calling for the adoption of a VAT with a tax rate of
10% [Lindholm, 1984, p. 121]. Ullman supported the VAT as a
means of reducing the federal deficit and as a way of eliminating the corporate income tax [Ullman, 1984, pp. 226-227]. Congressman Ullman's defeat in the 1980 congressional elections
could be interpreted as an indication of the VAT's lack of popularity among the electorate [McLure, 1984, p. 186; Trebby,
1990, p. 7].
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In 1988, Senator Hollings proposed a 5% VAT. The proposal provided that half of the VAT revenues would be used to
reduce the national debt. Food, housing, and health care were
to be excluded from the tax base [Chiu and Siegel, 1989, p. 3].
In September 1989, the GAO issued a briefing report on VAT
policy issues to the U.S. Congressional Joint Committee on
Taxation. The report pointed out arguments in favor of and
against VAT but contained no recommendations [GAO, 1989].
Interest continues in the VAT at the federal level. The VAT
was suggested as a method of financing the health care reform
proposals of the Clinton Administration. Although the VAT idea
was temporarily abandoned, it has resurfaced as reform measures are being discussed in Congress. House Ways and Means
Committee Chairman Archer supports the VAT as a means of
encouraging savings and investment [Willens a n d Phillips,
1995, p. 39]. A VAT could also generate significant revenues to
reduce the budget deficit [Norton, 1993, p. 77]. A recent study
issued by the AICPA reviewed a n u m b e r of current proposals
regarding flat taxes and consumption taxes, providing information a b o u t how each of the different a p p r o a c h e s operates
[Sullivan, 1995, pp. 1-10].
History of VAT in the U. S. at the State Level: There has also been
c o n s i d e r a b l e i n t e r e s t in the VAT at t h e state level. The
Brookings Institution recommended the adoption of the VAT in
Alabama in 1932 and in Iowa in 1933. Although neither state
adopted it, interest continued at the state level [Lindholm,
1980]. Hawaii used a VAT-type business excise tax in the 1930s
[Ebel, 1991, p. 305].
In 1953, Michigan became the first state to use the VAT
when it adopted the business activities tax (BAT), a "subtraction" type VAT. The value of each business enterprise's contribution to the total output of economic goods and services was
the conceptual base for the tax [Papke, 1960, pp. 350-351]. The
BAT was levied on the business enterprise's adjusted gross receipts in excess of $12,500. The tax rate was 0.775%. For a
"subtraction type" VAT, the base for taxation is calculated by
subtracting the amounts paid to suppliers from gross receipts
[Reinstein et al., 1990, pp. 589-590].
After seven years of experience, the BAT was deemed successful from an administrative viewpoint and as a revenue provider. However, the tax was viewed as unnecessarily limited in
scope and somewhat inequitable due to its various exemption
provisions.
It was also argued that the $12,500 exemption did
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/15

128

et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 1999, Vol. 26, no. 1
120

Accounting Historians Journal, June 1999

not provide adequate relief for small business and resulted in
an unfair burden on that sector [Papke, 1960, p. 358].
The Michigan legislature repealed the BAT in 1967 and
replaced it with a corporate income tax. The corporate income
tax was replaced in 1975 with the single business tax (SBT), an
"addition type" of VAT. The SBT was enacted to reduce fluctuations in tax revenues and to provide a more stable basis for
taxation [Reinstein et al., 1990, pp. 589 591].
Officials believe that Michigan's VAT is achieving its intended purpose. David Kirvan of Michigan's Department of the
Treasury reported that the VAT has been very successful in
increasing revenue stability [Hanlon, 1993, p. 307]. Jay Wortley,
senior economist with Michigan's Senate Fiscal Agency, agreed
that the VAT was m u c h more stable than the corporate income
tax [Davenport, 1993, p. 310].
A legislative committee formed to conduct a comprehensive
study of Michigan's VAT found that representatives of smaller
businesses were opposed to it. The central complaint was that
the VAT placed a heavy burden on labor-intensive businesses.
This discouraged employment and disproportionally favored investments in capital. Other complaints centered around high
compliance costs and complexity. Representatives from banking, automotive companies, and other larger businesses supported continuation of the VAT. They contended that the VAT is
a stable source of revenue, adds stability to the tax structure,
and is more equitable than the taxes it replaced [Nowak and
Engerer, 1993, pp. 564-565]. The legislature, with support from
business groups including large and smaller businesses, responded by lowering the rate to 2.3% and raising the filing
threshold to $250,000 [Kleine and Cummings, 1994, p. 17].
In 1965, Louisiana incorporated a value-added tax element
in its tax structure [Due, 1991, p. 272]. Manufacturers, wholesalers, jobbers, suppliers, and brokers of tangible personal
property receive advance payments of sales tax on sales to retailers [Chiu and Siegel, 1989, p. 4]. The retailers then receive
credit for the amount of the advance payment against the sales
tax liability based on retail sales. Several states have adopted a
value-added element in the tax structure for contractors [Due,
1991, p. 272].
Other states have seriously considered the VAT. The West
Virginia legislature adopted the VAT in 1970, but the governor
vetoed the enacting legislation [Lindholm, 1980]. The governor
of Nevada proposed a modified VAT as a business activity tax
as part of his budget for the 1991-1993 biennium, but the legisPublished by eGrove, 1999
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lature voted it down [Brown, 1991, p. 1]. The Texas State Controller proposed a Texas Business Tax, similar to Michigan's
SBT, which would repeal the state franchise tax and replace it
with the VAT [Brown, 1991, p. 8]. The Constitutional Drafting
Committee of the Florida Tax and Budget Reform Commission
proposed a constitutional a m e n d m e n t to replace the corporate
i n c o m e tax a n d o t h e r taxes w i t h a VAT [ T o w n s e n d a n d
Ferguson, 1992a, p. 461]. The governor of Florida prepared
draft legislation to impose a VAT for tax years beginning after
July 1, 1993 [Townsend and Ferguson, 1992b, p. 222], but the
Florida legislature failed to enact the governor's proposal
[Townsend and Greene, 1993, p. 890].
Lessons from European Experiences with the VAT: A Brookings
Institution study indicated that European countries have successfully utilized different rates for different classes of goods
and services and zero rating and exemptions to convert a tax
that in its simplest form is regressive with respect to income
into a tax that is slightly progressive [Aaron, 1981, pp. 7-9]. The
study also indicated that the switch to the VAT was less costly
for both business firms and tax agencies because most European countries had an existing sales tax and a collection structure already in place [Aaron, 1981, viii]. Since most states have
an existing sales tax, the adoption of a national VAT could piggyback the states' collection efforts and reduce collection costs
than otherwise would be the case. Bannock's [1990] study of
the administrative cost in Europe pointed out that smaller businesses will bear a relatively heavier burden than larger ones.
P r o b l e m areas e n c o u n t e r e d by E u r o p e a n c o u n t r i e s in
adopting a VAT included agricultural products, nonprofit organizations, sales of secondhand goods, and financial institutions. Most European countries have either exempted these
problem areas or have provided lower rates [Aaron, 1981, pp. 912].
In looking at the question of increased public spending, the
European experience was examined by a recent study presented
at the 1996 North American Tax Policy Conference. This study
indicated that the VAT did not become a money machine and
that, while the overall tax burden increased somewhat from
1970-1990 for the European countries, the increase was due to
i n c r e a s e d c o r p o r a t e i n c o m e t a x e s a n d n o t to t h e VAT
[McGowan and Billings, 1996].
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SUMMARY
State governments and the federal government are facing
severe budget and fiscal problems. Policy makers examining
alternatives for tax reform view the VAT as an attractive option
for restructuring tax systems.
Although the VAT conceptually originated in the U.S.
where it was first proposed as a national tax, France and Denm a r k were the first countries actually to adopt and implement
the VAT.
A European commission recommended the adoption of the
VAT by all EC members starting in 1970. Since that date, the
VAT has spread across the European continent and is spreading
all over the world. There are many lessons to be learned from
the extensive European experience. Transition to a new tax system is difficult. Exemptions and multiple rates are necessary to
combat regressivity, but they complicate administration and
compliance. VAT rates in Europe have all increased, some substantially. As usual, once a new tax is enacted, the rates will be
increased over time. The political costs of increasing a consumption tax, which can be passed on to others and is more
hidden, are not very high.
Following the commission's recommendation of the VAT
for EC members, interest in the VAT was rekindled in the U.S.
It was recently mentioned as a revenue source to finance the
health-care proposal of the Clinton Administration or as a way
to reduce the deficit. Congressman Archer of Texas proposed
the VAT as a means of encouraging savings by taxing consumption.
Past experiences suggest that the best chance to pass a VAT
tax at the national level is to replace or reduce an existing tax or
to meet a temporary emergency. The public will have to be
persuaded by these arguments.
The federal income tax and the IRS are currently very unpopular in the U.S. Politicians are focusing on this unpopularity. Reported horror stories from irate taxpayers have generated
considerable public debate and caught the politicians' attention. Restructuring of the IRS now has the support of the
Clinton Administration. Several measures providing an IRS
oversight board have been introduced in Congress. Perhaps the
purpose of the IRS-bashing is to make it more politically expedient to replace an unpopular income tax with a more hidden
consumption tax. Blakey's warning should be heeded.
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The background provided in this study could provide insight into the problems that have occurred in the development
of the VAT. Policy makers, having such knowledge when considering VAT as a possible revenue source, could make more
informed decisions in comparing VAT with a sales tax. This
review of the historical development shows that there are numerous and complex issues requiring careful study.
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USING DISTRIBUTION COSTS IN
DECISION MAKING AT THE DENNISON
MANUFACTURING COMPANY,
1909 TO 1949
Abstract: Early in the 20th century, predating most academic and
practitioner literature, Dennison Manufacturing's top management
recognized that certain kinds of distribution costs, normally treated
as part of general overhead and allocated based on prime costs,
were highly relevant for product-costing and pricing decisions. They
pulled as many identifiable direct costs of distribution as possible
out of the general overhead pool and assigned t h e m to the appropriate product lines as extra information for the managers of those
lines. However, these off-book assignments of costs were not fully
understood and caused misunderstandings for m a n y years. New archival evidence allows us to see the frustrations of managers who
wanted to understand and use this information and how they attempted to solve these problems.

Dennison Manufacturing Company, now a subsidiary of
Avery-Dennison, was founded in the mid-19th century. During
the first half of the 20th century, the period of this study,
Dennison manufactured a range of paper products including
tags, boxes, holiday goods, crepe paper, and seals and labels.
Dennison produced some five or six thousand items within
those p r o d u c t lines, half of t h e m special orders a n d half
throughput, for a varied customer base. Vollmers [1993] discussed the company's treatment of distribution costs (both order-filling and order-getting costs) based on published articles
by Dennison's statistician, E.S. F r e e m a n [1929, 1933]. The
company's efforts within the area of distribution costing ap-
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peared to be on the cutting edge of this type of cost analysis.
The subsequent discovery of materials from the company's
archive relating to order-filling costs, dating from as early as
1909, enriches that previous research and is the focus of this
work. Order-getting costs, such as advertising and sales expenses, were handled quite differently by the company because
of their speculative nature and are therefore not considered in
this paper.
First called "supplementary" and later "secondary" costs by
company managers, order-filling costs arose from the clerical,
warehousing, filling, packing, shipping, and collection activities
on customer orders — costs incurred both prior and subsequent to the manufacturing process. Some of these costs, managers discovered, were material in size and could be directly
traced or were reasonably allocable to commodity (product)
lines. Accordingly, Dennison's statistical and accounting departments put an immense effort, in terms of personnel and time,
into tracing, analyzing, and distributing these costs to achieve a
better understanding of both how they were driven and to
which commodities they were attributable. The purpose of this
research is to describe the evolution of this work at Dennison
and to highlight the problems the firm faced. The work begins
with a brief description of the Dennison archive, followed by a
literature review, the Dennison story, and a conclusion.
THE DENNISON ARCHIVE
The archive of Dennison M a n u f a c t u r i n g is located in
Framingham, Massachusetts, in a storage room in the administration building of the company. Where once the company employed professional historians to maintain and develop the
company's archive, it has now sunk to quite a low state. The
room is filthy, doubtlessly accelerating the deterioration of the
delicate onionskin paper used for correspondence. The documents are probably only being preserved because nobody is
interested enough to discard them. There is no general indexing
system for the collection as a whole. Files, however, are in file
cabinets; some are even organized alphabetically. The materials
used in this study were found in manila file folders entitled
"Secondary Costs," "Costs," "Costing Conference," and "Accounting Committee Minutes." The contents of these files overlap considerably. The researcher cannot depend upon all references to a desired topic being contained in any one folder.
Other file drawers are dedicated to "Factory Cost Reports" or
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"Treasurer's Reports," organized by date. There are no ledgers
or journals. There are decades of correspondence, annual reports of the company's governing committees, special studies
(e.g., histories of products, a study of business cycles) coordinated and/or collated by the historians, etc. For a detailed description of the archive, see Vollmers [1998]. Copies of the
memos and reports used in this research are available from the
author.
Archival research is difficult, costly, time consuming, and
subject to substantial biases. There is the bias of preservation
(what was saved and why), the bias of choice (what was found
and chosen by the researcher), and finally the bias of interpreting history from one's own perspective. Is it possible to understand the past? Is objectivity possible? The bias of subjectivity
has been the subject of considerable debate in the academy.
Some believe the data will speak for themselves. Others find
this view hopelessly naive and argue that there is no possibility
of r e c o n s t r u c t i n g a n objective h i s t o r y [see, for e x a m p l e ,
Fleischman et al., 1996]. Nevertheless, despite these problems,
archival research is the only method available for approaching
an understanding of how accounting was used, was integrated
into the decision-making process, and was adapted to problems
that surfaced in its environment.
I believe, despite possibilities of error in evidence and error
in interpretation, that the archival journey is filled with fascination and meaningful information. One finds perceptions of the
world and areas of familiarity that differ from one's own. The
researcher discovers surprising techniques and processes. Then
one can ask why. Why did new techniques occur? Why did the
methods change or disappear? Or what was it about a process
that allowed it to survive? Even if one's interpretation is misinformed to some degree, it may be that the information found
will shed light on the present. If, as this research shows, activity-based costing was being used, what conditions were present
that led to its adoption? Why did it not spread to other firms?
Will the activity-based systems now in use disappear as did
those of this earlier period or have technological advancements
solved some of the problems that earlier complex systems
faced? Finally, of course, archival research can be fun.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Although Dennison Manufacturing's managers were surely
not the first to turn their attention to distribution costs, their
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interest appears to have arisen spontaneously. If it were comm o n or noteworthy for any company, practitioner, or academic
to examine or discuss them, it was not reflected in contempor a r y l i t e r a t u r e (1900-1920). Chatfield a n d V a n g e r m e e r s c h
[1996, p. 210] reported that only two articles on distribution
cost and selling expense appear in the Accountant's Index from
1910-1919 and, indeed, that seems to be the case. If there are
more articles on the topic, they are not indexed in such a way
that they can be easily identified. One of the two, Frazer's 1912
article in the Journal of Accountancy, not only appears to be
unique, but the literature did not build on this topic until the
1920s. Frazer [1912, p. 26] said that distribution costs are usually ignored, combined with other expenses, because they are
indirect, "personal and psychological in their character and do
not admit of standardization." Asserting that this treatment was
an error, he categorized distribution costs into the broad headings of "cost of selling," the "cost of storing, packing and delivery," the "cost of collection," and "general indirect expense." He
discussed various methods for allocating these costs to sales
orders and the pros and cons of each. For example, the direct
costs of a sales order, including the materials and labor incurred in packing and shipping, should be assigned to the order, with other costs allocated using a rational method "indicative of the expenditures in the department concerned" [Frazer,
1912, p. 43]. Other literature from the period contains a fair
n u m b e r of articles on keeping sales records of various types
(sales by salesmen, by territories, by customer, etc.) for analysis
purposes, but product or other costing issues are not addressed
[see, for example, Lewis, 1917]. The Accountant (British) committed but one article during the two decades to distribution
costs, stating t h a t "few m a n u f a c t u r e r s have a t t e m p t e d to
analyse selling costs on a scientific basis, and very few retailers
know anything at all about their true expense of conducting
business" [Allen, 1919, p. 58].
Henry Dennison, Dennison's long-time president, joined
the Taylor Society in May 1917 and became its president in
December 1919. Since the Accountant's Index did not include
the Bulletin of the Taylor Society, would this journal be the
source for contemporary thinking about distribution costs? It
was not. The Society's Bulletin, first published in December
1914, did not contain any discussions of product costs or allocations of any kind, at least during its first decade. Members
focused on various issues of efficiency but did not discuss how
to measure it, apart from time-and-motion studies, or how cost
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accounting could contribute to an understanding of this elusive
concept. They may well have considered costing issues among
themselves, but if so, such deliberations did not make their way
into the Bulletin.
In contrast to the silence of the previous two decades, distribution costing literature exploded in the 1920s and the 1930s.
At least 30 related articles appear in the National Association of
Cost Accountants Bulletin (NACA Bulletin), the journal of the
National Association of Cost Accountants, founded in 1919.
Also, beginning around 1925, virtually all cost textbooks came
to include some coverage of the topic, ranging from a few pages
to several chapters [Vollmers, 1993, 1997]. Much of this literature recommended analyzing these costs by customer, channel
of distribution, or territory [see, for example, Van Sickle, 1938].
This seemingly sudden fascination with distribution costs
arose for a variety of reasons. The severe recession of 1920-1921
spurred a general impulse to identify and control costs. Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover requested a study of waste,
and the resulting Report on Waste in Industry, released by a
committee of the Federated American Engineering Societies in
1921, found, among many other things, a correlation between
the large increases in distribution costs and increasing product
variety. Hoover later directed the Domestic Commerce Division
of the Chamber of Commerce to study distribution costs in
various industries. Its series of census results, published in
1929, 1933, and 1935, confirmed the linkage between product
differentiation and a spiraling increase in distribution costs
[Stewart et al., 1939]. Others also recognized that distribution
costs were increasing rapidly relative to other company costs
[Castenholz, 1930; Longman, 1941]. Nevertheless, despite the
advice of government and the apparent response of practitioners contributing to the NACA Bulletin, there is little evidence
that many companies attempted to tackle these rather slippery,
illusive, but expensive costs. In fact, in the introductory notes to
Freeman's [1929] article, the editors of the NACA Bulletin noted
that, to their knowledge, very few efforts in the distribution
area were forthcoming.
An exception was Dennison Manufacturing. E.S. Freeman
[1929, 1933], Dennison's chief statistician, reported in the
NACA Bulletin that, by analyzing cost statistics the company
had retained for years, causes of cost variation could be identified and used to determine more accurate costs and profits by
product line. These efforts clearly presaged activity-based costing. The cost drivers, including weight of the product, n u m b e r
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of orders, and n u m b e r of items in an order, were used to distribute variable order-filling costs to commodity lines. It is difficult to know whether these distributions actually entered the
accounting records. Freeman's comments suggest true book allocations, but one cannot be sure. Earlier, as this research will
show, the distributions were definitely off-book a n d w e r e
meant to provide chairmen with additional information regarding the costs of their product lines. The company's understanding and use of these costs evolved over time. The effort was
substantial, but the results were often unclear and misunderstood.
We will see that it was Henry Dennison who maintained
the m o m e n t u m behind the company's interest in distribution
costs. What brought his attention to this area so early? I believe
the answer lies in his commitment to learning. He was a member of and a contributor to many organizations, including the
aforementioned Taylor Society, the American Economic Association, the Boston Chamber of Commerce, and the Association
for Labor Legislation [Dennison, 1955]. In 1922, always interested in management methods, he formed the Manufacturers
Research Association, a consortium of companies that contributed personnel and financial resources to maintain a research
staff for studying and sharing information about management
methods. He was also a trustee of the research organization,
the Twentieth Century Fund, from 1926 until his death and was
vice chairman of the International Management Institute of
Geneva, Switzerland from 1927-1933. Henry Dennison's business and political views, as well as the company's efforts in
many areas, were frequently published and presented to interested groups. Early on, his progressive opinions on profit sharing, put into practice at his company, found their way into
publication [Dewhurst, 1915; Dennison, 1918]. The company's
unemployment insurance program, begun in 1916, was the first
in the U.S. His opinions that good management was only possible when the manager was on-site and that financial or absentee m a n a g e m e n t was bad, almost by definition, were wellk n o w n [Forester, 1912; Dennison, 1915]. His theories a n d
efforts to smooth out business cycles were widely published
[Dennison, 1922a, 1922b; Feldman, 1922].
Dennison and other company executives frequently contributed to the NACA Bulletin. The reader should note that articles included in the NACA Bulletin and the Bulletin of the Taylor Society were typically t r a n s c r i p t s of p r e s e n t a t i o n s at
meetings. Managers and others interested in cost accounting
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issues or in solving other business problems attended these
meetings to learn from one another. This commitment to contributing to and learning from peers is undoubtedly the source
of Dennison's examination of cost behavior in his own firm and
the reason why he continually tried to put that understanding
to use. The unique problems of distribution costs were very
likely discussed informally at these meetings of managers and
cost accountants, despite the absence of written evidence.
Modern literature on distribution costing has been relatively sparse. Anderson [1979], in an historical piece, reported
on some of the methods of distribution analysis favored by
early writers. Lambert and Armitage [1979] criticized the academy for not teaching distribution costing, handicapping practitioners by leaving them oblivious to a major area of costing
difficulties. Rarely do cost or management textbooks more than
mention the topic. Miller and Vollman [1985] drew attention to
the explosion of overhead costs supporting factory operations.
These costs are caused or driven by structural activities, not by
output. Continuing to accumulate and allocate these costs using
direct labor hides them and allows them to increase. Bridging
the academic and the practical is an excellent research study by
Schiff and Schiff [1994]. Their literature review, which ignored
the rich literature of the pre-1950 period, showed that distribution costing was very topical in the 1950s and 1960s but disappeared from the literature in the 1970s and 1980s. It has reemerged in the 1990s in a small n u m b e r of articles which use
activity-based costing as a framework for analysis. They have
also included case studies of three firms that attend closely to
their marketing costs [Schiff and Schiff, 1994, pp. 9-19]. Foster
et al. [1996] recognized that profitability depends not only on
the unit factory cost of a product but also on the marketing,
distribution, and customer services required. Hence, they recommended an activity-based costing approach to these other
areas using drivers such as purchase orders, n u m b e r of shipments, and n u m b e r of invoices. Very recently, a series of short
features by Cooper and Slagmulder [1998a, 1998b] have encouraged cost management beyond the factory walls and beyond the firm; that is, looking at costs and drivers that include,
but are not limited to, both the order-filling and order-getting
components of distribution costs. These feature articles are
theoretical in nature and do not explain how the ideas might be
put into practice.
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A HISTORY OF SECONDARY COSTS
AT DENNISON MANUFACTURING
The Dennison archive contains a n u m b e r of m e m o s and
reports on the topic of secondary costs spanning many years.
Their existence shows that managerial recognition of these
costing problems occurred very early, predating known publications in journals and textbooks. The effort to manage and understand these costs continued for many years but, contrary to
Freeman's matter-of-fact presentation in his 1929 and 1933 articles, the in-house treatment of the costs confused many of the
company managers for whom it was intended. Dennison's experience contributes to our understanding of why it appears that
few companies tackled their distribution costs or, perhaps, why
some of those that did failed to maintain interest after an initial
effort. The clerical and analytical commitment was huge and
the results ambiguous.
The earliest applicable company records are two virtually
identical 1909 m e m o s from the c o m p a n y ' s C o m m i t t e e on
Records and Accounting — Dennison Manufacturing was managed largely by committees — to two executives referencing
order-filling and other overhead costs. It reported that the current overhead allocation policy of distributing all general expenses aside from factory overhead using percentages based on
prime cost was misleading. "This condition of things...is very
undesirable as it consistently makes our best quality goods appear to cost more and our cheaper quality of goods less t h a n
they actually do cost." 1 Since the company relied heavily on
special, customized orders (about 50% of its total production),
it was enormously important that managers be able to estimate
costs well so that they could establish competitive and realistic
bids. They proposed to mitigate the problem by changing the
method of overhead allocation. They said that while productive
labor hours seemed the most theoretically appropriate method
of allocation, those statistics were not readily available. The
next best choice, they decided, was an allocation based on productive labor dollars. Labor rates, unlike the costs of materials,
did not differ significantly among products; therefore, the distribution would be more equitable. The Committee proposed
that the new method of allocation be adopted in February 1910.

1

Compare Johnson and Kaplan [1987, p. 22]: "Costs get distributed by
simplistic measures .. . and . . . systematically bias and distort product costs at
the individual product level."
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Although there was no attempt to differentiate between
costs with different behavioral characteristics or, using modern
terminology, different cost drivers, the Committee did understand the problems that arose from the choice of allocation
base. Soon they were to begin looking even more closely at
costs.
In January 1916, accounting manager A.B. Rich wrote to
Freeman that Henry Dennison (then treasurer and director of
works) wanted a report that separately stated the cost of packing cases in calculating the profit on product lines. Packingcase cost had been part of factory overhead, but Dennison recognized that it was largely a direct cost, not one evenly incurred
over all products, and deserving of separate treatment. But how
could these costs be distributed realistically to a vast array of
products? Rich said the firm had on hand the cubic contents of
various case sizes that could be used as standard for different
products. Management might be able to distribute the cost of
cases based on size, specifically cubic inches. 2 Though packingcase costs were direct costs, the logistics of assigning them to
actual products or orders was assumed to be impossible; in
fact, it was never mentioned. Hence, the Rich proposal that
standard costs be adopted for a variety of case sizes was justified. Undoubtedly the cost of tracking all actual costs to products would outweigh the benefit of increased accuracy.
A.B. Rich forwarded a m e m o later in the year from the
Records and Accounts Committee to Henry Dennison for comment, demonstrating the concepts of responsibility accounting
and cost drivers. Rich was concerned about both:
The w a r e h o u s i n g a n d s h i p p i n g w h i c h is d o n e at
Framingham does not seem to be a production expense, and consequently it should be included in the
general selling expenses and not in factory cost. The
more one considers the matter, the more it seems to be
an item the control of which is in the hands of the
selling organization and not the factory management. I
a m speaking of those causes of expenditure which depend on the kind of goods sold — the quantities of
goods sold — the method of selling, whether or not
through rehandling — and all the different methods of
selling policies.

2

This memo was stapled to another piece of paper on which Freeman had
written (probably in 1917) that Henry Dennison wanted more rather than less
expense allocated to products. He wanted to reduce general overhead.
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If some attempt were made to include the extra cost of
warehousing and shipping seasonal goods in the individual costs of the line, I believe truer returns would be
made of the ultimate profit accruing from such items.
Small quantities, if they prevailed exclusively, would
cost more for equal value than large, as the element of
labor employing handling, checking, billing to transportation companies, etc., is far greater than for a few
large shipments.
Dennison's immediate response was mixed, judging from handwritten remarks appearing on the memo. In reference to pulling
warehousing and shipping out of production cost, he wrote: "I
would object on the whole for it would m e a n one more item
removed from basic cost and responsibility left in the air more
or less." He was not opposed to reclassifying costs; on the contrary, he wanted as many costs assigned to products as possible, but he was concerned that reclassifying these particular
costs might remove them from anyone's direct responsibility.
Rich continued to work on this project and, though we never
discover who bore ultimate responsibility for the costs, in a
later m e m o to E.S. Freeman, he wrote that:
He [Dennison] favors our applying [warehousing and
shipping] these items and any others of similar nature
on the basis of the quantities as revealed by the quarterly statistics, thousands of tags etc. . . . and including
with them such items as cost of cases and anything else
that will be more accurately applied in this m a n n e r
than it is at present.
Rich and Dennison had determined that some of these overhead items could be allocated effectively without losing responsibility. The costs were not hopelessly joint in nature and could
be reasonably assigned to particular product lines. They were
also material enough to warrant pulling them out of the general
allocation pool. However, in order to make this assignment,
neither the factory overhead pool (now allocated using direct
labor cost) nor the selling expense pool (allocated on the basis
of total manufacturing cost) could be used. Another method of
allocation was needed and a third class of costs:
This third group . . . may include . . . warehousing and
shipping distributed on a quantity basis and then also
Order Department on the basis of the n u m b e r of orders
and Tracing on the same basis. Possibly . . . Estimating, per estimate, Billing, per order, etc, and all of
these various items might total up to enough to make a
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charge per order or per unit that could be added to
either our Estimated costs or to our regular costs . . .
but would not be added to factory cost as such.
The company accountants began to work on this category
of costs, calling them "supplementary costs." Neither production volume nor sales volume drove these costs but rather, cubic inches, n u m b e r of estimates, and n u m b e r of orders. Soon
the accountants, with the help of company statisticians, had
pooled this third class of costs, allocated them to product lines,
and sent the commodity chairmen (managers of product lines)
off-book information on the supplementary costs of the product
lines for which they were responsible.
Unfortunately, the information was based on averages, so
that although commodity lines (e.g., tags, boxes, and crepe)
were distinguished as were components of lines (e.g., marking
tags and shipping tags), the various sizes and shapes of marking and shipping tags were not differentiated. Because there
was considerable variety within lines, possibly hundreds of tag
varieties, the supplementary information was not of direct help
in estimating or pricing individual orders. This situation led to
a considerable amount of documented confusion that lasted for
years. Despite the best intentions and explanations issuing from
accounting and statistics, some chairmen did not understand
what they were supposed to do with this information and
merely added the supplementary costs to factory costs when
making pricing decisions. Freeman first referred to the problem
in a 1918 m e m o to A.B. Rich. He had discovered that some
chairmen were adding the supplementary cost they had received from his department to all orders, regardless of the size
of the order. For example, a dollar of supplementary cost was
being added across the board to orders ranging from ten cents
to five dollars:
When these [supplementary costs] were made up the
idea was that they should be used by the chairmen, as
a very rough indication of the additional cost applicable. Accordingly very broad averages were used. As a
matter of fact, when the chairman goes to the cost
sheet showing both factory and supplementary costs,
he merely adds the two together and uses the total . . .
one being given equal weight with the other. They tell
me that they are held to a profit not over the factory
cost but over the complete cost. If so m u c h weight is to
be given to these they will evidently require a m u c h
more profound study.
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A.B. Rich wrote to J.P. Wills, sending h i m a copy of
Freeman's m e m o and suggesting that they simply stop sending
the information routinely to chairmen and refer to supplementary costs only when determining policies or when deciding
whether to accept a special order with a very narrow profit
margin. Wills responded that not all chairmen were making this
error and that he was making sure that the others were informed. He wished to continue to receive the information.
In a lengthy 1918 statement, Freeman discussed innumerable supplementary costs and how they varied (cost drivers).
The excerpt that follows is one of nine parts referencing clerical
expense alone:
Costs varying as per item on sales orders:
Scrutinizing the orders when they come in by order
clerk and censor.
Pricing, with selling price and cost (less extra expense on specials).
Typewriting invoices and typewriter supplies used
thereby.
Checking invoices.
Punching commodity statistical cards and the cost
of cards used.
Pricing cost on store bills and inter-district orders.
The excerpt identified the item on the order as what today
would be labeled the cost driver. Other drivers mentioned elsewhere include the n u m b e r of estimates, the volume of business,
and the n u m b e r of customer accounts. Freeman then proposed
reasonable methods of allocation, discussing the difficulties of
each method and the softness of these data. For example, referring to the distribution of shipping labor and overhead costs on
the basis of cubic inches, he said: "The difficulty . . . is the
dispute as to what the real unit is, and the difficulty where the
unit varies within a commodity statistics group. Should the
carton or the box within the carton be the unit when it is quite
customary to split the carton?"
Later, in 1920, Freeman told Dennison that though they
could trace supplementary costs to product lines fairly well,
when the totals were "reduced to averages according to commodity classifications [e.g., tags] and then multiplied by the
quantity shipped it is doubtful if the result is any nearer to the
truth than a percentage on cost." Dennison responded by reiterating the purpose behind the supplementary cost idea:
I believe we can more and more pull out of that great
pool of selling expense items which can be directly alPublished by eGrove, 1999

147

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 26 [1999], Iss. 1, Art. 15
Vollmers: Distribution Costs at Dennison

139

located in one way or another, perhaps a half dozen
ways. We should then ask in our prices that they cover
factory cost, the specific selling costs and a further percentage to cover unallocated costs and our profit.
He wanted to find how costs varied to improve his understanding of product costs and to maximize the reasonableness of the
company's pricing policies.
The only early quantitative data retained from the archive
are contained in a report from the first six months of 1920,
reproduced as Appendix A. It shows that of the $420,420 of
secondary costs, $274,300 was allocated to the five broad lines
or commodity categories. 3 Why $146,120 of the total was called
a "loss" is unclear. The bulk of the secondary costs (63%) is
attributable to warehousing and shipping and the remainder to
various general office expenses. This a p p o r t i o n m e n t represented an additional 7.7% over manufacturing costs (materials,
labor, and factory overhead — called "primary" in the table).
The total a m o u n t of secondary costs added another 11.7%
above manufacturing costs. The allocations to the five lines
ranged from 5 to 10% of primary costs, evidence that costs had
been allocated differentially. The report also shows, on the second page of Appendix A, how general office expense, which
appears aggregated at the bottom of the first page of Appendix
A, was distributed to stock orders, box orders, and special (custom) orders per sales order and per item in total and per unit.
The total costs of the Credit Department are not shown, but
company accountants assigned $5,250 of those costs to Stock
Orders, $1,620 to Special Orders, Except Box Orders, and $417
to Box Orders. Considerable effort was put into pulling costs
out of general overhead and placing them into the secondary
cost pool. This practice supports Freeman's 1929 and 1933 presentation of how the company handled those types of orderfilling costs.
Further confirmation that these costs were used appeared
in a 1922 report, "Method of Distributing and Figuring Overhead Expenses," by A.L. Hawes of the Cost Accounting Department. The report stated that secondary costs were to be divided
among four factors: 1) stock goods (throughput, not special
orders); 2) Box Division Special Orders; 3) three categories of
other special orders (simple, plain orders; ordinary special

3
At some time prior to this report, the term "secondary" had replaced
"supplementary."
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printed orders; complex or complicated orders); and 4) cubical
inch basis. The first three factors included costs that varied by
item in an order or by work order. The fourth factor included
the cost of packing cases, wrapping material, and some labor
and expense of the warehousing and shipping room which varied with the size of the goods handled. This report listed overhead expenses, categorized as "Secondary Costs," and described
how they were distributed. For example:
The sum of all costs applicable to stock goods [not
customized] is divided by the total of all items of this
class shipped, which gives the cost per item. The number of items is based upon the average quantity order
at one time which are obtained from the commodity
statistics report [a report generated by Freeman's department].
and

;
The cost of packing cases, wrapping material and certain handling labor and expense in the warehousing
and shipping rooms which varies with the size of the
goods handled on the basis of 1000 cubic inches. Total
expense is divided by the total n u m b e r of thousand
cubic inches shipped to obtain the cost per 1000 cubic
inches.

Hawes said that these costs are used to help set selling prices
and, in the commodity statistics reports, to determine the percentages of profit made on various items.
The purpose of these secondary costs continued to be misu n d e r s t o o d . In a 1923 m e m o , E. S. F r e e m a n asked T. G.
Portmore, chairman of the Merchandising Committee, to convene a costing and pricing conference to discuss this topic. Despite years of explanations, many people were still mistaking
secondary costs for actual charges to orders rather t h a n as additional information. "It is apparent that at least some . . . have
had the impression that secondary costs were in fact charged to
the orders, and as a consequence it appears that special prices
on non-estimated jobs have been set lower t h a n they would
have been had these people had the correct understanding."
Freeman's frustration is audible:
The widest possible publicity has always been given to
the fact that secondary costs were not entered on the
order. The minutes of the Merchandise Committee
meeting of November 18, 1920, state this fact very definitely. During the year which followed the adoption of
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secondary costs, Mr. C. F. Buckley had charge of Factory Billing Department as well as Sales Billing. That
he must have known the secondary costs were not put
on the order is self-evident from the fact that all the
work of both departments was carried on under his
direction. Furthermore, the fact that 1) Pricing and
Billing were using and understanding secondary cost,
and 2) Pricing and Billing were u n d e r the same chief
clerk, seemed sufficient reason to assume that his successor understood. Factory Billing Department has
long been turning over to the Pricing Department for
investigation all orders priced by Sales Billing which
showed less than 40 percent. This 40 percent was set
by Mr. Howell in a letter to me last May in which the
percentage was specified as 'primary revenue or gross
profit,' which means over factory cost and not over
factory plus secondary. A copy of this was given to
Pricing Department.
It is not difficult to reconstruct the chain of events. The
chairman of the Tag Division would receive the commodity statistics report for his operation. On it would appear a secondary
cost of perhaps 6% on primary costs, an average across that
commodity class. He was expected to adjust that percentage for
types of tags and orders based on his knowledge of the good
and his experience with the sales market. The customized tag
orders clearly demanded more secondary costs on a percentage
basis than did stock orders. However, because he believed that
the secondary costs were charged uniformly to all orders, he set
prices just above factory costs plus secondary cost (1.06 times
factory cost). Hence, on orders requiring special care and handling, price estimates were set too low.
The minutes [1924] of the Committee on Accounting contained a familiar refrain: "Our secondary costs have never been
properly understood and probably interferes with more t h a n
they aid proper judgement as to what selling prices should be."
In view of long, troubled experience with them, Freeman and
two other committee members recommended they be discontinued. At the conclusion of a lengthy 1925 report distributed to
committee members prior to a "Special Costing Conference,"
E.S. Freeman reiterated that recommendation — abandon secondary costs.
Henry Dennison blocked this recommendation. Although
no m e m o to this effect exists, circumstantial evidence abounds.
These costs continued to be calculated and used by the company for many years. Freeman's 1929 article showed that the
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/15
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company not only was still using secondary costs but had by
then standardized them. The standards were used for budgetary
control, for performance evaluation, and for informational purposes on gross profit by merchandise line (a synonym for commodity line). Freeman said that the costs of assembly, packing,
and loading were directly assigned to products. These expense
items were standardized based on a cost per unit varying by
size. Other costs, aggregated, standardized, and called "cost per
item on an order," included those arising from pricing and invoicing, the costs of the factory accounting department, etc.
These costs per item were multiplied by the total items ordered
in a month. The sum of both of these totals, total cost per item
and the total per unit, were added to factory costs to determine
the gross profit per merchandise (commodity) line.
Freeman compiled a report ("Box Line Profit and Loss,"
1928) analyzing the probable effect on income over a n u m b e r
of years of dropping all or a part of the box commodity line.
This keep-or-drop analysis included the differential effects of
secondary costs. They were material in size, representing almost 25% of total costs. "The order-filling costs are estimated
with a fair degree of accuracy. The gross profits or losses after
deducting order-filling costs, can, therefore, be considered as
fairly significant." Though but a single piece of evidence, it
appears that managers used secondary costs in more t h a n one
way.
The last archival reference to secondary cost is a lengthy
report written in 1949 by James Dennison, Henry Dennison's
son, entitled "Interpretation of Secondary Costs for Factory and
Merchandising Personnel." At the outset, J a m e s D e n n i s o n
stated that he had been asked to write the report to explain to
nonaccountants what secondary costs were, their purpose, how
they were calculated, and how they were allocated. He reported
t h a t 38% of warehouse costs, 27% of p r o d u c t i o n - p l a n n i n g
costs, 13% of treasurer's costs, 13% of service costs (correspondence, etc.), 6% of the Box Division's costs (its own shipping and warehousing departments), and 1% of Printing's costs
became Dennison's secondary costs, amounting to $1,220,000
(Appendix B).
The first table of Appendix B, "Distribution by Commodity," shows the assignment of the costs accrued in the support
departments deemed to be secondary. For example, 21.2% of
Outside Warehousing expenses were directly assigned to the
Shipping and Marking Tag Line. Although many of the secondary expenses were to be divided equally among all lines, certain
Published by eGrove, 1999
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lines pulled heavily on the support departments, particularly
the Box Line, the Holiday Line, and the Shipping and Marking
Tag Line. The second table, "Breakdown by Unit of Measure,"
shows how those same dollar a m o u n t s varied. Thus, Stock
Costing expenses were driven 90% by the n u m b e r of items in an
order and 10% by the n u m b e r of orders. The costs of Outside
Warehousing were driven 63.5% by bulk (cubic inches) and the
remainder by the order. He summarized thusly:
What does all this give us? In the first place, we have
an accurate and fair way of allocating the $1,220,000
expense to the cost of our products. We know how
m u c h it costs us to handle orders for each commodity.
By adding that handling cost to the primary and transportation costs, we know the total cost of making, storing and shipping every Dennison item. Subtracting the
total costs from the selling price leaves a balance which
indicates whether or not the item is profitable. This in
itself is justification enough for all the work going into
the preparation of Secondary Costs.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this research was to add some rare archival
evidence to the limited literature on distribution costs. The
many pertinent internal memos at Dennison Manufacturing
show that distribution costs commanded the interest of management for many years. Considerable support was forthcoming to foster understanding and to maintain control over them.
Calculated at least through 1949, statistical records of costs and
qualitative data were retained and analyzed for years. Without
computers, calculators, or easy-to-use adding machines, this
undertaking was a considerable project.
Secondary cost information was to be used primarily for
preparing estimates and making pricing decisions, but at least
one extant report shows that they were also integrated into
differential analysis and later standardized and used for budgeting and performance evaluation. It is strikingly familiar to read
that managers responded to the numbers given to them while
ignoring explanations of how numbers were to be used. This
pattern adds to our growing knowledge about the effect statistics and accounting measurements have on behavior and on the
tendency to privilege numbers over words. The continual difficulties that Dennison's management had with distribution costing, despite strong top management support, partially explains
the rarity with which this type of analysis was applied in other
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/15
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firms, at least in so far as is indicated by the literature.
Managers knew that these costs were driven by factors outside of production or sales volume. They also realized that no
one cost and driver were perfectly or even closely correlated.
Thus, although they decided to distribute certain costs on a
cubic-inch basis, there is ample recognition in the memos that
this approach was not the perfect answer, only that it was superior to their former method of allocating by a percentage of
cost. For example, a large order of the same product certainly
cost less to handle than an order of the same size packed with a
variety of products. Nevertheless, managers thought it was better that the cost assignments be more nearly correct rather t h a n
completely wrong. It is difficult to assess whether Dennison's
handling of these costs greatly improved by 1949 when the last
reference to t h e m a p p e a r e d a n d impossible to d e t e r m i n e
whether their efforts paid off on the bottom line. Clearly, however, the project was still in place, suggesting either substantial
inertia or a strong belief that expanding costing parameters had
benefitted the firm.
REFERENCES
Allen, G. T. (1919), "Costing in Relation to Selling," The Accountant, July 19:
58-59.
Anderson, P.F. (1979), "Distribution Cost Analysis Methodologies, 1901-1941,"
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 6, No. 2: 39-51.
Castenholz, W.B. (1930), The Control of Distribution Costs and Sales (New
York: Harper and Brothers).
Chatfield, M. and Vangermeersch, R. (eds.) (1996), The History of Accounting:
An International Encyclopedia (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc.).
Cooper R. and Slagmulder, R. (eds.) (1998a), "Strategic Cost Management,"
Management Accounting, Vol. LXXIX, No. 8: 16-18.
Cooper R. and Slagmulder, R. (eds.) (1998b), "Cost Management Beyond the
Boundaries of the Firm," Management Accounting, Vol. LXXIX, No. 9: 1820.
Dennison, H.S. (1915), "The Principles of Industrial Efficiency Applied to the
Form of Corporate Organization," The Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science, Vol. 61: 97-103.
Dennison, H.S. (1918), "Why I Believe in Profit Sharing," Factory, March: 424.
Dennison, H.S. (1922a), "Stabilizing Employment in a Diversified Seasonal
Industry," Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, Vol. 9, No. 4:
547-551.
Dennison, H.S. (1922b), "Management and the Business Cycle," Journal of the
American Statistical Association, Vol. 18, No. 1: 20-32.
Dennison, J.T. (1955), Henry S. Dennison: New England Industrialist
Who
Served America (New York: The Newcomen Society).
Dewhurst, M. (1915), "Something Better Than Philanthropy," Outlook, September 1:48-51

Published by eGrove, 1999

153

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 26 [1999], Iss. 1, Art. 15
Vollmers: Distribution Costs at Dennison

145

Federated American Engineering Societies (1921), Waste in Industry (New
York: McGraw Hill).
Feldman, H. (1922), "The Outstanding Features of Dennison Management,
Part 1: Analyzing and Anticipating Cyclical Movements," Industrial Management, Vol. 57, reprint for Dennison Manufacturing.
Fleischman, R., Mills, P., and Tyson, T. (1996), "A Theoretical Primer for
Evaluating and Conducting Historical Research in Accounting," Accounting History, Vol. 1, No 1: 55-75.
Forester, R.P. (1912), "A Promising Venture in Industrial Partnership," The
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 44: 97KB.
Foster, G., Gupta, M., and Sjoblom, L. (1996), "Customer Profitability Analysis:
Challenges and New Directions," Journal of Cost Management, Vol. 10, No.
1:5-17.
Frazer, G. (1912), "The Prorating of Distribution Expense to Sales Orders,"
Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 13, No. 1: 25-43.
Freeman, E.S. (1929), "The Manufacturer's Marketing Cost," NACA Bulletin,
Vol. 11, No. 6: 331-353.
Freeman, E.S. (1933), "Distribution Cost Analysis and Its Influence on Pricing
Policy," NACA Bulletin, Vol. 15, No. 1: 3-37.
Johnson, H. and Kaplan, R. (1987), "The Rise and Fall of Management Accounting," Management Accounting, Vol. LXVIII, No. 7: 22-30.
Lambert, D.M. and Armitage, H.M. (1979), "Distribution Costs: The Challenge," Management Accounting, Vol. LX, No. 11: 33-45.
Lewis, E. St.E. (1917), "Applying the Scientific Method to Sales Management,"
Industrial Management, Vol. 52: 684-696.
Longman, D.R. (1941), Distribution
Cost Analysis (New York: Harper a n d
Brothers).
Miller, J.P. and Vollman, T.E. (1985), "The Hidden Factory," Harvard Business
Review, Vol. 63, No. 5: 142-150.
Schiff, M. and Schiff, J. (1994), Marketing Cost Analysis for Performance Measurement and Decision Support (Montvale, NJ: Institute of Management
Accountants).
Stewart, P.J., Dewhurst, F., and Field, L. (1939), Does Distribution Cost Too
Much? (New York: Twentieth Century Fund).
Van Sickle, C. (1938), Cost Accounting (New York: Harper & Brothers).
Vollmers, G. (1993), "Accounting for Distribution Costs in the Dennison Manufacturing Company during the 1920s and 1930s," Accounting
Historians
Journal, Vol. 20, No. 2: 83-94.
Vollmers, G. (1996), "Academic Cost Accounting from 1920-1950: Alive and
Well," Journal of Management Accounting Research, Vol. 8: 183-199.
Vollmers, G. (1998), "The Dennison Manufacturing Company: An Introduction
to the Company, Its Most Influential President and Its Archive," The Accounting Historians Notebook, Vol. 2 1 , No. 1: 12-13, 35-40.

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/15

154

et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 1999, Vol. 26, no. 1
146.

Accounting

Historians

Journal,

J u n e 1999

Gross
Amount

Per Cent
Gross

APPENDIX A
Secondary Costs - 6 Months 1920
Credits from Commodity Statistics

Lines

Estimated
Selling Price

Primary
Cost

Secondary
Cost

351,600
1,971,800
472,800
703,900
67,100

$

18,000
143,900
37,600
70,400
4,400

$

139,300
944,400
297,700
369,200
36,900

0.396
0.479
0.630
0.525
0.550

Jewelers
Consumers
Dealers
Crepe
Holiday

$

Total
Retail Profit

$5,629,000
$
90,000

$3,567,200

$

274,300

$1,787,500
$
90,000

0.501

Total
Loss on
Purchases
Loss on
Secondary

$5,719,000

$3,567,200

$

274,300

$1,877,500

0.526

Total

$5,719,000

508,900
3,060,100
808,100
1,143,500
108,400

$

$

19,900

$3,587,100

$

(19,900)

$

146,120

$ (146,120)

$

420,420

$1,711,480

0.477

Charges from Expense Accounts
Packing material
Other Dept. 9 Labor and Expense
Dept. 30 Labor and Expense.
Total Warehousing and Shipping
Total General Office
Total (In table above)

$

118,921
87,161
60.560
266,642
153.778
$ 420,420

Distribution of General Office Expense
Secondary costs
Stock Order
Box Orders
Special Orders
Total Per Order
Total Per Item
Total Charged Secondary Costs
Charged to Primary Cost
Charged against Gross Profits.
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Sales Order Basis
$
49,185
5,266
23.933
78.384

Item Basis
$ 18,186
11,784
45,424

75,394
78,384
153,778
25,691
24,129
$ 203,598
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APPENDIX A - CONTINUED
Composition of Secondary Costs: Stock Orders

Credit Dept.
Pricing and Estimating
Planning and Tracing
Billing
Cashier, Ledger & Index
Costing and Tabulating
Filing and Mail
Correspondence
Sales Div. Stationery
Sales Div. Postage
Misc. Expense

Cost for 6 m o n t h s
for 100 M
for 350 M
Sales Orders
Items
$ 5,250
$
-

—
3,615
2,230
9,985
910
4,630
11,290
4,660
5,115
1,500
$49,185

—
350
10,473

—
7,363

—
—
—
—
—
$18,186

Cost per Order or Item
per
per
Sales Order
Item
$0.053
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.036
0.001
0.022
0.030
0.000
0.100
0.009
0.021
0.000
0.046
0.113
0.000
0.000
0.047
0.000
0.051
0.000
0.015
$0.492
$0.052

Composition of Secondary Costs: Special Orders, Except B o x Orders

Credit Dept.
Pricing and Estimating
Planning and Tracing
Billing
Cashier, Ledger & Index
Costing and Tabulating
Filing and Mail
Correspondence
Sales Div. Stationery
Sales Div. Postage
Misc. Expense

Cost for 6 m o n t h s
for 32 M
for 40 M
Sales Orders
Work Orders
$ 1,620
—
5,433
—
9,275
31,304
716
1,842
3,179
—
295
6,845
1,473
—
3,700
—
1,500
—
1,650
—
475
—
$23,883
$45,424

Cost per Order or Item
per
per
Sales Order
Item
0.053
0.000
0.000
0.136
0.290
0.078
0.022
0.046
0.100
0.000
0.171
0.009
0.046
0.000
0.115
0.000
0.047
0.000
0.000
0.051
0.015
0.000
$0.431
$0.748

Composition of Secondary Costs: Box Orders

Credit Dept.
Pricing and Estimating
Planning and Tracing
Billing
Cashier, Ledger & Index
Costing and Tabulating
Filing and Mail
Correspondence
Sales Div. Stationery
Sales Div. Postage
Misc. Expense

Cost for 6 months
for 8000
for 9000
Sales Orders
Work Orders
$
417
0
1,500
—
1,626
5,100
1,924
180
800
—
72
3,260
350
—
919
—
370
—
410
—
122
—
$35,266
$11,784

Cost per Order or Item
per
per
Item
Sales Order
0.000
$0.053
0.170
0.000
0.566
0.203
0.214
0.022
0.000
0.100
0.362
0.009
0.000
0.046
0.000
0.115
0.047
0.000
0.051
0.000
0.000
0.015
$1.312
$0.661
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27,510

40,542

33,263

63,619

Files

Credit

Accts. Receivable

Billing

25,508

59,343

Traffic

Dept. 9

W a r e h o u s e Division

90.0%

29,298

Correspondence

100.0%

100.0%)

85.9%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%)

100.0%

25,998

Stock Costing

4.4%

2.0%

53.8%

13,789

31,830

Order Register

17,639

Box

14.1%

10.6%

10.0%

92.2%

5.0%

5.8%

3.0%

Dealers
Line

2.3%

100.0%

9.1%

Gummed
& Bronze

6.3%

30.0%

82.1%

6.6%

Labels
& Seals
Consumer

0.8%

3.0%

4.8%

0.7%

Crepe

20.0%

50.0%

94.0%)

9.3%

20.3%

Shipping
& Mktg
Tags

10.0%

1.8%

1.8%

Outside
Purchases

148

Electro Storage

100.0%

61,962

Tag

0.2%

16,855

23,533

4.8%

Gum

59.6%)

1.9%

3.8%

100.0%

Holiday
Line

43,768

Box
Line

24,032

Equally
Among
All Lines

Holiday

Label

40,000

$

Christmas W a r e h o u s e

Production Planning
Dept.

Total
Dollars 1948

S e c o n d a r y Expense
Departments

APPENDIX B
S e c o n d a r y Costs - Distribution by Commodity
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32,558

Transcribing

Postage, etc.

% of Total Carried
by E a c h Grouping

Total Dollars

Warehousing

Milford Stk Box

Shipping

Marlboro-Box Division

$1,219,448

16,363

52,107

73,732

24,033

Outside Warehousing

Part Office Expense

52,218

30 Office

131,800

Packing Materials

16,930

89,170

30F

Sales Service

152,048

Total
Dollars 1948

30P

Secondary Expense
Departments

$

60.0%

729,084

$

8.0%

98,155

100.0%

100.0%

31.8%

100.0%

100.0%

0.9%

Box
Line

31.6%

58.0%

100.0%

80.5%

30.6%

81.8%

Equally
Among
All Lines

$
9.0%

112,917

5.4%

20.4%

Holiday
Line

$
2.0%

27,818

15.7%

16.4%

Dealers
Line

$

6.0%

77,499

9.4%

3.5%

19.5%

0.2%

18.2%

Gummed
& Bronze

$

4.0%

45,077

6.4%

Labels
& Seals
Consumer

APPENDIX B (Continued)
Secondary Costs - Distribution b y Commodity

$

2.0%

26,759

8.6%

22.8%

Crepe

$

8.0%

98,202

21.2%

7.9%

9.6%

Shipping
& Mktg
Tags

$

1.0%

3,937

Outside
Purchases
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100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

29,298

27,510

40,542

33,263

41,772

Correspondence

Files

Credit

Accts. Receivable

Billing

20,407

11,869

Traffic

Dept. 9

W a r e h o u s e Division

20.0%

80.0%

21,847

34.4%

20.0%

10.0%

2,600

Stock Costing

5,101

100.0%

31,830

O r d e r Register

80.0%

33,263

15.1%

2,072

84.9%

11,717

Electro Storage

47,474

27,510
40,542

3.5%

617

96.5%

17,022

Box

65.6%

29,298

16.5%

10,255

83.5%

588

51,707

Tag

Holiday

90.0%

97.5%

22,945

2.5%

23,398

11.8%
30.0%

40,000

59,343

25,508

63,619

25,998

31,830

13,789

17,639

61,962

23,533

16,855

43,768

24,032

5,165

$

5,057

2.1%

88.2%

495

70.0%

$

11,798

26.2%

38,603

Production Planning Dept.

Gum

10,474

Total
$ - 1948

Label

$

% Total

Measured Per:

12.1%

61.7%

Unit

97.9%

24,696

% Total

M e a s u r e d Per:
Item

4,830

$

% Total

Measured Per:

Cubic Inch

23,537

$

C h r i s t m a s Warehouse

% Total

Measured Per:

Order

Departments

Secondary Expense

APPENDIX B (CONTINUED)
S e c o n d a r y Costs - B r e a k d o w n By Unit Of Measure (Variable)
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Total p e r Variable

Warehousing

Milford Stk Box

Shipping

Marlboro-Box Division

Postage etc.

Part Office Expense

556,947

46.0%

100.0%

36.5%

100.0%

8,800

32,558

Transcribing

73,732

23.1%

12,056

30 Office

Outside Warehousing

100.0%

16,930

Sales Service

$

Packing Materials

$

100.0%

131,800

451,705

14,563

52,107

37.3%

89.0%

100.0%

63.5%

31.1%

15,233

90.8%

13,978
27,761

30P

138,070

9.2%

% Total

Measured Per:

Cubic Inch

% Total

Measured Per:

Order

30F

Departments

Secondary Expense

$

72,921

20,309

Item

6.0%

38.9%

% Total

M e a s u r e d Per:

$

APPENDIX B ( C o n t i n u e d )
S e c o n d a r y Costs - B r e a k d o w n By Unit Of M e a s u r e (Variable)

130,217

1,800

19,853

10.8%

11.0%

38.0%

68.9%

% Total

M e a s u r e d Per:

61,409

Unit

Total

$ 1,219,448

16,363

52,107

73,732

32,558

24,033

52,218

16,930

131,800

89,170

152,048

$ - 1948
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Accounting History
CALL FOR PAPERS
Accounting in Crises
The contemporary purpose, character and perceptions of a particular craft are
often illuminated and elucidated when its pursuit is implicated in a crisis.
Social scientists have often considered that the functioning of a technique
together with the values and relationships which surround its practice, are
most observable when its deficiencies are located as the source of a calamitous
event. Discourses also surface when practices are impacted upon by exogenous
adversities. Accounting historians have recognised that change in accounting
practice and regulation has often been instigated by high profile failures,
frauds and ensuing litigation. The role of accounting has also been m a d e visible when the discipline and its practitioners have been perceived as repositories of possible solutions to problems which have emerged during periods of
severe economic and military crisis. Total war, for example, has been a catalyst
for considerable change in the accounting profession and cost accounting.
These changes, in turn, have had consequences for wider organisational and
social functioning. The inter-war depression saw accounting feature in the
search for solutions to a crisis of capitalism. The nature of accounting and the
vocation has also been laid bare at times of crisis within the discipline itself.
The object of this special issue of Accounting History is to focus on crisis and
change and on crisis and making accounting visible in contemporary contexts.
Submissions are sought which explore themes such as:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

The impact of particular crises on accounting development and its
practitioners
Crisis, identity and legitimacy in accounting
Crisis and causality in accounting history
Crisis and continuity in accounting history
Crisis and opportunity in accounting
Crisis and revelations of the functioning of accounting
The profession and the management crises.

The above list is not intended to be exhaustive and contributions are encouraged which examine accounting in crises in a variety of times and locales. This
special issue will appear in November 2000. Submitted papers will be refereed
in the usual way.
Submissions (three copies) should be forwarded by 1 February 2000 to:
Stephen P. Walker
Department of Accounting and Business Method
University of Edinburgh
50 George Square
Edinburgh EH8 9JY
UNITED KINGDOM
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ACCOUNTING HALL OF FAME
1998 INDUCTION
August 17, 1998
New Orleans, Louisiana

Remarks, Citation, and Response

ARTHUR
RAMER
WYATT

REMARKS
by
Donald E. Kieso
Northern Illinois University
I have had many fortuitous events in my life. But one of the
most fortuitous was the day I walked into Professor Arthur
Wyatt's graduate accounting theory class. It was September
1958 (almost 40 years ago), and it was my second day on the
campus at the University of Illinois.
I'll never forget Art's first words to me. When he came to
my name, as he called the class role, I was surprised to hear,
"Mr. Kieso, I'll take West Aurora and 7 points." Although Art
and I were complete strangers, I shortly learned that we were
from the same home town, Aurora, Illinois, albiet from competing high schools. I also learned that we both caddied at the
same country club; that I had played fast-pitch softball for
nearly a decade with his younger brother; and that my motherin-law was his mother's childhood friend and neighbor, both
graduating together from East Aurora, my high school. But, up
until that wager, which Art won on Thanksgiving Day when
West High beat East High, we had never met or known of each
other.
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It was Art who persuaded me to apply for a teaching assistantship upon entering the graduate program. He even split his
honors class of James Scholars with me so that I had someone
to teach. Between my masters and doctoral programs, Art persuaded me to apply for a research associate position in New
York with the AICPA where I was promptly assigned to work on
Art's business combination research study project. During my
doctoral program, Art served as my dissertation adviser, and
two years after finishing my Ph.D. program, we coauthored a
book on mergers and acquisitions, which was my introduction
to book writing. He has supported me throughout my career as
a role model, mentor, and friend—as he has done for n u m e r o u s
others—including some in this audience.
Art's service to the profession is well recognized and his
articles and editorials have been widely read. I wish, however,
to salute him for excelling as a master teacher and as an identifier and mentor of promising students. I have always felt that
his transition from a c a d e m e to public accounting, t h o u g h
s m o o t h and extremely successful, was p r e m a t u r e . He h a d
cloned himself hundreds of times in the too few years he was a
professor. Not to diminish what he accomplished in public accounting, but had he remained in academe, he would have enhanced the profession with thousands of additional Wyatt disciples.
I am thankful for the opportunity to have studied u n d e r
and worked my entire career with a person of such intellect and
sound judgment, such devotion to his students and his profession, and such extraordinary integrity.
We have played many games of golf, but I have never beat
or tied him. I cannot resist concluding: "Mr. Wyatt, I'll take my
home course and 18 strokes."

REMARKS
by
Jerry J. Weygandt
University of Wisconsin
I have known Art for close to 35 years. I have read most of
his written work, be it articles or textbooks. I have listened to a
n u m b e r of his speeches, served on committees with him at the
AAA and the AICPA, and socialized with him on m a n y occasions at conventions, conferences, dinners, my home, and, of
course, the golf course. Like Don Kieso, I a m one of Art's many
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students. He has been my mentor, and everything that Don said
about Art goes double for me.
I believe we would all agree that Art is a remarkable individual. He is a leader; he has vision; he has character; he is
persuasive; he is intelligent; he is articulate; he is good-humored; and, as a result, he is just great to be around. My wife
calls him the Renaissance m a n because he can discuss intelligently so many different subjects. As they would say in the
sports world, which Art knows quite well, Art is a superstar.
And his record of professional accomplishments shows that:
numerous articles, presentations, textbooks, superb classroom
teacher, leader of Arthur Andersen's accounting principles
group, chair of AcSEC, chair of IASC, president of the AAA, and
board member of the FASB. And that, in my view, is why he
belongs in the Accounting Hall of Fame.
But Art is better than a superstar in my book. He possesses
a unique set of qualities: a sense of commitment, a sense of
responsibility, a sense of caring about the institutions he serves
and the people involved in these institutions. Art participates,
Art gets involved, Art makes things happen.
For example, he loves the University of Illinois. If there is a
more loyal alumnus of the U. of I. and the Department of Accountancy, it would be a shock to me. What a wonderful goodwill ambassador for the University. He supports it generously
with his time, expertise, and financial resources. His recent efforts to help secure the funding for the new Arthur Andersen
building on campus is a wonderful illustration of his dedication
to the University.
Art views his responsibilities as a teacher to go beyond just
presenting content. Art cares about his students. He tries to
help them. Don is a case in point, and I a m another. One of the
luckiest days of my life was when I walked into his auditing
class at the University of Illinois in the fall of 1963. It did not
take long before Art had helped me secure a teaching assistantship which started me on the path of a masters degree. And
then Art discussed the Ph.D. program, and here I a m today.
Heaven only knows where I would be without his advice and
help.
You might think Art would slow up a little and rest on his
laurels at this point in his career, but that's not the case. When
Art was making the transition back to teaching at the University, I tried to get him to visit Madison for a few days. He told
me that he could not come—he had to cut back on both his
social and golf activities because he had to spend the summer
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/15

164

et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 1999, Vol. 26, no. 1
156

Accounting Historians Journal, June 1999

getting ready for class. That is the type of person Art is.
And his efforts continue to pay off. Last year at the convention in Dallas, Bob Elliot and I were talking about his recent
visit to the U. of I. Bob had spent some time with the student
body, and one thing he learned very quickly—the students love
Art Wyatt.
And, of course, Art has a strong loyalty toward Arthur
Andersen, which gave him the opportunity to move from academics into practice. He always seemed enthusiastic about his
work there and his interactions with his Andersen colleagues.
My sense is that his colleagues enjoyed the interaction every bit
as m u c h as Art.
Art is a superb academic and a great practitioner. He is a
role model for many. He is a wonderful h u m a n being. Congratulations Art for your induction into the Accounting Hall of
Fame. It is greatly deserved.

CITATION
written by
Daniel L. Jensen
The Ohio State University
read by
Donald E. Kieso and Jerry J. Weygandt
A m a n of principle and conviction, known for his independence and clear thinking, he helped shape the accounting
profession in both national and international spheres through
distinguished careers in both academe and accounting practice.
At the age of five, he was struck by a car while crossing a
street in his home town of Aurora, Illinois. The doctors told his
parents that the fractures in his right leg were so serious that he
might never walk again. Fortunately for this top-notch golfer
and enthusiastic supporter of athletics, the leg mended and recovered fully. Working as a caddy, he learned to play and love
golf and also met a n u m b e r of public accounting partners who
kindled his interest in an accounting career. During high
school, a teacher recognized his boredom with an accountingbookkeeping class and enlisted him in maintaining the accounting records for the school's 45 student organizations and also
initiated his teaching career by arranging for h i m to teach accounting to a local businessman.
He graduated from high school on a Friday in June of 1945
and entered the University of Illinois on the following day in
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order to get one semester of college out of the way before being
drafted. Of course, the war ended that summer, and he was not
drafted until 1955 when he began two years of service in the
Army. Describing his undergraduate experience, he notes, "The
decision to start school when I did was fortuitous, as I never
had a teaching assistant or an instructor. They were all off
fighting the war. Also, I got a semester ahead academically
which permitted me to take lighter schedules in the spring semesters when I was on the golf team."
Upon completing his baccalaureate degree in accountancy,
he was persuaded by Professor Cecil (Tee) Moyer to enter the
masters program and accept a teaching assistantship. "The
world was backwards," he recalls. "I should have been paid to
undertake graduate work; the teaching I would have done for
nothing." Because he enjoyed the classroom so much, he decided to obtain a Ph.D. which he received in 1953, u p o n
completion of a dissertation titled, "The Influence of Tradition
in Accounting." In 1952, as his Ph.D. program concluded, he
began 15 years of assistance to the University's golf coach—who
had been his coach during undergraduate days—by working
with the players and traveling with the team. He also had success as an amateur golfer during these years, winning club and
local championships.
Following completion of his Ph.D. degree, he joined the
Accountancy faculty at the University of Illinois where he
strongly influenced g r a d u a t e a n d u n d e r g r a d u a t e s t u d e n t s ,
authored many books and articles—including his classic study
of accounting for business combinations—and progressed to
the rank of full professor. Except for two years in the Army, he
remained at Illinois until 1966. In June of that year, he left to
begin a second c a r e e r in p u b l i c a c c o u n t i n g w i t h A r t h u r
Andersen & Co., becoming a partner just two years later. He
joined the firm's accounting principles group, working under
the leadership of George Catlett. When Catlett retired, he assumed leadership of the group which had responsibility for the
firm's basic accounting policies, a role in which he was distinguished for his independence of thought and soundness of judgment.
In 1973, he was appointed to membership on the Accounting Standards Executive Committee of the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA); he chaired the committee from 1977 to 1979. He served on the Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Council from 1978 to 1981 and the
AICPA Board of Directors from 1980 to 1984.
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In January 1985, he left Arthur Andersen & Co. to become a
m e m b e r of the Financial Accounting Standards Board, where
he served until his resignation in November of 1987. Upon returning to his firm, he was appointed by the AICPA as the
United States representative on the International Accounting
Standards Committee. He chaired that committee from July
1990 until January 1993 and is widely credited with laying the
groundwork for a new era of international cooperation in the
development of accounting principles.
His extensive record of contributions to organizations includes service as president of the American Accounting Association, vice-president of the AICPA, and m e m b e r of countless
committees and boards of professional groups, community organizations, and businesses. He is also a tireless worker on
behalf of his alma mater, the University of Illinois.
When he retired from Arthur Andersen & Co. in 1992, he
returned to the University of Illinois where he teaches senior
accounting students. He resides in Champaign, Illinois, and
spends his winters in Florida. His enthusiasm for golf has led
him to sponsor several young professional golfers, and he attends a n u m b e r of major golf tournaments every year. He is the
61st member of the Accounting Hall of Fame, Arthur Ramer
Wyatt.

RESPONSE
by
Arthur R. Wyatt
Arthur Andersen & Co., retired,
and University of Illinois
I am certainly most thankful for the electors who felt the
various aspects of my career warranted selection to the Accounting Hall of Fame. I must say that this is an honor I never
expected, and when I studied the list of prior selections, 35 of
whom I know or knew personally, I was really quite a little
uncertain that I fit the mold. Even so, I a m both pleased and
honored to be here today to join truly select company.
I have often been asked how I became interested in accounting. Neither of my parents went to college, b u t their top
priority was to see that my brother and I were able to get a
college education. Their sacrifices, especially during the depression years, led them to achieve their goal. My father was selftaught in accounting, and as a youngster I found the books he
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studied from, circa 1920, to be a bit fascinating. When it came
time to enter high school, he insisted that I enter the college
preparatory curriculum but that I not take courses in Latin,
which my father had found useless. My high school had never
permitted that combination, but my dad insisted. The result
was that I took a bookkeeping course as a sophomore and an
accounting course as a junior (and Spanish in my last two
years).
I graduated from high school on a Friday in June of 1945
and entered the University of Illinois the following day in order
to get one semester of college before being drafted. My expressed objective at that time was to become a CPA and work
for a large accounting firm (large being relative, of course, as
Arthur Andersen had only 25 partners when I entered college).
Of course, the war ended that summer, and I actually finished
my Ph.D. before entering the Army.
I also had entered Illinois with the hope of playing intercollegiate golf. Freshmen were eligible then—war years—and I got
my first chance as the 8th player on a team of 8 in our second
meet of my freshman year of eligibility. I finished 3rd on our
team that day, and never missed another meet throughout my
four years. I sustained the golf interest through graduate school
and thereafter, had some success in local and regional tournaments, and also helped coach the U. of I. golf team while I was
on the faculty in the 1950s and 60s.
In my junior year I encountered Tee Moyer, the person who
had the greatest impact on my career. Tee was deeply interested
in his students, as many w h o m he taught would agree, and he
has been a good friend and sounding board over the years. He
encouraged me in many ways, particularly to stay on to earn a
masters degree and later to pursue a doctorate. Hi Scovill, then
his boss, offered me a TA position for the 1949-50 school year. I
often said that was when I learned the world was backwards.
They paid me (a modest amount) to teach even though after I
got involved with the teaching, I would have done it for nothing. On the other hand, no one paid me for the graduate work,
but I felt they should have.
Along the way Moyer became the department head and
invited me to join his informal little accounting firm. We audited the two largest businesses in Champaign, and I learned a
great deal in those engagements about professionalism a n d
confidentiality. I also had several courses from A.C. Littleton
right at the end of his career, and his influence on my thought
processes was vital—even though today I a m convinced his emhttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/15

168

et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 1999, Vol. 26, no. 1
160

Accounting Historians Journal, June 1999

phasis on historical cost as a measurement base was misplaced,
but that is another story. I came to appreciate the necessity of
conceptual underpinnings for any reasoning process, an appreciation that served me well both in teaching and in professional
practice.
Moyer urged me to stay on as a full-time assistant professor
in 1953, and I did so (except for two years in the military) until
1966. In 1965, some changing policies in the College of Commerce led me to consider doing what I originally intended to
do—enter the public accounting arena.
I established a contact with Arthur Andersen in 1965 primarily because they had been the most helpful firm some years
earlier when I was involved with an AICPA research project
dealing with business combinations. That project was a real
challenge for a young Ph.D. with very little practical experience.
But, Don Kieso (then a graduate student) and I fought through
masses of data and reached a set of conclusions in 1960 that
still seem sound today.
Andersen laid out four alternative courses for me—recruiting, training, audit practice, and what they called the research
arm. The latter seemed the most challenging to me, the one that
fit best my skills and interests, and it proved to be the right
choice, mainly because it put me in touch with George Catlett,
who became my mentor on the practice side as Tee Moyer had
been in the academic arena. My years at Andersen were both
challenging and rewarding. I can honestly never remember a
day that I didn't eagerly look forward to going to the office. No
two days were alike, and the great people we had in our little
accounting principles group made each day a learning experience.
The transition from academe to public accounting was a
real challenge, in part because I moved over at an advanced
level without the practice b a c k g r o u n d or the institutional
knowledge to support the position. While early on I was irritated by comments such as, "That's just an academic idea," as
time passed I realized that if such a comment was the best
criticism one could make about a proposal, the chances were
that it was really a pretty good idea.
I attended every Accounting Principles Board meeting as
Catlett's associate from June of 1966 until the Board went out
of existence in 1973. When he retired in 1978, I assumed his
responsibilities in the accounting principles area. I often said it
was the best position in the accounting profession. We had
great independence within the firm and dealt with all the leadPublished by eGrove, 1999
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ing-edge issues facing the SEC and the FASB, including expressing the Arthur Andersen position on standards proposals,
both in writing and in oral testimony.
At one APB meeting George Catlett argued that the APB
needed to develop a conceptual framework if it ever hoped to
move away from its ad hoc approach to writing standards. Phil
Defliese and others argued that it was not possible to develop
such a framework. On the plane ride home all of a sudden
George turned to me and said, "By God, we're going to do it."
"It" turned out to be the first conceptual framework and one
that Arthur Andersen was continuing to use, with some modifications, into the 1990s—and may still be for all I know. That
framework had a balance sheet focus and little emphasis on
matching, characteristics of all subsequently developed frameworks.
When a particularly knotty problem hit our accounting
principles group, the first step was to gather all the relevant
information we could. Then we tried to find guidance to a resolution of the issues by reference to the framework. Of course,
many times the position of the client was different from what
we tentatively concluded—otherwise the issue likely would not
have reached our group. At this point we were in as good a
position as we could be in to assess the risk to the firm of
moving away from the conceptually sound position. Sometimes
we assumed that risk as bearable, and sometimes we did not.
To fulfill our responsibilities in the firm, we clearly had to live
the Andersen motto—Think Straight, Talk Straight.
In mid-1984, when I had six years remaining in Andersen
before retiring, Duane Kullberg, then my managing partner and
also the trustee of the Financial Accounting Foundation who
was assigned the responsibility of identifying new FASB members, approached me about joining the Board. I had previously
turned down specific offers on three prior occasions, including
turning down Kullberg the prior year, for a variety of reasons.
But, when your boss twists your arm, and especially when you
have absorbed nearly 20 years of the Andersen culture of stepping up to new responsibilities, it was difficult to turn him
down. Thus, I accepted the position with little enthusiasm and
a real sense of loss for the position I was leaving.
Many people influenced my career at Andersen in a favorable m a n n e r in addition to George Catlett—Norm Olson, Bill
Hall, John March, Bob Mednick, Dave Landsittel, John Stewart,
Dick Dieter, Mike Crooch—and it was hard to leave them. And,
Ed Jenkins and I had been particularly close, being admitted to
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/15

170

et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 1999, Vol. 26, no. 1
162

Accounting Historians Journal, June 1999

the firm together and working on a n u m b e r of projects jointly
over the years. Ed had progressed to a largely administrative
position in our hierarchy and seemed a lot more frustrated t h a n
I was. When I left, he assumed leadership of the accounting
principles group—a great move for the firm as well as for Ed
and his ongoing career.
My time at the FASB was more frustrating than satisfying.
Too many people with interests in the work of the Board were
less concerned with the mission of the Board and more concerned with achieving their own private agendas. My experience with having virtually no interference with accomplishing
our mission at Andersen did not prepare me well for my experience with the Board. The Board members and staff were great
to deal with, but too many outsiders with perceived political
power prevented us from making the progress we could have
made. So, in 1987, I decided to go back to having fun and
rejoined Andersen.
During the summer of 1987, I was in New York to meet
with my friends on the committee of corporate reporting of the
FEI when I accidentally bumped into Phil Chenok on a street
corner. Phil and I had been friends from the APB days in the
'60s, and he was then the head of the AICPA. During the conversation he said he was looking for a U.S. representative to serve
on IASC and asked if I would be interested. After thinking it
over and discussing the possibility with Ed Jenkins, soon to be
my boss at Andersen, we decided this was probably a good
assignment to take on. I then learned that after two and onehalf years the U.S. would take on the chairmanship of IASC and
that I would be put forward for that role. All in all, the five
years with IASC were most satisfying. We were in the midst of
moving IASC forward by strengthening its standards and adopting a conceptual framework. Their work is still progressing, and
while it has several hurdles facing it, the time may well come
when international standards issued by IASC become predominant in the world's markets.
Finally, the end of 1992 came and with it final retirement
from Andersen and completion of the work with IASC. I had
expected that real retirement would be difficult for m e to
handle, so I arranged to return to the University of Illinois to
teach in the fall semesters, then spending the next five m o n t h s
or so in Florida playing golf. People have asked m e why I would
tie myself down with teaching responsibilities when I could be
playing golf all the time. Well, if you play about 150 founds of
golf a year, the marginal benefit of another fifty or so is really
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questionable. I do maintain my interest in the game and a m
currently the sole or principal sponsor for three young golfers
trying to establish careers as professional golfers. In fact, one,
Mike Small, is playing later today in the ATT-Pebble Beach
Classic final round (postponed from February), and if I were
not here, I would be there with him.
I also find that a limited amount of board of director appointments and a limited amount of litigation consulting fit
well with my time availability. Both are fun and are satisfying
without the pressures that the work at Andersen required one
to endure.
My career has been most satisfying and has taken me far
beyond anything I could have envisioned when I started down
the road to become a CPA. I have really had twin interests that
may seem diverse but that have dove-tailed nicely for me. First,
I have tried to develop the same type of deep interest in the
careers of my students and my associates at Andersen that Tee
Moyer had for mine, and I continue to get great satisfaction
from o b s e r v i n g h o w my s t u d e n t s a n d f o r m e r a s s o c i a t e s
progress as their careers unfold. Second, I have tried to develop
as deep an understanding as possible of the conceptual bases of
accounting in relation to the needs of financial statement users
for data that reflect as clearly as possible the economic effects
of business decisions made. Even in practice that process is one
of continual learning, and even teaching, as well, to bring the
level of understanding of line personnel up to the expectations
of a changing professional environment. I have continuously
learned from my associates and colleagues and have increasingly come to respect the essential virtues of looking at issues
objectively, of being independent in reaching judgments, and of
maintaining the highest possible level of integrity.
I am truly honored to be here today to accept this induction into the Accounting Hall of Fame.
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Dale L. Flesher, Accountancy at Ole Miss: A
Sesquicentennial
Salute (Oxford: University of Mississippi School of Accountancy, 1997, 92 pp., price not available)
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Virginia's McIntire School of Commerce, The First Seventy-Five
Years 1921-1996 (Charlottesville, VA: McIntire School of Commerce Foundation, 1996, 170 pp., price not available)
Reviewed by
Kevin F. Brown
Drexel University
To an observer of the current, sophisticated state of the
many programs for business education, these programs may
appear to be inseparable components of their universities. Notable characteristics of such business programs include welldeveloped curricula, organized faculties, consistent student
bodies, and strong ties to the communities which the programs
serve. Given such characteristics, these business programs may
seem timeless, without any beginning. However, these programs did not always exist, and the characteristics which they
display today are the result of development over time. Histories
of such programs communicate how these developments occurred. An understanding of the historical evolution of programs provides an important context for evaluating current developments and challenges. Unfortunately, the body of histories
of business programs is not large. Past contributions to this
literature include C. Aubrey Smith's Fifty Years of Education for
Business
at the University
of Texas [1962] a n d M a u r i c e
Moonitz's History of Accounting at Berkeley [1986]. However,
new contributions are being added to this literature and additional histories can be expected. The purpose of this essay is to
provide a brief review of the content and style of three recent
additions - The University of Virginia's McIntire School of Comhttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/15
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merce by William G. Shenkir and William R. Wilkerson, Accountancy at Ole Miss: A Sesquicentennial
Salute by Dale L.
Flesher, and A History of Accountancy at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign by Norton M. Bedford.
THE MCINTIRE SCHOOL OF COMMERCE
With 141 pages of text, Shenkir and Wilkerson's The University of Virginia's McIntire School of Commerce is the longest
of the three histories. Part I covers the first 50 years of the
McIntire School and takes up about one-third of the text. Part
II, which represents the remainder of the text, spans the next 25
years of the School's history. Appendices list faculty members,
trustees, student scholarships, and awards. While Part I follows
a chronological ordering, the chapters of Part II are divided
among several major themes, such as curriculum, faculty, students, and administration.
Shenkir and Wilkerson begin their history with a fascinating background of the founding of the McIntire School in 1921.
While the study of economics dates to the early years of the
University of Virginia, the effort to include business and commerce in the curriculum began in 1904 with the appointment of
Edwin A. Alderman, the first president of the University of Virginia. Alderman, realizing the potential importance of business
education in a modern economy, brought Thomas Walker Page
to Virginia to establish the economics and commercial curriculum. The first step in this process was the founding of the
Wilson School of Economics, made possible by a $500,000 gift
from Andrew Carnegie. As business practices continued to develop, spurred on by the economic demands of World War I,
Alderman sought to provide more resources for education focusing on business administration and commerce. A gift of
$200,000 by Paul G. McIntire in 1920 resulted in a separate
school for such instruction named in his honor [Wilkerson and
Shenkir, 1996].
As a state institution, the University existed to provide Virginians with an education. However, the University also viewed
itself as competing academically with the prestigious private
institutions of the Ivy League. As a result, the University was
forced to provide exceptionally high educational quality with
comparatively meager resources. The authors provide an example of the concerns about quality in discussing the struggle
to separate the administration of the McIntire School from the
School of Economics in the late 1940s and early 1950s. While
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the accounting faculty lobbied for separation from economics,
the economics faculty argued that separation would lower
standards. The resolution of this issue included the formal
separation of the McIntire School, with its own dean, and the
creation of the Darden Graduate School of Business Administration. Later, in 1971, the McIntire School established its MS
in Accounting program, followed in 1989 by the creation of an
MS in MIS.
Shenkir and Wilkerson effectively divide the recent history
of the McIntire School into topic areas. This division allows the
authors to present material in detail while maintaining a pleasant, readable style. For example, their discussion of the development of the current curriculum at the McIntire School illustrates how the curriculum has evolved in concert with changes
in the business environment. This evolution is evidenced by the
inclusion of concentrations in management information systems in 1974 and international business in 1994. Interestingly,
Shenkir and Wilkerson also devote two sections of the text to
the planning and funding of the School's infrastructure "Physical Facilities and the Balfour Addition" and "Building an
Information Technology Platform." The inclusion of this material further demonstrates the breadth of this text.
ACCOUNTANCY AT OLE MISS
Flesher's Accountancy at Ole Miss: A Sesquicentennial
Salute follows a roughly chronological ordering through its 90
pages of text. The text is divided into 18 topic areas, beginning
with the heritage of the School of Accountancy and concluding
with a perspective on the School's future with reference to its
current mission and objectives.
The entrance of the accountancy program into the curriculum at Ole Miss in 1917 seems less harrowing than the introduction of business as a discipline at Virginia. However, Flesher
captures the many challenges which the program has faced
since its inception. One such challenge was the integration of
Ole Miss resulting from the civil rights movement. The author
reports that the uncertainty and violence of this process led to
the loss of at least one faculty member to another university.
Inclusion of this difficult period in Ole Miss history gives readers a deeper understanding of the institution.
One of the most interesting achievements is the formation
of the School of Accountancy in 1979. While the introduction of
a business curriculum may have been tranquil, the founding of
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the School of Accountancy was a fierce political struggle. The
idea was considered as early as 1949 by faculty m e m b e r Joseph
Cerny. However, the first real progress began in June 1974,
when the accountancy faculty voted in support of the AICPA's
policy on the establishment of separate schools of accountancy.
Flesher vividly explains the five-year confrontations between
the accountancy department and the dean of the School of
Business Administration, including the dean's threats of employment rejection and tenure denial for proponents of the
separate school. This reaction was not surprising given the loss
of power facing the School of Business Administration if a
separate school became a reality. The accountancy department
responded by pressing the issue with the support of donors who
served on the Professional Accountancy Advisory Council. The
continuing struggle led to the resignation of the accountancy
department chair, who expressed his dissatisfaction with the
dean's opposition in the local press. The director for accreditation of the AACSB joined the fray, warning that the establishment of a separate school might endanger the accreditation of
the School of Business Administration. Ultimately, the accountancy department mustered enough support from alumni and
professional accounting firms to win the endorsement of the
chancellor of Ole Miss. In response to the creation of the separate School of Accountancy with its own dean, the dean of the
School of Business Administration resigned his position.
In his coverage of more contemporary material, Flesher
continues to provide a unique perspective. Discussing the establishment of the National Tax History Research Center in 1988,
the author notes an indebtedness to donors of materials. One
substantial contribution came from an alumnus who salvaged a
wealth of materials nearly discarded by a public accounting
firm.. The inclusion of a brief section on the 1992 reaccreditation review of the Ole Miss doctoral program further illustrates
Flesher's insight. The author succinctly captures the accreditation process and relates how Ole Miss addressed the process.
With characteristic wit, Flesher comments on the conclusions
of the AACSB visitation team, noting, "Although the team concluded that the faculty was underpaid and overworked (which
they already knew), the accreditation report was quite positive"
[p. 52].
Throughout, Flesher conveys a sense of the humanity of the
participants. He tells of the brief service of one faculty member,
Robert Kane, who left Ole Miss in 1950 for a position with the
AICPA in New York. Flesher notes, "Unfortunately, the move
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north was deadly to Kane, as he died while shoveling snow" [p.
8].
ACCOUNTANCY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
A History of Accountancy at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
by Norton Bedford contains seven chapters
totaling 102 pages of text. Each chapter covers a 15-year period,
beginning with 1900 to 1915. The final chapter conveys a sense
of transition from the past to the future in its coverage of the
years 1990 to 2005. Bedford titles each chapter with a theme for
the 15-year period discussed: "The Origin," "The Organization,"
"The Stabilization," "The Standardization," "The Expansion,"
"The Restructuring," "The Future." Four appendices include
listings of faculty, doctoral students, numbers of accountancy
graduates, and the countries represented by visiting scholars
since 1974.
Of the three histories discussed here, the Illinois program
may call forth the greatest amount of interest from the larger
academic community due to the preeminent role which the
University of Illinois plays in the a c c o u n t a n c y discipline.
Throughout the monograph, readers will find evidence of the
efforts that helped build this reputation. For example, Bedford
relates the importance of the early leadership of H i r a m T.
Scovill, an Illinois alumnus, who joined the faculty in 1913. Not
only did Scovill build a high quality accountancy program at
Illinois, he also took on a leadership role in the American Association of University Instructors in Accounting. This leadership
tradition has lead to the current implementation of Project Discovery, a response to the proposals of the Accounting Education Change Commission. Throughout the text, Bedford pays
careful attention to the evolution of the curriculum in concert
with corresponding changes in accountancy theory and practice.
While no history can be exhaustive, readers may wish
Bedford had shared more of his personal insights. Referring to
A. C. Littleton, Bedford writes:
Over the period 1939-1943, A. C. Littleton served as
advisor for all twelve of the first Ph.D.s granted by the
accounting division. He was highly regarded by the
Ph.D. students for his theoretical concepts and analyses. His open faculty office carried the welcome 'Come
In' to which one admiring student added 'and crawl
out' [p. 22].
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U n f o r t u n a t e l y , B e d f o r d w i t h h o l d s a n y e x p l a n a t i o n for
Littleton's apparent ominous reputation. He does, however,
provide readers with a sense of his relationship with Robert
Mautz, his fellow "Gold Dust Twin." In recounting their numerous awards and achievements, the author conveys not a sense
of competition, but a genuine desire to contribute to the success of the Illinois program. Further, the author relates how the
controversial appointment of E. J. Demaris as department head
in 1965 resulted in innovations for the program. However,
Bedford notes, "The task of change was a thankless endeavor
and in 1974, Professor Demaris resigned as Head of the Department" [p. 55]. The change started by Demaris, and continued
under the direction of Bedford as department head, included a
transition in accounting research to respond to the explosive
change taking place within the discipline.
Bedford's history is encyclopedic. Each chapter begins with
listings of faculty serving at the beginning and the close of the
time period under discussion as well as numerous tabular presentations. While this presentation is somewhat less readable
t h a n the Virginia or Ole Miss histories, this approach is not
without merit. Bedford's history will serve as a useful reference
for particular facts about the Illinois program.
COMPARING HISTORIES
One interesting contrast among these histories pertains to
institutional relationships within the respective universities.
Shenkir a n d Wilkerson convey a vivid sense of the early
struggle for recognition for business education at the University
of Virginia. Undoubtedly, scarcity of resources exacerbated this
struggle. However, Shenkir and Wilkerson also demonstrate
how benefactors can positively impact the development of an
academic program. Such a struggle for legitimacy is not readily
apparent at Ole Miss or Illinois. At Ole Miss, the University did
not threaten the accountancy program. Rather, the School of
Business Administration attempted to block the establishment
of the School of Accountancy. Like Shenkir and Wilkerson,
Flesher includes recognition of donors who support the Ole
Miss program. In the case of Illinois, the author's emphasis
differs from both McIntire and Ole Miss. Bedford conveys a
sense of the tremendous efforts put forth by the faculty in forging and maintaining the discipline at Illinois. Also, the a u t h o r
portrays the Illinois faculty as providing leadership in national
academic organizations. However, Bedford places less emphaPublished by eGrove, 1999
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sis on the organizational dynamics which transpired between
the accountancy area and the university administration at Illinois. Further, donor support appears to be an inevitable consequence of program excellence. This difference might lead to an
interesting debate over the relationship between program excellence and financial support.
Another contrast can be found in the choice of material
presented by the authors. The McIntire history is not as exhaustively detailed as Ole Miss and Illinois. This observation should
not surprise readers. While both Flesher and Bedford focus
solely on accountancy, Shenkir and Wilkerson have a broader
scope of coverage. The other business disciplines included in
the McIntire School require Shenkir and Wilkerson to adopt a
more parsimonious approach. This parsimony is also illustrated
when comparing the presentations of the development of curricula. In summary, while each history exhibits different presentation choices, those choices exhibit a sensitivity for the nature of each program.
There are also similarities among the three histories, including rich collections of photographs of buildings, students,
and faculty. Such photographs allow the reader to associate a
visual image with the individuals who played roles in these
histories. Also, the works have broad appeal not only to the
academic community but also to those interested in the educational needs of their community.
Perhaps the most important similarity to consider when
comparing these histories is the role of the authors at these
institutions. All of the authors have made important contributions to the success of these institutions and thus have participated in the histories which they have documented. This
"participant as historian" model offers advantages and disadvantages. As eyewitnesses, the authors are able to report information unavailable to other historians, and their close relationships with other participants may result in greater candor.
However, experiencing particular events as they take place may
bias an author's characterization of those events.
Given the dearth of histories of business programs, these
histories provide an important contribution to scholarship in
this area. Moreover, as business and accountancy programs
continue to mature, one should expect that more institutions
will develop histories to provide constituencies with greater insights. As new histories are written, the pioneering efforts of
Professors Bedford, Flesher, Shenkir, and Wilkerson will serve
as a foundation upon which to continue to build this literature.
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Gary John Previts and Barbara Dubis Merino, A History of Accountancy in the United States: The Cultural Significance of Accounting, 2nd edition (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University
Press, 1998, 577 pp., $55.00)
Reviewed by
Richard G. Vangermeersch
University of Rhode Island
Reading this book is a thoroughly enjoyable experience.
While the first edition [1979] was a fine effort, this second
edition is a m u c h more academically rich achievement. The
second edition has an overriding theme of the importance of
property rights and its corollary in accounting, the proprietary
theory. Reflecting the a u t h o r s ' a c a d e m i c a n d professional
growth, the second edition is critical but hopeful. Likewise, the
second edition is m u c h richer in its historical discussion, reflecting Previts' experience in team teaching the history of
American industrial enterprise, his presidency of the Ohio Society of CPAs, and his leadership role in the American Institute of
CPAs; and Merino's long involvement with the critical school of
historical thought. The authors took a m u c h broader view of
the field in this edition. For instance, the topic "Cost and Managerial Accounting" had 14 pages noted in the index for the first
edition, while "Cost Accounting" had 70 pages and "Management Accounting" had seven in the second edition. The authors
are also to be commended for highlighting the importance of
the political nature of accounting in the United States.
The deepening of this second edition is also reflected by the
following comparisons in Table 1.
Published by eGrove, 1999
181

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 26 [1999], Iss. 1, Art. 15
Book Reviews

173

TABLE 1
Comparison of Editions
Periods
Chapters

Ed. 1

Ed. 2

Intro.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Notes
Bib.
Index

1492-1775
1776-1826

1492-1775
1776-1826

1827-1865

1827-1965

1866-1896

1866-1896

1897-1918

1897-1918

1919-1936

1919-1945

1937-1966

1946-1972

1967-1978

1973-1995

Pages
Ed. 1 Ed. 2

0
15
23
28
55
65
48
53
30
18
33
10
378

10
21
31
40
72
60
63
51
78
52
80

# of Notes
Ed. 1 Ed. 2

6
7
5
15
46
34
13
13

4
7
9
15
114
157
97
23

139

426

12.
577

Within the overriding theme of the importance of property
rights, Previts and Merino developed major topics in their chapters. The reviewer noted nine of these topics. The "bottom line"
is introduced early on and becomes the focal point for the concluding paragraph of the text. The second is the ambivalence of
accountants in defining in a uniform m a n n e r a cash-like statistic of earnings within the traditional framework of accounting.
The third is the Progressive movement in which accountants
play important roles in increased efficiency in government and
industry, in regulation of large businesses, and in income taxation.
The fourth is the topic of accounting for goodwill, springing from the watered stock arising from mergers and new issues of securities. The fifth is the "New Deal" and its actual
effect on the development of financial reporting. The long-lasting, historical-cost allocation model is the sixth topic.
The seventh stresses the political, rather t h a n the theoretical, basis for determining accounting principles. The secondclass role of accounting for the not-for-profit sector, in relation
to the private sector, is the eighth topic the reviewer noted. The
ninth is the hopeful role accounting does and will play in both
the national and the international arenas. The development of
these nine topics within the overriding theme of property rights
adds m u c h continuity and readability to this book.
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The excellence of this edition notwithstanding, the reviewer
offers these points for consideration. The first edition, coming
off the exciting U.S. bicentennial movement and somewhat less
academic in nature, may have had some appeal to accounting
practitioners. The second edition probably will have less appeal
to them, except for those in leadership positions with professional bodies. Also, our students are generally considered to be
less knowledgeable in U.S. history than 20 years ago. In the
reviewer's opinion, this means that adopters of this edition as a
text will have to devote some time to developing a proper
knowledge base for the historical discussions. Perhaps adopters
may consider either team teaching from the book with a history
colleague or, at least, asking for help in developing a reading
program for the course.
The second edition should be used as the basis for the
capstone course in a 150-credit-hour program. Every Ph.D. student in accounting should read it, as well as every accounting
professor. This reviewer looks forward to the continuous development of the third edition.

Robert B. Williams, Accounting for Steam and Cotton: Two
Eighteenth Century Case Studies (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1997, 282 pp., $57)
Reviewed by
Joann Noe Cross
University of Wisconsin Oshkosh
The title of this book is, unfortunately, terribly misleading.
Although it is true that it touches on accounting for steam and
cotton, it does so m u c h more that steam engines and cotton
cloth become mere footnotes to the main theme. This book is
really about providing a historical and biographical perspective
on the development of cost accounting techniques and their
contributions toward advancing the British Industrial Revolution.
The book has three major sections. The first and second
chapters are an intriguing synopsis of the economic history of
manufacturing and the role accounting played in the evolution
of business from selling to manufacturing. The first chapter
carefully outlines the environment that encouraged the development of the factory system, the core of the Industrial RevoluPublished by eGrove, 1999
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tion. The second chapter, entitled "The People," considers the
individuals who developed the principles of costing and cost
accounting within that factory system. More than that, however, this chapter describes the cultural factors which motivated and molded these individuals. Many of those factors, such
as the scientific tone of the Enlightenment and the role of dissenting religious views, become obvious once the author explains their somewhat obscure relationship to factory management and accounting.
The third and fourth chapters consider the specific contributions and embryonic development of cost accounting practices by Samuel Oldknow and James Watt jnr. It is from these
chapters that the book gets its title. Samuel Oldknow embodied
the character of the Enlightenment. He was a rationalist and a
religious dissenter and as a result focused m u c h of his energy
on experimentation with industrial processes and products. According to Williams "Oldknow was involved with the cotton
industry almost from the time it began its rush to prominence"
[p. 77]. After a brief biographical sketch, this chapter examines
in detail the types of records maintained over the course of
Oldknow's career and highlights the evolution of those records.
As a serendipitous side benefit, the reader gains considerable
knowledge about the history of the manufacture of cotton cloth.
James Watt jnr is the topic of the fourth chapter. Again
beginning with a biographical sketch, Williams contrasts and
compares the preparation of Oldknow and Watt jnr for their
respective positions. Whereas Oldknow was a dreamer whose
inspiration far outstripped his ability to support his dreams,
Watt jnr had been raised specifically to manage his father's
businesses in a systematic and rational way. The chapter then
turns to the organization of the Soho Foundry and the development of the detailed cost records used by James Watt jnr in
setting the prices for his steam engines.
I found this book exciting and engaging. It is easy to read
and certainly fulfills its intention of describing the foundations
of cost accounting in the early Industrial Revolution. Its primary benefit, however, is the elegant way the author draws the
reader into the story as a participant in the activities described.
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Xie Shaomin, Accounting Evolution in China, 1949 to 1994
(Chugoku no kigyokaikeiseido) (Tokyo: Soseisha, 1997, 461 pp.
(published in Japanese), $43)
Reviewed by
Yang Yuqi, Nihon University
Hiroshi Kawakita, Toa University
Yoshiro Kimizuka, Denkitsushin University, Emeritus
This book works to clarify the history, the status quo, and
the unique characteristics of the Chinese Business Accounting
System (CBAS) since 1949, w h e n the People's Republic of
China (PRC) was born. To the best of our knowledge, it is the
only systematic book on the modern accounting history of the
PRC. The author, Xie Shaomin, was born in the PRC and is
now an associate professor at Shizuoka Seika College in Japan.
From 1986 to 1989, prior to earning her doctorate in 1995 in
Japan, she was an assistant professor of finance and economics
at Shanghai University. We cannot but admire her efforts as
well as her talents that enabled her to master the intricacies of
the Japanese language and complete this wonderful work in
such a short period of time.
Dr. Xie Shaomin outlines her objectives in the preface: (1)
to introduce the CBAS objectively and in its economic and social contexts; (2) to grasp the character of the CBAS as it reflects accounting methods for state enterprises; (3) to understand trends through comparison and analysis of financial
statements; (4) to hypothesize that the CBAS is a subsystem of
public finance; that is, that that system evolved in response to
changes in the distribution of economic profits; and (5) to explain how the new accounting system reflects a change in accountability from the government to the business entity itself.
This ambitious work is divided into two parts - the development of the Chinese accounting system and the internationalization of that system. The three chapters in Part I describe
the development of the planned economy following the revolution in 1949, the socialist market economy since 1979, and the
socialist market economy since 1993 when CBAS, CPA Law,
and Company Law were published.
Some of the interesting facts from Part I include the problems caused by the Great Cultural Revolution (circa 1966 to
1977), creating disorder similar to the disregard for accounting
practice following the 1917 revolution in Russia [Chapter 1].
Later, when the PRC reopened diplomatic relations with the
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U.S. in 1979, economic innovation and the open-door policy
resulted in numerous changes in accounting regulations. The
ensuing trend towards separation of management from ownership introduced new forms of business as part or all of state
enterprises were put out to contract, leased or sold to employee
groups [Chapter 2]. As a result, the weight of state enterprises
in the gross products decreased from 78.5% in 1979 to 4 8 . 1 % in
1991, while that of group-owned enterprises increased from
21.5% and 38.0% respectively [p. 148].
Unfortunately, this reorganization of state enterprises was
accompanied by the disappearance of enormous amounts of
state assets as the hasty privatization bred private profiteering
and hopeless disorder (similar to what has occurred more recently in Russia). It was estimated that between 1982 and 1992,
100 million yuan evaporated every day. Eventually, systematic
accounting regulations, including standards of business accounting and finance, were introduced, including the modern
concepts of GAAP, double-entry bookkeeping (assets = liabilities + capital), accounting for bad debts, and LIFO inventory
cost flow. Accounting thus played an important role in the rationalization and modernization of the Chinese economy, resulting in renovations in numerous social and cultural institutions [Chapter 3].
Part II discusses the internationalization of CBAS and includes chapters on accounting for joint ventures, foreign investments, and equity-based enterprises. Though familiar in the
West, these concepts were novel for accountants in the PRC.
The efforts to establish Business Accounting Standards (BAS)
began in 1988 at the Finance Ministry, though the Chinese Accounting Association had formed a research group the preceding year. A specialist on International Accounting Standards
from the World Bank also participated in the standard-setting
efforts. BAS became law on July 1, 1993. In Part II, Dr. Xie
Shaomin also makes numerous comparisons between the Chinese accounting system and those of Japan, the U.S., and the
IASC.
In our opinion, this extraordinary effort is a nonperishable
fruit. Certainly, Dr. Xie Shaomin has made a notable and lasting contribution to the study of Chinese accounting history.
The abundant information and the many tables and figures
help make intricate relations and unique terms understandable.
Her earnest, wholehearted devotion to inquiry realized an
abundant harvest, one that is professional, coherent, and readable.
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" . . . but you gods will give us/Some faults to m a k e us
men . . . " (Antony and Cleopatra 5:1, pp. 32-33). There may be
no perfect writings without any demerits, and we find a few
questions to be unresolved even in this work. First is the insufficient narration on the groundwork of socialism. As far as we
know, socialist modes of production are built on the planned
economy and state ownership of the means of production. A
mere contrast of balance sheet items does not justify one of the
author's vital conclusions, that the nature of "traditional" Chinese accounting is a combination of public accounting and individual business accounting. We think the composition of the
balance sheet is reasonable regardless of historic stage, such as
feudalism or socialism, but the contents differ remarkably according to ownership.
Our next question derives from the first. Dr. Xie Shaomin
regards the accounting system under the planned economy as
"traditional," but, as we read her description of the accounting
books published in the PRC, the Soviet model appears to be the
prototype of the Chinese "traditional" system. Evidence of this
perception is the absence of any model to be applied to the
socialist economy just after the revolution. Readers will not
easily understand the meaning of "traditional" in this respect.
The second question leads us to the last. What is the difference between the early CBAS and the Soviet accounting system? We wish to know the differences, if any.
Despite the above comments, Professor Xie has bequeathed
a monumental treasure to research in accounting history. The
historians will say to her, "xie xie" (pronounced "shie shie,"
meaning thank you in Chinese).
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